Sunset review – Queensland's Biosecurity Regulation 2016

Consultation Impact Analysis Statement

May 2026

DELIVERING FOR QUEENSLAND

Queensland Government

The Department of Primary Industries proudly acknowledges Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islander people as the Traditional Custodians of Country. We recognise their continuing connection to land, sea, waters and sky. We pay our respects to them, their cultures and their Elders past and present, and commit to ongoing reconciliation.

The Queensland Government is committed to providing accessible services to Queenslanders from all culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds. If you have difficulty in understanding the *Sunset review: Queensland Biosecurity Regulation 2016*, you can contact us for assistance, and we will arrange an interpreter to communicate the report to you.

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Glossary

Term	Definition
ABGC	Australian Banana Growers' Council Inc.
ADG Code	Australian Dangerous Goods Code
AFB	American foulbrood
AFOLA Act	*Agriculture and Fisheries and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024*
AHA	Animal Health Australia
AHB	Asian Honey Bees
AHBIC	Australian Honey Bee Industry Council
AHC	Animal Health Committee
ANZFSC	Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code
BBTV	Banana Bunchy Top Virus
Better Regulation Policy	*The Queensland Government Better Regulation Policy*
Biosecurity Act	*Biosecurity Act 2014*
Biosecurity Act Review	2019 review of the *Biosecurity Act 2014*
Biosecurity Environmental Scan	Biosecurity Environmental scan (2025) by Jason Payne, Margo van Felius and Katie Hail-Jares (Griffith University) and Natlia Hanley (La Trobe University) and Katarina Mikac (University of Wollongong)
Biosecurity Regulation	*Biosecurity Regulation 2016*
BMP	Biosecurity Management Plan
BQ	Biosecurity Queensland
BSE	Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
CEBRA	Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis
CGMMV	Cucumber green mottle mosaic virus
C-IAS	Consultation Impact Assessment Statement
CoP	Code of Practice
CSIRO	Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (Commonwealth)
DDMRB	Darling Downs–Moreton Rabbit Board
D-IAS	Decision Impact Analysis Statement
DPI	Department of Primary Industries
EADRA	Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement
EHB	European house borer
EPBC Act	*Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cth)
EPPRD	Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
EU	European Union
FMD	Foot-and-mouth disease
FNBZ	Far Northern Pest Biosecurity Zone
GBO	General Biosecurity Obligation
GDA2020	Geocentric Datum of Australia 2020
GPCN	Golden potato cyst nematode

GVP	Gross Value of Production
HGP	Hormone growth promotant
HIN	Hive Identification Number
Human Rights Act	*Human Rights Act 2019*
IATA	International Air Transport Association
IGAB	Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity
KTPs	Key Threatening Processes
LGA	Local Government Area
LPF	Land Protection Fund
MCO	Movement Control Order
MNES	Matters of National Environmental Significance
MNSV	Melon necrotic spot virus
NAQS	Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy
NBBZ	Northern Banana Biosecurity Zone
NBC	National Biosecurity Committee
NEAEP	National Electric Ant Eradication Program
NFAEP	National Fire Ant Eradication Program
NEBRA	National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement
NLIS	National Livestock Identification System
OECD	International Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Panama TR4	Panama disease tropical race 4
PEZ	Phylloxera exclusion zone
PHA	Plant Health Australia
PIC	Property identification code
PIN	Penalty infringement notice
PMS	Parasitic Mite Syndrome
PRSV-P	Papaya ringspot virus type P
PRZ	Phylloxera restricted zone
PSHB	Polyphagous shot-hole borer
Public Health Act	*Public Health Act 2005*
QRFBSP	Queensland Ruminant Feed Ban Surveillance Program
RAM	Restricted animal material
RBE	Registered Biosecurity Entity
RDHB	Red Dwarf Honey Bee
RIFA	Red Imported Fire Ants
Regulatory burden	Obligations or requirements placed on people by regulation, sometimes known as 'red tape'
RSCS	Rural and Stock Crime Squad
SBBZ	Southern Banana Biosecurity Zone
SI Act	*Statutory Instruments Act 1992*
ToBFRV	Tomato Brown Fruit Rugose Virus

TSE	Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy
TPP	Tomato/potato psyllid
VMIRI	Varroa Mite Innovation and Resilience Initiative
WHO	World Health Organization
WOAH	World Organisation for Animal Health
WSD	White spot disease
WSSV	White spot syndrome virus

1. Preliminary

Cluster exclusion fencing for wild dog control © The State of Queensland 2020

Executive summary

Queensland's biosecurity laws serve as a critical safeguard against threats such as pests, pathogens, and diseases that can significantly impact industries, biodiversity, and public health. The state's biosecurity system is essential for protecting Queensland's primary industries, which not only drive the economy but also underpin the livelihoods of regional and rural communities. Beyond economic resilience, biosecurity plays a pivotal role in conserving Queensland's unique biodiversity and natural environment, which face ongoing challenges from pests and diseases. Biosecurity is also vital for safeguarding public health by managing zoonotic diseases and contaminants, ensuring a secure food supply and promoting the wellbeing of Queensland's residents.

The *Biosecurity Act 2014* (the **Biosecurity Act)** establishes overarching principles and high-level rules, while the Biosecurity Regulation 2016 (the **Biosecurity Regulation)** provides detailed requirements, procedures and measures to manage biosecurity risks to achieve the purposes of the Biosecurity Act. This includes statewide entry restrictions, biosecurity zones, permits, codes of practice, livestock traceability requirements, diagnostic test kit requirements, feed and fertiliser labelling, invasive animal board requirements, and prescribing fees. Without these provisions, the state's ability to safeguard industries, environment, and communities from biosecurity threats would be compromised.

The Biosecurity Regulation also supports Queensland's obligations under national biosecurity agreements and frameworks, ensuring consistency with other Australian jurisdictions. This alignment is essential for maintaining market access for Queensland's agricultural exports and upholding the state's reputation as a leader in biosecurity management.

The Biosecurity Regulation is set to automatically expire on 1 September 2026 under the *Statutory Instruments Act 1992* (the **SI Act**) unless action is taken to preserve it. The Department of Primary Industries (**DPI**) is conducting a sunset review of the Biosecurity Regulation, in accordance with *The Queensland Government Better Regulation Policy*, to evaluate whether it is still necessary and fit-for-purpose, while also identifying opportunities to reduce red tape where possible.

This Consultation Impact Analysis Statement (**C-IAS**) recommends the remaking of the Biosecurity Regulation with targeted amendments designed to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency while minimising unnecessary regulatory burden. The proposed amendments aim to address emerging biosecurity risks, streamline regulatory processes, and ensure alignment with national biosecurity frameworks. This document provides a comprehensive justification for the proposed changes, supported by evidence and analysis, and evaluates their potential impacts on businesses,

communities, and government. By balancing robust biosecurity protections with practical, risk-based regulatory measures, a remade Biosecurity Regulation would ensure that Queensland's biosecurity system remains fit-for-purpose, safeguarding the state's economy, environment, and health.

The review has identified several opportunities to improve the Biosecurity Regulation's clarity, efficiency, and effectiveness. Key proposed amendments include:

- **Statewide entry restrictions**: The removal of outdated restrictions for citrus canker carriers and Cavendish-competent Panama disease tropical race 1, as these no longer pose significant biosecurity risks. Updates to the Mediterranean fruit fly carrier list are also proposed to reflect the latest scientific understanding.
- **Biosecurity zones**: The Northern Banana Biosecurity Zone (**NBBZ**) is proposed for removal, as its objectives are now achieved through property-level biosecurity measures and other zones, while the Southern Banana Biosecurity Zone (**SBBZ**) will be retained. Additionally, the Sugar Cane Pest Biosecurity Zone 6 (Woodford Special) will transition to property-specific management under a Restricted Place Declaration.
- **Notifiable incidents**: Additional symptoms of bee diseases will be included to enhance early detection and response capabilities.
- **Apiary distance rules**: The outdated requirement for minimum distances between apiaries and queen bee breeder sites is proposed to be removed.
- **Recognised biological control agents**: Updates to the list of approved species for biological control.
- **Restricted Animal Material (RAM) statements**: Updates to align with nationally consistent labelling requirements for feed manufacturers.
- **Prohibited and restricted matter permits**: Amendments to provide the decision maker with discretion on requiring public liability insurance for permits related to low-risk, non-commercial, or public-benefit activities (e.g. eradication of prohibited matter).
- **Diagnostic testing**: The scope of diagnostic test approvals will be expanded to include nationally reportable diseases, and approval processes for diagnostic kits will be clarified to improve efficiency and alignment with national standards.
- **Test sample packaging**: Strengthened packaging requirements will improve the secure transport of diagnostic samples, aligning with national standards.

- **Miscellaneous provisions**: Provisions for external inspector appointments will be streamlined, with only the Australian Banana Growers' Council (**ABGC**) retained as authorised persons.
- **Administrative efficiencies:** to aid interpretation, update scientific names and correct errors.

This consultation process is a vital step in ensuring the Biosecurity Regulation continues to meet the needs and expectations of Queensland's industries, communities, and environment. Stakeholders are invited to provide feedback on the proposed remake and amendments, in addition to any other matter that DPI should consider as part of the sunset review. This input will inform a Decision Impact Analysis Statement (**D-IAS**), which will set out government's final decision on remaking the Biosecurity Regulation.

Have your say

DPI is seeking stakeholder feedback as part of the sunset review of the Biosecurity Regulation.

The Biosecurity Regulation affects a range of stakeholders including the agricultural, animal, aquaculture, fisheries, transport, environmental, and local government sectors, in addition to the general community. DPI values the input of all stakeholders, which will be used to inform what Queensland's biosecurity regulation looks like in the future.

This information is being collected for the purpose of obtaining feedback on the proposed remake of and amendments to the Biosecurity Regulation and may be used to follow up or clarify information you provide. The information may be grouped with other feedback and published at the conclusion of the sunset review as part of the D-IAS.

Your personal information will not be disclosed to any other parties unless authorised or required by law.

The consultation period will begin on **Friday 1 May 2026** and will be open for a period of 28 days. Consultation will close at **5pm on Friday 29 May 2026**.

There are different ways to have your say:

Lodge a written submission via the survey on DPI's engagement hub website:

https://dpi.engagementhub.com.au/biosecurity-regulation-review

Email a written submission to:

BQconsultation@dpi.qld.gov.au

Post a written submission to:

Biosecurity Regulation 2016 sunset review

Department of Primary Industries

GPO Box 46

Brisbane QLD 4001

For more information, email BQconsultation@dpi.qld.gov.au or call 13 25 23.

Section A
The biosecurity system

Bananas at a Cairns market © The State of Queensland 2020

2. Biosecurity system background

This section of the C-IAS explains biosecurity and describes Queensland's biosecurity system.

Biosecurity is the strategies and actions taken to prevent, manage, and mitigate the introduction, spread, and impact of harmful pathogens, diseases, invasive species, and contaminants. These threats can significantly affect human health, the economy, the environment, and social amenity.

Effective biosecurity relies on robust systems designed to prevent biosecurity matter from entering or spreading, as well as to respond swiftly to detections or outbreaks. These systems are supported by coordinated national and international policies and actions. The most effective and efficient way of managing biosecurity risk in Australia is to prevent its arrival.

Biosecurity is vital for protecting Queensland's key industries, including livestock production, horticulture, aquaculture, fisheries, tourism, and racing, while also preserving the natural environment and native wildlife, and maintaining our way of life. It has been instrumental in ensuring that Queensland and Australia remain among the few places in the world free from some of the most destructive pests and diseases. This provides significant trade advantages and supports market access while maintaining productivity.

2.1 General Biosecurity Obligation

A strong and effective biosecurity system relies on shared responsibility across the community. Under section 23 of the Biosecurity Act, all individuals and organisations that deal with biosecurity matter have a general biosecurity obligation (**GBO**) to take reasonable and practical steps to prevent or minimise biosecurity risks that they ought reasonably to have known about. The success of the framework depends on the awareness, capability, and willingness of individuals, industry, and all levels of government to meet these obligations and act in accordance with the legislative requirements.

DPI has provided strong messaging around shared responsibility, supported by targeted education and engagement, to improve the functionality of the Biosecurity Regulation. This includes ensuring that the regulatory framework and its implementation provide appropriate tools, guidance, and support to enable stakeholders to understand their obligations and take effective action.

Consistent with this approach, regulatory effort is focused on prevention and on promoting voluntary and assisted compliance. This is achieved by providing stakeholders with accessible, practical information and support to help them understand and meet their obligations, thereby reducing the likelihood of non-compliance and improving overall biosecurity outcomes.

2.2 Reasons for biosecurity

Biosecurity broadly aims to address the following challenges:

- the risk of introducing and spreading pests and diseases in Queensland, which could harm the state's environment, economy, or social amenity
- the risk of the uncontrolled spread of high-risk pests and diseases within Queensland, potentially exacerbating damage to the environment, economy, or social amenity
- the risk of introducing and spreading contaminants that could affect biosecurity concerns
- ensuring shared responsibility for managing biosecurity risks across government, industry, and the community
- promoting a fair and equitable distribution of costs associated with managing Queensland's biosecurity risks among government, industry, and the community.

While it is challenging to quantify the full impact of biosecurity measures on Queensland's economy, environment, and social amenity – given the presence of both known and unknown threats with uncertain consequences – it is widely understood that these measures have a positive effect.

Economic impacts

Queensland's agriculture, fisheries, and forestry sectors are the backbone of the state's economy, regions, and communities. In 2023–24, there were 67,100 businesses throughout the supply chain, contributing an estimated $34.7 billion. These businesses employed around 382,000 people, or almost 13% of the Queensland workforce. Of these people, 65,300 people were directly employed in the agriculture, fisheries, and forestry sectors. Queensland's primary industries gross value of production (**GVP**) has risen by 18.3%, from $22.7 billion in 2023–24 to the current forecast of $26.8 billion for 2024–25.[1]

A significant and serious outbreak of a plant or animal disease or a contamination incident could close major export and domestic markets, cause serious economic losses to businesses through productivity declines, damage Queensland's reputation as a major supplier to overseas markets, and lead to significant stakeholder and government spending to resolve (e.g. eradication, containment, and control). A strong, proactive biosecurity system helps prevent pests and diseases from entering, establishing, and spreading, and minimises risks associated with those that are already present in the state.

In 2021, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (**CSIRO**) estimated that invasive species cost Australia approximately $25 billion a year, which was equivalent to 1.26% of the nation's gross domestic product.[2]

[1] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

[2] www.csiro.au/en/news/All/Articles/2021/August/pest-plants-and-animals-cost-australia-around-25-billion-a-year

Environmental impacts

Consistent with worldwide trends, invasive plants and animals threaten Queensland's natural environment and native wildlife. Invasive plant species can have significant impacts on ecosystem function and biodiversity, including:[3]

- outcompeting native species for access to resources such as food, water, and habitat
- predation or herbivory of native species
- alteration of ecosystem structure and function
- changes to species composition and diversity
- disruption of mutualistic relationships
- introduction of pathogens and diseases to native populations
- habitat degradation and fragmentation through reduced habitat quality and barriers to movement.

Human health and social amenity impacts

Biosecurity issues, such as pests, diseases, and pathogens can have significant impacts on human health and social amenity. The introduction and spread of diseases, including zoonotic diseases that transfer from animals to humans, can lead to public health crises, increased healthcare costs, and loss of life. For example, outbreaks of diseases like avian influenza or mosquito-borne illnesses, such as dengue fever and Japanese encephalitis can place immense pressure on healthcare systems and disrupt daily life. Pests and pathogens can also contaminate food supplies, leading to foodborne illnesses and threatening food security, which disproportionately affects vulnerable populations.

Beyond health impacts, biosecurity threats can undermine social amenity by disrupting community activities, cultural practices, and recreational opportunities. For instance, invasive species can damage natural ecosystems, reduce biodiversity, and limit access to outdoor spaces for leisure and tourism. Additionally, the presence of pests or diseases in urban or peri-urban areas can lead to increased anxiety, reduced quality of life, and economic losses for communities reliant on agriculture, tourism, or natural resources. Addressing these biosecurity challenges is essential to safeguarding public health, protecting livelihoods, and maintaining the social and cultural fabric of communities.

2.3 Stakeholders in the biosecurity system

Biosecurity affects a diverse range of stakeholders.

Primary producers, including those in agriculture, aquaculture, forestry, and horticulture, are directly impacted by requirements to manage pests, diseases, and contaminants that threaten production and market access. Transport and logistics providers are affected by movement controls and certification requirements designed to prevent the spread of biosecurity risks. Tourism operators and recreational users rely

[3] www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/995f0bbd-2ed5-4727-a96e-15b5f9fd8abb/qld-invasive-plants-animals-strategy.pdf?ETag=e2fed047ff569d1d26cba84f78b3b354

on biosecurity measures to protect natural assets, such as national parks, beaches, and waterways, which are vital to the state's tourism economy and social amenity.

Local governments play a critical role in managing invasive species and implementing biosecurity programs at the community level. Retailers, wholesalers, and exporters are impacted by rules governing the sale and movement of biosecurity-regulated goods, while importers must comply with entry restrictions to prevent the introduction of harmful pests and diseases.

Additionally, the broader community benefits from biosecurity measures that ensure access to safe food, protect public health from zoonotic diseases, and preserve the environment for future generations. Together, these stakeholders form an interconnected system that relies on effective biosecurity regulation to safeguard the economy, environment, and way of life.

2.4 The Queensland context

Queensland is considered a frontline state for biosecurity due to a combination of unique geographic, environmental, and economic factors. These include:

- the wide range of climatic conditions and ecosystems in Queensland, which are suitable for a wide range of pests and diseases
- proximity to neighbouring countries to the north, providing opportunities for the illegal entry of goods, animals, or vessels that may carry biosecurity threats
- Expansive coastlines – Queensland has the second largest mainland coastline length in Australia, providing more entry points and associated monitoring challenges[4]
- reliance on global and interstate trade, which provide entry pathways for pests and diseases[5]
- being a popular tourism destination (including agritourism), creating risks through increased movement of people.[6]

Snapshot of biosecurity risks in Queensland

In 2024–25, DPI responded to 604 new biosecurity incidents across animal biosecurity, plant biosecurity, and invasive plants and animals.[7] These incidents included:

- 159 notifiable animal diseases, with 15 incidents related to animal diseases listed under the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (**EADRA**)

[4] www.ecat.ga.gov.au/geonetwork/srv/eng/catalog.search#/metadata/61395
[5] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm/export-trade
[6] www.tra.gov.au/en/economic-analysis/agritourism-report#ref4
[7] www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/6dd176e9-c8ae-4a67-9104-e0fea137f331/department-of-primary-industries-annual-report-2024-2025.pdf?ETag=affbeaed7dc1a636452a670cf4784373

- detection of 75 plant pest incidents, including 18 related to emergency plant pests and 57 incidents that were not reported under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (**EPPRD**)
- detection of 370 invasive plants and animals, including five incidents reported under the National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement
- varroa mite (*Varroa destructor*), a parasite of the European honey bee was detected in Australia for the first time in 2022. After a 14-month eradication response, the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (**DAFF**) determined that eradication no longer achievable. In March 2025, varroa mite was confirmed in Queensland for the first time. Since then, varroa mite has been detected at 1,033 premises across 21 Local Government Areas (**LGAs**). Queensland continues to work closely with affected beekeepers and industry to slow the spread, minimise impacts, and guide management practices
- Tomato Brown Fruit Rugose Virus (**ToBFRV**) is a plant disease that affects tomatoes, capsicums, and chillies. Infected fruits can be deformed or ripen irregularly. BFRV was first detected in Australia in 2024 and in May 2025 the National Management Group decided eradication was no longer possible. Queensland issued a Movement Control Order (**MCO**) on 16 December 2025 in response to the presence of the virus in states closest to Queensland. The MCO restricts the movement of ToBFRV carriers, such as tomato plants and seedlings, into Queensland. As of February 2026, no ToBFRV has been detected in Queensland.
- In 2025, a large-scale locust outbreak covered approximately 5.6 million hectares of land. The outbreak spread across Richmond, Winton, Longreach, Barcaldine, and Flinders LGAs. Queensland dedicated $4.5 million for locust control across the state, including areas like Richmond that were not included in the Plague Pest Contingency Fund. DPI deployed a total of 89 staff during the response, with 45 staff members undertaking repeat deployments.

Queensland plays a role in national responses for:[8]

- varroa mite (*Varroa destructor*)
- red imported fire ant (*Solenopsis invicta*)
- red witchweed (*Striga asiatica*)
- electric ant (*Wasmannia auropunctata*)
- Asian green mussel (*Perna viridis*)
- National Tropical Weeds Eradication Program
- white spot disease
- National Exotic Fruit Fly in Torres Strait Eradication Program.

[8] www.outbreak.gov.au/current-outbreaks/browsing-ant

Queensland has established biosecurity programs under the Biosecurity Act for surveillance, prevention, and control related to the following biosecurity matter:

- cattle tick
- invasive biosecurity matter
- invasive fish
- locust
- electric ant
- Red Imported Fire Ant
- Newcastle disease (poultry).

2.5 Macrotrends affecting biosecurity in Queensland

Biosecurity risks are increasing in Queensland. Figure 1 shows the increasing trend in new biosecurity incidents DPI that has responded to since the Biosecurity Act and Biosecurity Regulation came into effect.



Figure 1 Number of new biosecurity incidents responded to from 2014/15 to 2024/25[9]

A key aspect of biosecurity preparedness is the ability to identify and understand current, emerging, and potential biosecurity risks using reliable evidence.

In late 2024, DPI commissioned Griffith University to conduct an environmental scan (the **Biosecurity Environmental Scan**) to determine the key sociocultural factors driving

[9] www.publications.qld.gov.au/dataset/annual-report-department-agriculture-fisheries

biosecurity risks in Queensland.[10] 'Sociocultural factors' were defined as the factors operating at the individual, community, or wider population level to influence behaviours and decisions that affect biosecurity practices.

Five themes of sociocultural drivers were established:

- population movement and growth
- community attitudes and behaviours
- economic and financial factors
- social networks and trust
- other factors.

While biosecurity is, for the most part, considered a sociocultural or behavioural issue, external factors also play a role. These include:

- climate change, where rising temperatures and altered rainfall patterns may enable the spread of biosecurity threats into areas that were previously unsuitable for their survival
- movement of migratory species.

These topics are explored further below, drawing on the key findings of the Biosecurity Environmental Scan and information contained in other key resources.

It is evident that Queensland's biosecurity system must consistently adapt and evolve to effectively prevent and address biosecurity risks, which are themselves constantly changing and emerging over time.

Population movement and growth

Global and domestic population growth presents a range of complex challenges for effective biosecurity management as a result of increased trade pressures, changing land use, and increasing tourism. Generally, biosecurity risks increase with population growth.

Growing global populations increase demand for goods including food and other agricultural products. This means that, on a global scale, we would expect to see more international trade in high-risk industries such as meat, which increases the potential for biosecurity threats to enter Australia through expanded import pathways. In 2024–25, Queensland imported over $3.7 billion worth of agriculture and food products, which was 30.6% greater than the average of the previous five years.[11]

As an example, foot-and-mouth disease (**FMD**) is not present in Australia, however outbreaks are common in Asia, the Middle East, South America, and parts of Africa. In 2022, outbreaks of FMD were reported in Australia's close neighbour Indonesia. Prevention, early detection, and reporting are critical to keeping Australia disease-free, or to rapidly contain FMD if it ever arrived.

[10] dpi.engagementhub.com.au/network-biosecurity/news/biosecurity-environmental-scan
[11] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm/export-trade

Australia's and Queensland's domestic populations are also growing. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australia's population grew by 1.5% in the 2024–25 financial year. In Queensland, the population is projected to grow by a million people over the next decade, at 1.3% growth annually, making it the third-fastest growing Australian state or territory. Overseas migration drives most of Queensland's growth, however internal migration also makes a significant contribution.

Queensland's diverse migrant population has led to higher demand for a wider variety of non-traditional foods sourced from overseas, further increasing import volumes and associated risks.[12] Population growth also results in a broader and more diverse group of stakeholders – including communities, industries, and regions – that must be actively involved in biosecurity risk management.

Queensland's population is also decentralised, split evenly between the capital city (greater Brisbane) and the rest of the state.[13] This creates complexities in managing biosecurity risks over vast geographic areas, including the availability and effectiveness of monitoring and surveillance.

Tourism is an important part of Queensland's economy, however it brings increased biosecurity risks that must be considered. An increase in short-term, transient human movements across the country, combined with potentially lower visitor awareness of Australia's biosecurity system and measures, increases the risk. International tourism to Australia is forecast to grow to 10.9 million visitors in 2030 from 8.3 million in 2024. The fastest inbound growth markets are forecast to be the United Kingdom and China, in addition to Hong Kong, India, Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia.[14] In 2032, the Brisbane Olympic and Paralympic Games will also attract an influx of international visitors.

Community attitudes and behaviours

Community knowledge and awareness of biosecurity risks play a significant role in effective biosecurity management. Individuals may unintentionally contribute to the spread of pests or diseases, overlook or ignore early warning signs, or fail to follow the required prevention or mitigation practices.

The increasing trend of small lifestyle landholders, or 'hobby farmers,' in peri-urban areas introduces new pathways for biosecurity risks. Hobby farming is generally a lifestyle choice, set up at a scale that provides fresh food for household members, potentially saving money and offering therapeutic benefits through animal care and husbandry. Hobby farms are characterised by a small number of livestock (e.g. cows, sheep, goats, chickens, bees) or horticulture on relatively small parcels of land. As hobby farmers do not operate on a commercial basis, individuals may have a reduced understanding of the biosecurity responsibilities involved in animal husbandry or natural resource management, or may engage in alternative or unconventional agricultural practices.[15] These practices may introduce biosecurity risks to commercial

[12] dpi.engagementhub.com.au/network-biosecurity/news/biosecurity-environmental-scan
[13] www.population.gov.au/sites/population.gov.au/files/2026-01/ss-2025-pop-statement-qld.pdf
[14] www.tra.gov.au/en/economic-analysis/tourism-forecasts-for-australia
[15] www.agrifutures.com.au/wp-content/uploads/publications/08-186.pdf

agricultural or livestock operations in close proximity, with possible international trade implications.

To DPI's knowledge, there are no recent estimates of the number of hobby farms in Queensland or at a national level. However, a subset of the hobby farmer population can be estimated by the number of non-commercial registered biosecurity entities (**RBEs**) in Queensland, a requirement that applies to any individual or entity that keeps the minimum threshold number of designated animals (Table 1). Based on these numbers, there are almost 60,000 non-commercial livestock or bee 'farmers' registered in Queensland, making up 44% of all registrations. This estimate does not include hobbyists that do not meet the threshold number of animals, for example, households with less than 100 chickens, which is expected to include a significant cohort, or the large number of people expected to grow backyard fruits and vegetables.

Table 1 Non-commercial vs commercial registered biosecurity entities by designated animal

Registered biosecurity entity – designated animal	Non-commercial registrations	Commercial registrations	Percentage non-commercial registrations of all registrations (%)
Cattle	18,675	38,856	32
Sheep	5,433	5,821	48
Goat	4,378	3,494	56
Pig	2,017	2,200	48
Buffalo and bison	41	103	28
Deer	57	97	37
Camel	118	260	31
Equine (e.g. horse, pony)	14,518	19,575	43
Poultry (minimum 100)	3,515	3,640	49
Other designated birds	177	94	65
Alpaca and llama	689	358	66
Bees (minimum 1 hive)	9,955	97	94
Total*	59,573	74,595	44

*Separate RBE registrations are required to keep bees and other designated animals. Therefore, the total number of RBE registrations may overrepresent the number of unique entities if the entity keeps both bees and another type of designated animal.

Community and consumer preferences for agricultural products can also shape the effectiveness of biosecurity systems. For example, in Australian egg production consumer preference for free-range eggs has increased in response to community expectations of higher animal welfare standards. Traditional poultry farming practices are changing from caged egg production to barn-laid or free-range systems. Free-ranging chickens are more readily exposed to wild bird populations, which are known to carry avian diseases, such as avian influenza. The shift towards more free-range chickens

changes the biosecurity risk profile and highlights the need to ensure biosecurity measures continually evolve.

Economic and industrial factors

The growth of economies amplifies biosecurity risks in supply chains – from bigger and more diversified trade volumes, increased cross-border movement of people and goods, and the expansion of transportation networks. These factors put pressure on Australia's biosecurity system to monitor and survey the multitude of pathways for pests, diseases, and invasive species to infiltrate and spread within Australia. With about 80,000 different combinations of individual commodities and pest and disease pathways for threats to enter Australia, outbreaks can have significant impacts on the economy, environment, or social amenity.[16]

For example, the Asian green mussel, which is native to the northern Indo-Pacific region including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, was detected on vessel hulls and marine infrastructure in waters near Weipa, Queensland in 2024.[17] This invasive species can be introduced through ship ballast water, as biofouling on boat hulls, and through internal seawater systems. Queensland is leading the biosecurity response to prevent and manage potential impacts on native species, marine infrastructure, and human health, recognising that it is now present in Queensland waters.

At a domestic level, Queensland's and Australia's growing population puts pressure on nearly every major system – from housing to energy, transport, healthcare, water, food supply, education, and social infrastructure. Industrial development and intensification of industries to meet these demands often involves large-scale land clearing and construction projects, and concentration of risks, which can disrupt ecosystems, diminish natural buffers that previously restricted the movement of harmful matter, and expose new relatively undisturbed areas to biosecurity threats.[18]

Consistent with worldwide trends, invasive plants and animals are threatening Queensland's natural environment, native wildlife, agriculture, cultural heritage, and social well-being.[19] According to the *Queensland State of the Environment Report 2024*:

> "*Each year, invasive plant species increase in Queensland as more species escape cultivation or get imported. We have eliminated 37 high-risk invasive plant species, with others on track to be eradicated. Sale restrictions and quarantine measures have prevented many more invasive species*."[20]

The abundance and distribution of invasive species depend on many complex factors, but a key determinant is land disturbance (e.g. land clearing, land degradation, and

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[16] www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/6dd176e9-c8ae-4a67-9104-e0fea137f331/department-of-primary-industries-annual-report-2024-2025.pdf?ETag=affbeaed7dc1a636452a670cf4784373

[17] www.outbreak.gov.au/current-responses/asian-green-mussel-perna-viridis

[18] dpi.engagementhub.com.au/network-biosecurity/news/biosecurity-environmental-scan

[19] www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/995f0bbd-2ed5-4727-a96e-15b5f9fd8abb/qld-invasive-plants-animals-strategy.pdf?ETag=e2fed047ff569d1d26cba84f78b3b354

[20] www.stateoftheenvironment.detsi.qld.gov.au/biodiversity/terrestrial-ecosystems/invasive-non-native-terrestrial-flora-species

grazing pressures). The ecological adaptations of invasive plant species mean they are usually amongst the first to take advantage of disturbed sites.

The combined impact of these factors increases the susceptibility of ecosystems and agricultural industries to biosecurity risks. This highlights the critical need for comprehensive and proactive biosecurity strategies that adapt to the changes brought about by economic growth, industrial expansion, habitat disruption, and increasing global connectivity.

Social networks and trust

The international Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (**OECD**) reports that governments around the world are under pressure as they navigate systemic transformations, while contemplating environmental factors such as geopolitical tensions and complex information environments, which combine to create volatility and uncertainty.[21] Public trust in government is primarily influenced by perceptions of competence (the ability to deliver quality public services, manage crises, and make sound decisions) and values-based behaviour (integrity, fairness, openness, and responsiveness to citizens). When governments demonstrate both effective performance and ethical conduct, trust increases; when either is lacking, trust declines. In 2024, the OECD reported that 49% of people over 15 years old expressed confidence in the Australian government, a result slightly lower than the 53% recorded in 2006. This standing is mid-range compared to other OECD countries.

The community's trust in regulators, such as biosecurity authorities, is an important factor in how effective the system operates. Distrust undermines the government's ability to implement effective policies. In the case of biosecurity, distrust could result in undesirable behaviours, such as under-reporting of threats and non-compliance with biosecurity measures, thereby allowing pests or diseases to spread more easily. The Biosecurity Environmental Scan by Griffith University documents several studies that recognise the importance of trust in biosecurity authorities in achieving effective biosecurity governance.

It is also important to recognise that compliance with biosecurity measures varies significantly across stakeholders and can be influenced by a range of factors, including awareness, capacity, and intent. Understanding the different types of non-compliance is critical for designing effective strategies to improve adherence to biosecurity requirements. A lack of awareness or understanding due to complex legislation, inconsistent requirements across government departments or jurisdictions, weak enforcement, or unclear consequences – reduces the effectiveness of regulations.

DPI recognises the importance of partnerships with industry and the community in achieving strong biosecurity outcomes and measures the 'level of satisfaction with biosecurity partnership performance' as part of the annual Service Delivery Statement. In 2024–25, DPI achieved a score of 3.40 out of five, which exceeded the target of >3.0.[22] This result is based on surveys conducted at the Biosecurity Partners' Forum annual

[21] www.oecd.org/en/publications/drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-in-australia_28a876c2-en.html?utm_source=copilot.com

[22] budget.qld.gov.au/files/Budget-2025-26-SDS-Department-of-Primary-Industries.pdf

events, which bring together key partner stakeholders from industry, government, and the community.

'Other' factors

The Biosecurity Environmental Scan also identified some drivers that are not considered socio-cultural factors, including:

- addressing gaps in the biosecurity systems approach, such as analysing trends in the exotic pet trade
- leveraging technological advancements to an advantage.

Climate change

Climate change is expected to significantly increase Australia's biosecurity risks by altering the distribution, behaviour, and survival of pests, weeds, and diseases.[23,24] Rising temperatures, shifting rainfall patterns, and more frequent extreme weather events will increase the likelihood of some pest and disease incursions, expand the geographic range of existing threats, and reduce the effectiveness of traditional control measures.

Migratory species

Many animals travel to Australia and its surrounding waters during annual migrations. The movement of wildlife between countries creates pathways for the introduction of pests and diseases, which are difficult to monitor and control. Notably, migratory birds are known to spread avian diseases, such as avian influenza, which can transfer to native species and domestic poultry farms. Outbreaks of avian influenza have affected Australian poultry since 1976. However, the worldwide spread of a highly contagious strain, known as H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, has been decimating wild and domestic bird populations throughout much of North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Antarctica since 2021. While this strain is not currently present in Australia, jurisdictions across the country are preparing for a potential outbreak.

2.6 Value of biosecurity

Estimating the cost-benefit of Australia's biosecurity system is challenging due to its size, complexity, and the difficulty in quantifying the monetary value it generates and where that value is created. In 2020, the Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis (**CEBRA**) estimated the benefits of Australia's biosecurity system over a 50-year period.[25] The analysis found that, without a biosecurity system, damages from newly introduced pests and diseases could reach $671.9 billion over 50 years. However, with the system in place, these damages could be reduced by $325.3 billion, resulting in a Net Present Value of $314 billion and an average return on investment of 30:1. CEBRA's report highlights

[23] www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/WGII_TAR_full_report-2.pdf

[24] parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportrep/RB000221/toc_pdf/AustralianFoodStoryFeedingtheNationandBeyond.pdf

[25] cebra.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/3535013/CEBRA_Value_Docs_KeyResultSummary_v0.6_Endorsed.pdf

that while there are limitations and assumptions in the bio-economic modelling of the system's value, the results demonstrate clear and significant positive benefits for Australians.

2.7 National biosecurity system

The Australian National Biosecurity System is a collaborative, multi-layered system governed by the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (**IGAB**), which provides a framework for federal, state, and territory governments to work together.[26]

One of the key commitments in the IGAB is that each party agrees to fulfil their obligations and be accountable for their commitments under the emergency response deeds, including agreed financial funding contributions.

Response deeds and agreements are legal contracts between governments and industry, ensuring the fair distribution of costs for preparing for and responding to exotic pests, weeds, and diseases that are detected within Australia and have the potential to impact animal, plant or human health, or the environment.

- The EADRA applies to terrestrial animals (livestock) and poultry. Animal Health Australia (**AHA**) is the custodian of the EADRA and there are currently 24 signatories to the EADRA including all governments, AHA and industry bodies.
- The EPPRD applies to plant pest incursions including grains, horticulture, nuts, and forestry. Plant Health Australia (**PHA**) is the custodian of the EPPRD and there are currently 48 signatories to the EPPRD including all governments, PHA and industry bodies.
- The National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (**NEBRA**) applies to environmental pests, including marine pests and those affecting social amenity. These can include pests such as invasive ants and animals. DAFF is the custodian of the NEBRA and all governments are signatories. There are no non-government signatories.

These documents outline funding and cost-sharing arrangements to enable a rapid response. All parties commit to a national response. Industry is also obligated to reduce the risk of a biosecurity incident.

2.8 Queensland's biosecurity system

In Queensland, biosecurity is managed through a combination of regulatory and non-regulatory approaches. Regulatory settings include enforceable measures such as legislation, with complementary non-regulatory approaches focused on education, awareness, stakeholder and industry partnerships, and community engagement. Together, these approaches encourage proactive risk management and shared responsibility.

[26] www.federation.gov.au/sites/default/files/about/agreements/2019-intergovernmental-agreement-biosecurity.pdf

Regulatory approach

Queensland's Biosecurity Act and Biosecurity Regulation provide the framework to manage biosecurity risks that could harm the state's economy, environment, public health, and social amenity. The framework aims to prevent, respond to, and manage the impacts of pests, diseases, and invasive species.

The Biosecurity Act provides the overarching framework and principles, while the Biosecurity Regulation specifies the practical details needed to implement the Biosecurity Act effectively.

A key concept of the Biosecurity Act is the GBO, which requires everyone in Queensland to take reasonable steps to minimise biosecurity risks within their control, where they ought to have reasonably have known of the risks.

The Biosecurity Regulation is subordinate to the Biosecurity Act, meaning it must align with the Biosecurity Act's objectives and cannot override its provisions. Together, they ensure a comprehensive approach to biosecurity and contaminant risk management, balancing flexibility (through the Biosecurity Act) with specificity (through the Biosecurity Regulation), applied in response to a range of circumstances, conduct, and behaviours.

Queensland employs a comprehensive regulatory framework to achieve biosecurity outcomes. This framework includes biosecurity programs, statewide entry requirements, prohibited and restricted matter lists, Movement Control Orders (**MCOs**), and other regulatory tools to effectively manage and mitigate biosecurity risks.

The Biosecurity Act provides Queensland's overarching framework for managing biosecurity risks that may impact human health, the environment, the economy, and social amenity. It operates alongside, and complements, the *Public Health Act 2005* (the **Public Health Act**) and relevant environmental health legislation, including the *Environmental Protection Act 1994*, with each Act applied according to the primary risk being managed. The Biosecurity Act focuses on prevention, early detection, and control of pests, diseases, contaminants, and invasive species – particularly where animal, plant or environmental risks may escalate into human health impacts – while the Public Health Act governs the management of disease in people and public health emergencies. Environmental legislation addresses environmental harm and ecosystem protection outcomes, including threats to wildlife. Together, these Acts support a coordinated One Health approach, enabling agencies to act within their respective powers while working collaboratively to manage shared risks.

Relationship with Commonwealth legislation

State and federal laws work together to ensure a coordinated approach to preventing, detecting, and managing pests, diseases, and invasive species. Generally, the *Biosecurity Act 2015* (*Cth)* focuses on managing biosecurity risks at Australia's national borders, while the Queensland Biosecurity Act addresses biosecurity risks within the state (e.g. from intrastate movement).

The federal DAFF is responsible for:

- **Pre-border measures** that reduce the likelihood of threats reaching Australia. This includes developing import conditions and requirements, informed by biosecurity risk analyses, in addition to import permitting.
- **At-the-border measures** that safeguard against the arrival of biosecurity threats, including surveillance and treatment.
- **Post-border measures,** including coordinated action using emergency management capabilities involving investigation and compliance action.

The *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)* (**EPBC Act**) serves as the primary national framework for environmental protection, but it does not formally replace or override state and territory biosecurity legislation. Instead, it operates alongside these laws to manage Matters of National Environmental Significance (**MNES**) and invasive species that threaten biodiversity.

Under the EPBC Act, invasive species can be listed as Key Threatening Processes (**KTPs**). This allows for the development of national Threat Abatement Plans (e.g. for feral cats or rabbits) to coordinate management across jurisdictions.

Non-regulatory approach

Collaborative efforts across Queensland's biosecurity system are guided by the *Queensland Biosecurity Strategy 2024–2029*, which establishes an overarching framework and calls on every Queenslander to play their part.[27] Consistent with the Biosecurity Act, a key principle of the strategy is shared responsibility under the GBO.

To achieve its goals, the strategy prioritises prevention, early detection, and rapid response to biosecurity threats. It emphasises collaboration between governments, industries, communities, and Indigenous groups, alongside investment in innovation, technology, and research to improve surveillance and control measures. The strategy also addresses emerging challenges, such as climate change and increasing global trade, while focusing on vulnerable areas like northern Queensland and the border regions. By strengthening partnerships and public awareness, the strategy aims to create a robust biosecurity system that can effectively respond to current and future challenges.

The *Queensland Invasive Plants and Animals Strategy 2025–2030* provides a strategic framework to manage the risks and impacts of invasive plants and animals across the state.[28] It focuses on protecting Queensland's environment, economy, and communities by preventing the introduction and spread of invasive species, reducing their impacts, and enhancing the capacity of stakeholders to respond effectively.

[27] www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/e3869c8e-55b6-4578-95f2-43b4dbaeeb97/qld-biosecurity-strategy.pdf?ETag=43114f5a525ac0224375d16ee5688991

[28] www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/995f0bbd-2ed5-4727-a96e-15b5f9fd8abb/qld-invasive-plants-animals-strategy.pdf?ETag=e2fed047ff569d1d26cba84f78b3b354

Section B
Sunset review

Beef cattle at Nambour © The State of Queensland 2020

3. Sunset review

Under the SI Act, subordinate legislation automatically expires every 10 years unless action is taken to preserve it. This ensures that government regularly reviews legislation to maintain its ongoing relevance to the economic, social, and general well-being of Queensland.

The Biosecurity Regulation is staged to expire on 1 September 2026. If it expires, the rules it sets out, which are designed to prevent and minimise the biosecurity risks affecting Queensland, would no longer be in effect.

The Queensland Government Better Regulation Policy (the **Better Regulation Policy**) stipulates that a sunset review is required to evaluate the efficiency, effectiveness, and ongoing need for an expiring regulation, before a decision can be made to remake it.[29]

3.1 Purpose

The purpose of a sunset review is to:

- **evaluate the continued need** – review the Biosecurity Regulation to ensure it is fulfilling the role of operationalising the Biosecurity Act
- **assess effectiveness and efficiency** – analyse how well the Biosecurity Regulation performs and whether it achieves its goals with minimal costs and administrative burden
- **ensure relevance** – ensure the Biosecurity Regulation remains contemporary and fit-for-purpose
- **identify improvements** – identify necessary amendments, updates, or, in some cases, the repeal of outdated laws.

3.2 Methodology

The sunset review of the Biosecurity Regulation has been conducted in accordance with the Better Regulation Policy. The review process was designed to be evidence-based, transparent, and inclusive, with a focus on minimising unnecessary regulatory burden while achieving the intended biosecurity outcomes.

The review began by establishing a governance framework and defining the scope of work. A multidisciplinary review team was formed, comprising experts in biosecurity, regulatory policy, and stakeholder engagement. A detailed review plan was developed, outlining the objectives, key milestones, timelines, and strategies for stakeholder consultation.

To provide a comprehensive foundation for the review, the historical context of the Biosecurity Regulation was examined, acknowledging its origins and the risk management challenges it was designed to address. This step ensured that the review

[29] www.treasury.qld.gov.au/files/Queensland-Government-Better-Regulation-Policy-1.pdf

was grounded in an understanding of the Biosecurity Regulation's purpose and the biosecurity risks it sought to mitigate.

The review assessed the currency of the Biosecurity Regulation's rationale by considering whether the biosecurity risk profile has shifted since its implementation. This included an evaluation of emerging threats, changes in industry practices, and advancements in biosecurity science and technology. The effectiveness and efficiency of the Biosecurity Regulation in mitigating biosecurity risks and creating opportunities were also evaluated, with a focus on determining whether the Biosecurity regulation continues to achieve its intended outcomes while minimising regulatory burden.

The review also considered the Biosecurity Regulation's alignment with national obligations. This included an analysis of how the Biosecurity Regulation supports Queensland's commitments within the broader national biosecurity system, market access requirements and international trade agreements. By articulating these linkages, the review ensured that the Biosecurity Regulation remains consistent with Queensland's obligations and priorities in the national and global biosecurity landscape.

A critical component of the review was assessing the potential impacts of the Biosecurity Regulation's expiry. This involved documenting the consequences of a "no regulation" scenario, including risks to biosecurity, economic impacts, and potential disruptions to market access. This analysis provided a clear understanding of the Biosecurity Regulation's necessity and the implications of its removal.

To ensure best practice, the review included a benchmarking exercise to compare Queensland's biosecurity framework with jurisdictional models in other Australian states and internationally. This analysis identified opportunities for harmonisation and alignment with inter-jurisdictional requirements, where appropriate, to enhance the Biosecurity Regulation's effectiveness and efficiency.

The review also explored alternative options for achieving biosecurity outcomes. This included considering non-regulatory approaches or amendments to the existing Biosecurity Regulation to deliver more efficient and effective outcomes while maintaining Queensland's biosecurity standards.

The review included a comprehensive evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with the Biosecurity Regulation. This involved assessing the economic, social, and environmental impacts, including compliance costs for businesses and administrative costs for government. Particular attention was given to identifying opportunities to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden while maintaining the Biosecurity Regulation's effectiveness in managing biosecurity risks.

Stakeholder consultation was a critical component of the review process. Key stakeholders, including industry representatives, local governments, community organisations, and individuals affected by the Biosecurity Regulation, were identified and engaged through a range of methods. These methods included invitations for written or verbal feedback. Stakeholders' needs and expectations were carefully considered and informed the development of the C-IAS.

To ensure the Biosecurity Regulation reflects leading practice, a benchmarking exercise was conducted to compare Queensland's regulations with those of other Australian

jurisdictions. This analysis provided valuable insights into potential improvements and opportunities for alignment.

The impacts of the Biosecurity Regulation on human rights were assessed in accordance with the *Human Rights Act 2019* (the **Human Rights Act**).

Based on the findings of the review, evidence-based recommendations were developed. These recommendations considered whether the Biosecurity Regulation should be remade, amended, or allowed to expire, with a focus on ensuring that any proposed changes were proportionate to the risks being managed and did not impose unnecessary costs.

The purpose of this review is to ensure that biosecurity measures are:

- suitable for the nature of the pest or disease (e.g. containment or quarantine within Queensland)
- appropriate for the identified vectors of pest or disease spread
- effective in managing endemic pests and diseases based on risk levels, and
- aligned with industry best practices while minimising regulatory burdens on businesses.

The recommended policy will be the one that best meets these objectives and delivers the greatest net benefits to the community by preventing impacts from biosecurity risks and in providing flexibility in managing those risks.

Matters not considered as part of the sunset review

The Better Regulation Policy states that provisions of a regulation that have been recently reviewed or amended do not need to be reviewed again, provided that the details of when they were reviewed or amended are included, and that the results of the review demonstrate the continued relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of the provisions.[30]

Accordingly, the following parts of the Biosecurity Regulation have not been considered in detail as part of this sunset review:

- *Code of practice for the management and control of Panama disease tropical race 4 (**Panama TR4**)*[31] which was reviewed and later amended through the Biosecurity (Updating of Code of Practice and Biosecurity Zone Map) Amendment Regulation 2024.[32]
- Schedule 1 and 1A–prohibited and restricted matter species lists, which were updated through the Biosecurity (Prohibited and Restricted Matter) Amendment

[30] www.treasury.qld.gov.au/files/Queensland-Government-Better-Regulation-Policy-1.pdf
[31] www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/f0f6c000-c481-4507-8f51-a75212b943e2/code-of-practice-management-control-panama-tr4-infested-property-qld-v2.pdf?ETag=ec8daa4a53e96b75b213bef1885e09f4
[32] www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2024-0247/lh

Regulation 2026[33], which commenced on 27 April 2026. These updates followed an extensive review and consultation process conducted in late 2025.[34]

- Statewide entry restrictions relating to tomato/potato psyllid carrier were updated through the Biosecurity (Tomato/Potato Psyllid Carrier) Amendment Regulation 2026, which was notified on 3 April 2026.[35]

Feedback on these parts of the Biosecurity Regulation is still welcome and will be considered where possible. However, as these parts relate to separate review processes, outcomes will be outlined in separate Impact Analysis Statements where applicable.

The Biosecurity Regulation also prescribes the fees (Chapter 9 and Schedule 10) referred to under the Biosecurity Act. This C-IAS considers the rationale and cost-recovery models applied when the fees were first set in 2016. A review of the fee structure and amounts payable will be considered in the next phase of the sunset review.

3.3 Preliminary consultation

To inform the development of the C-IAS, DPI undertook preliminary consultation with a cross-section of stakeholders who are required to comply with or have an interest in the Biosecurity Regulation. In total, 110 representative stakeholder groups were consulted, encompassing peak industry bodies, industry representative groups, local government, natural resource management groups, and research organisations.

In September 2025, four major stakeholder representative groups – AgForce Queensland, Queensland Farmers' Federation, AHA, and PHA were invited to provide feedback on the need for the current Biosecurity Regulation. This drew on the experience and expertise of their constituents who have been working with the Biosecurity Regulation for almost a decade.

Consultation was conducted through a series of targeted meetings in which the following five questions were asked:

- Is it still needed? Consider what would happen if the Biosecurity Regulation expired.
- Is it effective? Is it working? Consider whether the biosecurity system has changed since the Biosecurity Regulation was made (~10 years ago and in subsequent amendments) or will it change over the next 10 years in a way that will require a different way of doing things.
- Is it efficient? Consider if there are any opportunities to reduce regulatory burden or make it easier to do business.
- Is anything in the Biosecurity Regulation causing concern and what impact does it have?
- Is anything missing?

[33] https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2026-0035
[34] www.dpi.engagementhub.com.au/biosecurity-prohibited-restricted-matter
[35] www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2026-0032

In November 2025, an additional 106 stakeholder representative bodies, were invited to provide feedback. Specifically, they were invited to share insights, identify challenges, and suggest improvements to the way the Biosecurity Regulation works. A list of the stakeholders invited to provide feedback is provided in Attachment 1.

These groups were chosen for their role as representative bodies for 'regulated parties' under the Biosecurity Regulation, as they possess the knowledge and expertise to understand the challenges and the potential impacts the Biosecurity Regulation may have on their members.

3.4 Consultation outcomes to date

Of the 110 stakeholders invited to provide feedback, 22 responded. Generally, stakeholders supported remaking the Biosecurity Regulation without issue, and there were no requests to allow the Biosecurity Regulation to expire.

A total of 26 issues were raised, with 13 related to the Biosecurity Regulation and therefore considered in scope for this review:

- handling of Restricted Animal Material (**RAM**) – feeding exemptions
- Category 3 restricted matter disposal sites, options, and biological control – approved sites and options for disposal, and biological controls require clarity
- Category 3 and Category 7 restricted matter – reuse for bioenergy and beneficial purposes
- definition changes/corrections – including Queen Bee breeding, Panama Tropical Race 1, and the National Vine Health Committee
- clarification for notifiable incidents, sugar cane biosecurity zones, GBO, cost implications, and eradication requirements
- changes to Red Imported Fire Ant (**RIFA**) controls – including the merger of zones and consideration of chemical barriers, and more explicit movement control requirements
- support for programs – electric ant biosecurity zone and Biosecurity Management Plan (**BMP**) legislation
- maintaining current protections, including for the papaya ringspot biosecurity zone
- Darling Downs–Moreton Rabbit Board – changes to board members, maintaining board function, discussion on operational areas, and responsible councils
- prohibited and restricted matter lists, including the movement of lists from the Biosecurity Act to the Biosecurity Regulation, listing of an additional species
- local government payments, including a cap on annual payments at current levels
- BMPs, including issues with exemptions to comply under other Acts and the requirement for explicit wording
- administrative clarifications.

3.5 Additional information to inform the review

DPI also considered Biosecurity Regulation-related matters that were raised with government through incoming correspondence, stakeholder meetings, national biosecurity bodies, and community discussions. Please refer to the above preliminary consultation section for further insight.

Section C
Biosecurity Regulation analyses

Checking for varroa mite © The State of Queensland 2022

4. Biosecurity Regulation Overview

The Biosecurity Regulation supports the implementation of the Biosecurity Act by providing the detailed tools and processes to manage biosecurity risks across the state. The Biosecurity Regulation achieves this through:

- establishing measures to prevent the introduction and spread of pests, diseases, and contaminants e.g. statewide entry restrictions or biosecurity zones that restrict the movement of high-risk materials (such as soil, plants, animals, and other carriers of biosecurity matter)
- setting out approved ways of dealing with restricted matter, including biological control and disposal
- establishing fertiliser and animal food labelling requirements and maximum contaminant levels – ensuring that manufacturers in Queensland meet nationally agreed standards for safe animal feed
- notification and testing requirements – ensuring scientific rigour and immediate action on new incursions
- matters relating to local governments – capping required contributions to land protection funds
- invasive animal barrier fencing responsibilities – setting clear responsibilities for upkeep and rebuilding
- obligations for biosecurity entities and animal identification – supporting livestock traceability, and strengthening responses to disease outbreaks and incursions
- prohibited and restricted matter permits – providing for situations where biosecurity matter can be dealt with under strict conditions to minimise risks
- recognising the 'Biosecurity Manual' as a statutory document – providing detailed technical standards and risk minimisation requirements
- appointment of certain members or classes of inspectors) e.g. employees of industry partner organisations) – to carry out compliance activities
- setting a fee schedule that is underpinned by the principle of "beneficiary pays"
- schedules with specific technical rules, such as codes of practice and pest and disease carrier species lists – ensuring that risks with particular risk mitigation methods are managed consistently and effectively.

A detailed evaluation of each topic in the Biosecurity Regulation is provided in this consultation paper.

These rules and regulations affect a broad cross-section of the community, from farmers and food producers, who must comply with pest and disease management requirements, to transport operators adhering to movement restrictions, tourism operators protecting natural attractions, local governments managing invasive species, and everyday citizens who benefit from safe food, protected environments, and public

health safeguards. Attachment 2 lists the stakeholder sectors to which the Biosecurity Regulation applies.[36]

Obligations can come into effect when a biosecurity risk is observed or suspected, when action is needed to prevent a risk from spreading, to reduce an existing risk, or to prevent an incursion into Queensland. Several provisions in the Biosecurity Regulation are opportunity-based, and so people have a choice, rather than an obligation, to use the opportunity. These are in place to avoid regulatory burden (e.g. permit applications) that would otherwise apply.

The scale of obligation is case-specific and can be as simple as making a phone call to a biosecurity officer or as complex as conducting a program of treatments before transporting biosecurity matter.

The absence of effective biosecurity measures would have far-reaching and potentially devastating consequences for Queensland's economy, environment, human health, and social well-being. Without proper controls, the state would be highly vulnerable to the introduction and spread of harmful pests, diseases, and contaminants, jeopardising key industries such as agriculture, fisheries, and forestry, which are vital to the economy and food security. This could lead to significant economic losses, reduced market access, and job insecurity.

Additionally, the environment would face severe threats from invasive species and diseases, resulting in biodiversity loss, ecosystem disruption, and diminished social amenity in public spaces. Human health could also be at risk from zoonotic diseases and bioaccumulative contaminants entering the food chain. Furthermore, the financial and reputational costs to the government would escalate, as unmanaged biosecurity risks could lead to costly emergency responses and erode public confidence in the state's ability to protect its industries and communities.

Case study – Forecast spread of Red Imported Fire Ants without the NFAEP

The response to RIFA provides a compelling case for the benefit of the Biosecurity Regulation. Based on the observed spread of RIFA in the United States (approximately 48 kilometres per year), it was estimated in 2022 that, without the National Fire Ant Eradication Program (**NFAEP**), RIFA would now infest around 100 million hectares across an arc stretching from Bowen in the north, west to Longreach, and south to Canberra. Human-assisted movement of RIFA poses one of the greatest risks for their spread. Without the biosecurity zones in place, the scale of infestation would likely be significantly larger.

[36] Star,M., Rolfe, J. 2021. Assessing the Impacts of the Red Imported Fire Ant Report for Biosecurity Qld, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries.



Figure 2 Forecast spread of RIFA in 2022 if no response was mounted since 2001 and the actual spread of RIFA since 2001 to 2022. Note there have been several outlier detections since 2022 not depicted in this illustration.[37]

The government has a responsibility to minimise the regulatory burden on the community, businesses, and itself, ensuring that regulation is efficient while achieving its intended outcomes. The majority of the provisions in the Biosecurity Regulation are designed to prevent activities that could pose significant and avoidable risks (e.g. the movement of infested plants to new areas without proper certification), and to mandate appropriate responses when risks are identified, such as reporting notifiable incidents. While these measures may impose certain restrictions on individuals or businesses, they safeguard the broader interests of industries by protecting market access and ensuring the long-term sustainability of Queensland's economy and environment.

The sunset review has identified some opportunities to simplify rules and reduce regulatory burden, which are explained in each analysis.

[37] Star,M., Rolfe, J. 2021. Assessing the Impacts of the Red Imported Fire Ant Report for Biosecurity Qld, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries.

4.1 Adapting the Biosecurity Regulation to emerging and changing risks

The Biosecurity Regulation achieves a responsible and effective balance between agility and stability by providing clear, consistent requirements while maintaining the flexibility to respond swiftly to emerging biosecurity threats. Its risk-based approach ensures that regulatory measures are proportionate to the level of risk, minimising unnecessary burdens on regulated parties while safeguarding Queensland's agricultural industries, environment, and communities. The framework allows for timely updates to address new risks, such as outbreaks of pests or diseases, without imposing unreasonable disruption on businesses. At the same time, the Biosecurity Regulation provides a stable foundation of well-defined obligations, enabling stakeholders to plan and operate with confidence. This balance ensures that Queensland's biosecurity system remains robust, adaptable, and supportive of long-term economic and environmental sustainability.

The Biosecurity Regulation has been updated since its introduction to address changes in biosecurity risk profiles, and to reduce regulatory burden wherever possible. This has resulted in a regulation that has remained modern, effective, and efficient. Amendments to the Biosecurity Regulation since its introduction, and a brief explanation are outlined in Attachment 3.

Case study – Amending the Biosecurity Regulation following interstate incursions of citrus canker

Citrus canker is a highly contagious bacterial plant disease that impacts all types of citrus plants. It spreads quickly over short distances through wind-driven rain, weather events, and human activity, particularly in tropical and subtropical regions. Affected plants develop distinctive lesions on their leaves, fruits, and stems, leading to reduced plant health, lower fruit quality, and decreased yield. The disease can also be transmitted via contaminated machinery and equipment used in cultivating citrus crops.

Citrus is a significant crop in Australia, with over 23,000 hectares of citrus planted. For the financial year ending June 2023, citrus production was valued at $977.1 million, with Queensland being the largest producer of mandarins, lemons, and limes. The high quality of Australia's citrus fruit makes it Australia's largest fresh fruit exporting industry by volume, with exports of oranges, mandarins, lemons, limes, and grapefruit, totalling 231,301 tonnes valued at $441.1 million in 2023.[38] In Queensland, there were 233 citrus-growing businesses in 2024–25, and citrus accounted for $138.5 million in exports in 2024–25.[39]

In April 2018, citrus canker was detected in the Northern Territory, with confirmation following a month later. Additional cases were also confirmed in northern Western Australia, traced back to nursery plants transported from Darwin.

[38] www.horticulture.com.au/globalassets/hort-innovation/australian-horticulture-statistics-handbook/australian-horticulture-statistics-handbook-2024-25--fruit.pdf

[39] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

The sale of citrus nursery plants from the Northern Territory into Queensland represented a risk pathway for the incursion of the disease into the state. Following the initial use of MCOs under the Biosecurity Act, movement restrictions were transferred into the Biosecurity Regulation to minimise the risk of this serious disease entering Queensland through a clear and stable set of statewide entry restrictions.

Eradication of citrus canker from Australia was confirmed in April 2021.[40] This review proposes to remove the unnecessary statewide entry restrictions from the Biosecurity Regulation, to ensure that industry is not unduly avoiding the movement of citrus plants and, therefore, limiting trade.

Case study – Amending the Biosecurity Regulation following varroa mite spread into Queensland

A notable example of a recent amendment is the regulatory response to an incursion of a bee pest into Queensland. *Varroa destructor* (varroa mite) is a serious bee pest that causes deformities in pupae and adults, reduces productivity, and can lead to colony collapse. Apiary losses from varroa mite impacts not only honey production but also on critical pollination services for some of Queensland's most important crops (e.g. avocados and strawberries).

Varroa mite can be spread through anything produced or collected by bees, such as honey, beeswax, pollen, propolis, hives, appliances, or equipment in contact with these materials, as well as by the bees themselves. It can also spread through wild European bee populations interacting with managed bees.

In June 2022, varroa mite was detected in New South Wales. Queensland DPI put a series of temporary MCOs in place (under the Biosecurity Act) to prevent the entry of varroa mite carriers into Queensland while the spatial scale of the incursion and incursion pathways were mapped. Queensland beekeepers were supported through education on prevention and surveillance and were obligated to inform DPI of any varroa mite sightings to ensure any incursion that occurred could be controlled before the pest spread further.

Industry worked alongside government to help determine the distribution and spread of varroa mite in New South Wales, which enabled Queensland's temporary MCOs to transition to a more stable set of rules established in the Biosecurity Regulation as the varroa mite biosecurity zone regulatory provisions. The securing of movement controls in legislation was beneficial to Queensland beekeepers as it offered the best available protection from varroa mite spread and provided regulatory stability that supported business continuity.

These statewide entry controls provided protection to Queensland for some time. However, varroa mite was then detected in South-East Queensland in March 2025 and quickly spread throughout South-East Queensland despite further regulatory action. The Varroa Mite Innovation and Resilience Initiative (**VMIRI**) team, a Queensland Government-led program, monitored the spread within South-East Queensland, and

[40] www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/pests-diseases-weeds/plant/identify/citrus-canker

the Biosecurity Regulation was updated accordingly to remove rules that were no longer effective. These regulatory changes were implemented on 5 December 2025.

4.2 Jurisdictional comparison

The majority of Queensland's regulatory settings for biosecurity match the approach taken across Australia for those jurisdictions that experience similar biosecurity and contaminant risks (Attachment 4).

Consistency with other jurisdictions supports stakeholders in understanding requirements and, therefore, maintaining a strong biosecurity system. It promotes fairness or competitive neutrality with other jurisdictions so that Queensland businesses have equal access to markets, and it ensures that incursion or risk pathways are mitigated wherever possible.

Jurisdictional alignment, where appropriate and possible, satisfies a recommendation made in the 2017 independent review of the capacity for Australia's national biosecurity system:

> "*Increased consistency of approach for biosecurity across jurisdictions would also be a benefit, given that governments interact with a largely similar client base*." [41]

In some cases, a consistent approach to any given biosecurity risk is not possible due to differences in a jurisdiction's size, resources, financial capacity, biosecurity risk status, and proximity to areas of higher risk.

Case study – Impact of red imported fire ants

When considering the potential impacts of RIFA, it is important to recognise that the species would not only affect a single industry but would have widespread impacts across the community and Australia's economy. The Central Queensland University Cost-benefit analysis (2021) suggests the likely cost of RIFA in Australia, if not eradicated, will exceed an estimated $1.3 billion per year, with adverse impacts likely in most sectors of the economy, including many agricultural sectors, the environment, as well as the Australian outdoor lifestyle (Table 2)[42]. Updated estimates indicate that these costs are now predicted to be closer to $2 billion annually. RIFA:

- have the potential to reduce biodiversity of Australian native fauna and flora by endangering 45% of birds, 38% of mammals, 69% of reptiles, and 95% of amphibians.
- can cause significant public health impacts as they cause painful stings, which may result in hypersensitivity, anaphylaxis, and death.

[41] www.agriculture.gov.au/sites/default/files/sitecollectiondocuments/biosecurity/partnerships/nbc/priorities-for-aus-bio-system.pdf

[42] Assessing the Impacts of the Red Imported Fire Ant Report for Biosecurity Qld, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=d409aa7f-d4e5-4e23-b8b8-7f0514864b8b&subId=751052

- can decrease outdoor activity and liveability
- can damage crops, livestock, agricultural equipment, telecommunications,and electrical infrastructure.

Table 2 – Impact of increasing fire ant spread and the cost on different areas by 2035 at a per annum basis

Impact Area	Bears Costs	5km Spread Yr 15 @7%	48km Spread yr 15 @7%
Household	Households	$447,880,224.30	$536,869,066.43
Agriculture	Qld, NSW Business'	$256,163,315.51	$381,130,000.10
Water	Sunwater, NSW Water, NRM Groups, Coucil	$82,942,151.72	$133,813,803.31
Environment	Community	$39,642,845.27	$84,012,204.67
Education	Dept of Education, Private Schools	$34,674,661.61	$39,710,868.38
Parks and Rec Areas	Council's Local Sporting Committees	$11,705,235.69	$57,788,587.55
Industrial	Business' and Coucil	$6,491,657.71	$7,198,735.63
Tourism	Business'	$3,338,354.01	$3,502,646.29
Hospital	Dept of Health	$2,750,864.96	$3,295,295.60
Commerical	Businesses	$2,355,674.21	$2,714,780.59
Health	Dept of Health	$2,339,257.85	$2,404,846.30
Transport	Main Roads & Council	$102,121.69	$106,680.15
	Total	$890,386,364.52	$1,252,547,515.01

5. Chapter analyses – Options considered and impacts

An options and impacts analysis for each topic in the Biosecurity Regulation is provided below. Due to the size and complexity of the Biosecurity Regulation, chapter-level analyses have been provided wherever possible. Where chapter-level analyses are not possible due to complexity, part-level or division-level analyses have been developed.

Proposed amendments are included for consideration throughout the options analyses.

5.1 Chapter 1 – Preliminary

Chapter 1 of the Biosecurity Regulation sets out preliminary administrative matters governing the Biosecurity Regulation, including the short title, commencement, and a reference to Schedule 11, which contains definitions for key terms used throughout the Biosecurity Regulation. The chapter confirms that the standard for defining spatial locations under the Biosecurity Regulation is the Geocentric Datum of Australia 2020 (**GDA2020**), meaning the Reference Frame under the *National Measurement (Recognized-Value Standard of Measurement of Position) Determination 2017* (Cth) as in force on 1 July 2020.

The provisions in Chapter 1 are not matters of policy, and so no further analysis in this consultation paper is required.

5.2 Chapter 2 – Biosecurity obligations

Chapter 2 of the Biosecurity Regulation outlines specific biosecurity obligations to manage risks associated with biosecurity matter, carriers, and activities. It sets out

detailed requirements that must be followed by individuals and organisations to comply with the GBO.

Chapter 2 regulates the following:

- Part 1 – prohibited and restricted matter regulations
- Part 2 – codes of practice
- Part 3 – obligations relating to restricted matter
- Part 4 – notifiable incidents
- Part 5 – maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers
- Part 6 – diagnostic testing
- Part 7 – bees and apiaries
- Part 8 – repealed
- Part 9 – RAM statements

Part 1 – Prohibited and restricted matter

Part 1 prescribes what is prohibited and restricted matter, including invasive biosecurity matter, by referring to Schedule 1 and 1A of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Consideration of Part 1, and Schedule 1 and 1A, is not within the scope of this C-IAS, as these provisions were recently reviewed and updated through the Biosecurity (Prohibited and Restricted Matter) Amendment Regulation 2026. This followed amendments to the Biosecurity Act through the *Agriculture and Fisheries and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014* (**AFOLA Act**)[43] which provided for the prohibited and restricted matter lists to be moved from the Biosecurity Act to the Biosecurity Regulation. The AFOLA Act provisions, and the Biosecurity (Prohibited and Restricted Matter) Amendment Regulation 2026 came into effect on 27 April 2026.

Part 2 – Codes of practice [proposed amendment]

Nature and scope of the problem

Codes of Practice (**CoP**) establish clear, practical standards that provide industries with a consistent framework to manage biosecurity risks effectively and demonstrate compliance with the GBO. By standardising requirements and addressing gaps in industry practices, CoPs reduce ambiguity and promote uniformity in risk management approaches. This helps minimise biosecurity risks, ensuring better protection for industries, the environment, and the community.

The Biosecurity Act requires consultation with relevant entities, such as community groups, professional and industry associations, educational institutions, and natural resource management bodies, during the development of CoPs. This ensures that the

[43] Agriculture and Fisheries and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government

standards are practical, widely supported, and tailored to the needs of those directly impacted, while also promoting shared responsibility and alignment across sectors in managing biosecurity risks. This approach fosters collaboration between stakeholders, enhances accountability, and supports proactive measures to safeguard Queensland's biosecurity resilience.

This part of the Biosecurity Regulation includes three CoPs:

- *Code of Practice for the Labelling of Fertilisers and for Contaminants in Fertilisers* (Schedule 2)
- *Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals* (Schedule 3) and
- *Code of Practice for the management of Panama TR4*[44] (document published outside the Biosecurity Regulation)

The *Code of Practice for the management of Panama TR4* was recently reviewed and updated through the Biosecurity (Updating of Code of Practice and Biosecurity Zone Map) Amendment Regulation 2024[45] and is therefore not part of this sunset review. Queensland continues to have a responsibility to protect other parts of the state and other jurisdictions from potential Panama TR4 incursions.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

CoP for the Labelling of Fertilisers and for Contaminants in Fertilisers

Queensland agricultural exports need to adhere to the Codex Alimetarius Commission's international food standards, which are recognised by the World Health Organization (**WHO**) and, therefore, by many of Australia's trading partners. Under the Codex framework, participants, including the European Union (**EU**), China, the United States of America, and Australia, must meet specific requirements regarding contaminants such as heavy metals. Fertilisers can contain heavy metals at levels that render plants unsafe for consumption. Queensland agricultural products exported from Australia must adhere to international food standards.

CoP for Feed for Food Producing Animals

Queensland agricultural exports must comply with international food standards, including Codex, which include specific requirements for contaminants, such as heavy metals. The CoP for Feed for Food Producing Animals aligns with the *Australian Ruminant Feed Ban National Uniform Guidelines* for RAM in stockfeed, which is a nationally agreed guideline for animal feed, the *draft Australian Feed Standard for Food Producing Animals,* and international food safety standards under the Codex Alimentarius Commission.[46] These national standards help assure Queensland manufacturers, sellers, and users of stockfeed that it is fed to appropriate animal species and does not contain contaminants at levels of concern, thereby protecting market access, animal and human health.

[44] www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2024-0247

[45] www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2024-0247

[46] www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/thematic-areas/animal-feed/en/

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Attachment 2 summarises regulated parties, direct compliance costs, and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

Fertilisers

The Biosecurity Regulation and *Code of Practice for the Labelling of Fertilisers and for Contaminants in Fertilisers* regulate 344 businesses, with a sector value of $2.5 billion (Australia).[47]

A campaign by Fertilizer Australia highlighted the consequences of unclear or misleading labelling, where growers may unknowingly apply unsafe or ineffective products, risking crop damage, soil contamination, financial loss, and potential regulatory breaches. There are documented cases where the quality of imported fertiliser did not match the certificate of analysis provided by the supplier. In one case, cadmium levels far exceeded the maximum permissible concentration. In another, the "fertiliser" appeared to simply be soil.[48] These examples reinforce the importance of clear, accurate, and enforceable labelling requirements to protect industry, consumers, and the environment.[49]

Feed for food producing animals

Correct labelling of animal feed reduces the risk of livestock accidentally being given unsuitable feed, which can potentially lead to the introduction or spread of serious diseases such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (**BSE**, or "mad cow disease") and scrapie in sheep, chemical residues in meat, milk, or eggs.[50]

The Biosecurity Regulation and the *Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals* impact 432 feed manufacturing and retail businesses and 290 jobs as of the 2021 census,[51] with a current sector value of $4.6 billion (Australia).[52]

It also impacts and protects Queensland dairy farming, which was valued at $259 million in 2025[53] and, according to the 2021 census, included 1,301 jobs in the milk industry in the state (excluding the related supply chain).[54] The feedstock industry, valued at $4.6 billion in Australia is also impacted.[55]

Objectives of government action

The purpose is to provide clear, consistent, and practical standards that can be applied by industries to manage biosecurity risks and demonstrate compliance with the GBO.

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[47] www.expertmarketresearch.com.au/reports/australia-fertilizer-market
[48] apal.org.au/fertilizer-australia-launches-labelling-awareness-campaign/
[49] apal.org.au/fertilizer-australia-launches-labelling-awareness-campaign/
[50] library.dpird.wa.gov.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=ap_factsheets
[51] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[52] www.feedlots.com.au/overview
[53] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm/primary-industries
[54] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[55] www.feedlots.com.au/overview

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Effectiveness: The CoPs for fertiliser labelling and feed for food-producing animals protect animal and human health by preventing contamination of the food chain and the spread of diseases. They support market integrity and access, and provides for alignment with national approaches. The CoPs provide clear, consistent standards for regulated parties.

The CoPs for fertiliser labelling and feed for food-producing animals remain effective, providing a clear framework for managing risks to human health, animal health, and the environment. The CoPs aim to prevent contamination and misrepresentation of products, including, for example, ensuring that ruminants are not exposed to contaminants or RAM. Together, the CoPs support market integrity, protect agricultural production systems, and maintain Queensland's alignment with national standards.

Efficiency: The CoPs provide a straightforward, practical pathway for compliance with the GBO for both industry and the regulator, ensuring Queensland maintains nationally consistent standards.

The fertiliser CoP is the only mechanism through which human health risks associated with fertiliser manufacture and sale are mitigated. The feed for food-producing animals CoP also supports efficient compliance by consolidating requirements into a single, accessible framework that is well understood by manufacturers, retailers, and producers.

Proposed amendment

One important amendment to the *Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals* is required to correct a typographical error regarding the maximum permitted levels of aflatoxin B1 in certain dairy animal feeds. Aflatoxin B1 is a toxic compound produced by certain moulds that can contaminate animal feed and pose serious health risks to both animals and humans if consumed at unsafe levels.

It is proposed to increase the allowable limits from 0.02 mg/kg up to 0.2 mg/kg to align the CoP with research conducted by the CSIRO,[56] ensuring accuracy in contaminant limits. Currently, the allowable limit is unnecessarily low. With this amendment, the CoP would maintain its effectiveness and ensure it continues to protect public health, animal welfare, and trade.

Jurisdictional comparison

Fertiliser – All jurisdictions regulate fertilisers through legislative instruments rather than CoPs, as is the case in Queensland.

Feed for food-producing animals – All jurisdictions rely on a combination of legislative requirements and voluntary industry codes to regulate feed for food-producing animals.

Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

[56] www.connectsci.au/an/article/53/3/181/115137/A-review-of-potential-contaminants-in-Australian?guestAccessKey=

Options considered and impacts

Table 3 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 3 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking codes of practice with amendments

OPTIONS	Benefits	Costs
Option 1 – expiry of regulation and CoPs	There are minimal long-term benefits associated with allowing this part of the Biosecurity Regulation to expire. There are short-term benefits in reducing compliance costs and regulatory burden for industry and government. However, an increase in biosecurity risks is likely, including the introduction and spread of contaminants, pests, and diseases. This would, in turn, increase risks to human and animal health, particularly through reduced controls on fertiliser quality and stock feed inputs. There is also the potential for inconsistent labelling and product standards, which increases the likelihood of misuse or non-compliance. As a result, this may contribute to adverse environmental outcomes.	Industry would lose clear standards for feed and fertiliser, increasing the risk of contamination incidents and potential market access impacts. Communities would face a higher risk of unsafe food entering the supply chain and a reduction in consumer confidence. Government would lose alignment with national and international standards, as well as face an increased likelihood of costly contamination or disease outbreaks.
Option 2 – remake CoPs with no amendments	The CoPs are fit for purpose as they are, but there is a known error that needs to be addressed to prevent potential non-compliance and industry confusion.	Industry would face a risk of confusion due to incorrect (unnecessarily conservative) aflatoxin B1 limits. There is potential for negative government sentiment due to misaligned regulation with national standards.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Costs
Option 3 (recommended) – remake the CoPs and amend a typographical error in the ***Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals*** by adjusting (increasing) the maximum permitted levels of aflatoxin B1 in dairy animal feed from 0.02 mg/kg to 0.2 mg/kg, in line with national standards.	By remaking Chapter 2, Part 2 the legislative framework to manage biosecurity threats in Queensland would be maintained, protecting businesses, governments, and the community. The CoPs establish clear, practical standards that help industries manage these risks and demonstrate compliance with the GBO. Updating the typographical error relating to the permitted levels of aflatoxin B1 will ensure that industry has clear, accurate requirements aligning with national standards. This will maintain market access and protect animal and human health. The Biosecurity Regulation and *Code of Practice for the Labelling of Fertilisers and for Contaminants* protects 344 businesses, with a sector value of $2.5 billion (Australia). The Biosecurity Regulation and *Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals* affect 432 businesses, with a 2022–23 financial year sector value of $4.6 billion (Australia).	Regarding the typographical error relating to the permitted levels of aflatoxin B1, there will be minimal costs to industry to comply with the correct standard, as many businesses are already complying with the national standard, which is less restrictive. There are minor government administrative costs related to updating industry about the change. Queensland dairy farming in 2025 was valued at $259 million and, according to the 2021 census, included 1,301 jobs in the milk industry in the state (excluding the related supply chain). The feedstock industry, valued at $4.6 billion in Australia, is also impacted.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no consultation with industry regarding the proposed amendments to the maximum permitted levels of aflatoxin B1 in dairy animal feed prior to this C-IAS.

Recommended option

The recommended option (option 3) is to remake all of the CoPs and correct a typographical error in the *Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals* by adjusting (increasing) the maximum permitted levels of aflatoxin B1 in dairy animal feed to align with the national standard.

Survey questions – See *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey
Survey questions 7–12 The recommended option (option 3) is to remake all of the Codes of Practice and correct a typographical error in the *Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals* by adjusting (increasing) the maximum permitted levels of aflatoxin B1 in dairy animal feed to match nationally agreed levels. Question 7: Do you support the recommended option? Question 8: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 9: If so, please provide an explanation, including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 10: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 11: If so, please explain. Question 12: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 3 – Obligations relating to restricted matter [proposed amendment to biological control agents]

Nature and scope of the problem

Certain biosecurity matter may already exist in Queensland but still poses significant risks if dealt with in a way that exacerbates the biosecurity risk. As a result, it may be recognised under the Biosecurity Act as 'restricted' matter and have certain obligations or restrictions attached to it.

For restricted matter with 'Category 3' applied to it, a person must not distribute or dispose of it, unless it is done in an authorised way. For restricted matter with 'Category 7' applied to it, a person must kill and dispose of the matter in the way prescribed in the Biosecurity Regulation.

This part of the Biosecurity Regulation provides for some of those ways. It provides opportunities for how and why restricted matter may be moved, disposed of or used, while managing the biosecurity risks.

Restricted matter, such as some invasive plants or animals, may spread through trade, transport, disposal, or handling practices. Some ways of dealing with restricted matter may be legitimate (e.g. research or authorised biological control activities) but must be tightly regulated.

Section 13 provides an important exemption that allows a person to distribute recognised biological control agents to assist in managing biosecurity risks posed by Category 3 restricted matter. Schedule 4 of the Biosecurity Regulation lists the specific recognised biological control agents for invasive plants and animals.

The sunset review has identified some opportunities for improvement to approved biological control agents for some Category 3 restricted matter.

Proposed amendments

Biological control uses natural organisms, such as insects, mites, or pathogens to manage invasive species. While distributing restricted matter without a permit is usually illegal, releasing it with approved biological control agents in areas where the target species exists is allowed. This low-risk method effectively weakens invasive species, reducing their spread and impact.

The current regulation allows the distribution of approved Category 3 invasive matter for biological control purposes, but the list of approved agents needs updating to remove ineffective species, add effective ones, and update scientific names. Proposed amendments aim to expand the list of permitted agents, enabling their use without requiring a permit, which would reduce costs and improve the control of target species.

Before any biological control agent is released in Australia, it undergoes rigorous risk analysis to ensure minimal environmental impact, as required under the *Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth)*. Processes for approval are outlined in the Commonwealth's protocol for biological control agents. For animals, additional approval under the EPBC Act is required for eligible species.

The list of proposed amendments to the current biological control agents and target species is detailed in Attachment 5. Seven species are proposed to be removed due to being ineffective or of unacceptable non-target risk. There are 19 proposed new biological control-species combinations. Additionally, there were 70 suggested changes to common names and scientific names of biological agents in Schedule 4 to reflect current taxonomic understanding listed on the Live Import List. These name updates do not alter opportunities or impacts and, therefore, have not been presented for consultation.

The proposed amendments will ensure the approved list is scientifically up to date, includes effective agents, and provides a clear definition of recognised biological control agents. This will enhance the use of biological control as a safe, cost-effective, and efficient method for managing invasive species.

Clarification of the definition of recognised biological control agent is also proposed.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Queensland must comply with the national *Protocol for Biological Control Agents*.[57]

Queensland also has an obligation to follow the process outlined in the Commonwealth's *Revised Guidelines for the Introduction of Exotic Biological Control Agents for the Control of Weeds and Plant Pests*. There is a similar process for animal control. These guidelines outline the process for implementing biological controls. This includes the approval of a weed as a candidate for biological control, the execution of research, and various levels of testing. Overall, it is the decision of Commonwealth DAFF as to whether the state is able to implement a biological control for invasive plants and animals. [58]

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Attachment 2 provides a summary of regulated parties, direct compliance costs, and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

These regulations both impact and support Queensland's over $20 billion agriculture industry (2024–25)[59] and over $42 billion tourism industry (2025).[60] Biosecurity matter can impact the environment, leading to flow-on impacts on tourism, especially[61] agritourism and ecotourism. Agritourism accounted for 6% of total trips in Australia and generated $20.3 billion in national spending in 2024,[62] and it relies on robust biosecurity frameworks to protect agricultural assets and enhance the visitor experience. Similarly, ecotourism, a vital part of Queensland's tourism industry, attracted over 5 million visitors to the state's national parks in 2018, where they contributed more than $2.6 billion.[63]

Queensland has extensive areas infested with Category 3 restricted matter and multiple high-risk weeds. Data on the use of approved disposal and distribution methods is not reported to the DPI, and there is no direct compliance cost as the provisions are self-managed, and do not require reporting.

DPI, other state agencies (including Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service), local governments, and community and First Nations groups routinely distribute restricted matter that has been infested with a recognised biological control agent to assist with managing Category 3 restricted matter (invasive plants and animals).

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[57] www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/policy/risk-analysis/biological-control-agents/protocol_for_biological_control_agents

[58] www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/policy/risk-analysis/plant/biological-control-agents#:~:text=Before%20a%20biological%20control%20agent,(the%20Live%20Import%20List).

[59] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

[60] www.detsi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/421291/destination-2045-delivering-queenslands-tourism-future.pdf

[61] www.tra.gov.au/en/economic-analysis/agritourism-report

[62] www.tra.gov.au/en/economic-analysis/agritourism-report

[63] www.qao.qld.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-05/Growing%20ecotourism%20in%20Queensland%20%28Report%2012%20%E2%80%93%202022%E2%80%9323%29.pdf

Objectives of government action

The objectives of government action are to minimise the impacts of pests and diseases classified as restricted matter on Queensland's economy, environment, and social structure. This is achieved by providing specific, technical ways for disposing of and distributing restricted matter to ensure that the risk of spreading such matter is prevented or minimised.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Part 3 of Chapter 4 of the Biosecurity Regulation is operating effectively and efficiently in managing risks associated with the disposal and distribution of restricted matter. The provisions for Category 3 restricted matter support appropriate disposal practices and enable controlled distribution in circumstances that improve biosecurity outcomes, thereby avoiding the need for more burdensome permitting requirements under the Biosecurity Act. These arrangements provide a proportionate and risk-based framework that facilitates legitimate activities while minimising the risk of spread.

Provisions relating to biological control agents are generally effective and support national biocontrol programs; however, improvements are required to address uncertainty in the current definition of "recognised biological control agents." Proposed amendments to clarify definitions and update the prescribed list will enhance regulatory certainty, align with national standards, and streamline low-risk activities without increasing regulatory burden.

Category 7 provisions are also functioning as intended, clearly prescribing safe disposal methods for noxious fish and preventing high-risk uses (such as consumption or composting) that could lead to further spread. These provisions are more explicit than those in other jurisdictions and provide a high level of assurance that biosecurity risks are effectively managed.

Jurisdictional comparison

All jurisdictions regulate the disposal and movement of high-risk or declared pests. Most jurisdictions rely on general biosecurity duties, permit systems, or broad powers to control declared plants and animals. All jurisdictions, including the Commonwealth, have specific legislation related to biological control to regulate the introduction and release of biological control agents. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 4 provides an analysis of three potential options for this part of the Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 4 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking obligations relating to restricted matter with amendments

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – expiry of the Biosecurity Regulation	The expiry of Part 3 would result in short-term benefits, reducing compliance costs and regulatory burden for industry and government. However, this would substantially weaken the operation of the biosecurity legislative framework, limiting its ability to regulate biosecurity risks and respond effectively to incidents.	The expiry of Part 3 would remove the authorised ways to deal with Category 3 and Category 7 restricted matter. This would undermine the predetermined safe and effective ways to distribute and dispose of certain restricted matter and increase regulatory burden through the need for people to apply for restricted matter permits for certain activities. It would also undermine Queensland's ability to comply with the agreed national scheme on biological controls.
Option 2 – remake without amendment	Remaking the Biosecurity Regulation as it currently stands is justified in most cases, as it is effective and efficient in managing biosecurity risks as intended. It provides sufficient guidance on how industry, the community, and government organisations can dispose of and distribute restricted matter. However, it is not appropriate to remake the section related to biological control agents, as certain parameters need to be amended and updated.	Industry and the community would require a restricted matter permit before the added species can be distributed for biological control purposes. Current permit fees are set at $443.65 per permit for applications to distribute Category 3 matter for unlisted biological control agents.
Option 3 (recommended) – Remake with an amendment to clarify the definition of a biological control agent	As stated in option 2 most of Part 3 is effective and efficient in managing biosecurity risks as intended. Updating the definitions surrounding biological controls will provide industry with clearer rules, reduce the need for permits, and support research and biocontrol programs. The environment will have stronger safeguards and	Regulated stakeholders would need education about the biological control agents definition updates, and government would face a minor administrative burden. Some opportunities for biological control would be removed; however, the proposed species for removal are not being utilised or are ineffective as biological control agents.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
	clearer alignment with national biocontrol protocols. Overall, this protects Queensland's agriculture industry, worth over $20 billion, and tourism industry, worth over $42 billion, in 2024–25.	

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake or amend this part of the Biosecurity Regulation. However, one stakeholder representative group has suggested that some clarifications on ways of disposing of Category 3 matter are needed.

Recommended option

The recommended option (Option 3) is to remake Chapter 2, Part 3, with an amendment clarifying the definition of a recognised biological control agent, including updates to Schedule 4 identifying the recognised biological control agents for specified restricted invasive matter.

This option maintains an effective, low-burden regulatory framework, ensures clarity and national alignment, supports legitimate biocontrol, research, and management activities, and avoids unnecessary permit requirements, strengthening Queensland's ability to manage invasive plants and animals.

If allowed to lapse, effective ways to distribute and dispose of Category 3 and Category 7 restricted matter and biological control methods would be limited, reducing the effectiveness and efficiency of Queensland's biosecurity system.

Survey questions – See *Invasive plants and animals including matters relating to local government* survey
Survey questions 13–18 The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the existing regulation for distributing and disposing of Category 3 and Category 7 restricted matter, including when used as a biological control, with an amendment to clarify the definition of a recognised biological agent to mean: • a plant, animal, or pathogen (disease) that reduces the vigour, size, viability, and competitiveness of target Category 3 restricted matter; and • for Category 3 restricted matter listed in Schedule 4, Part 1, column 1 or Part 2, column 1, means a plant, animal, or pathogen listed in Schedule 4, Part 1, column 2 or Part 2, column 2, opposite the Category 3 restricted matter. • An updated schedule of allowable biological control agents and host species, as found in Attachment 5.

Survey questions – See *Invasive plants and animals including matters relating to local government* survey
Question 13: Do you support the recommended option?
Question 14: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business?
Question 15: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.
Question 16: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?
Question 17: If so, please explain.
Question 18: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 4 – Notifiable incidents [proposed amendment to add exotic bee disease symptoms]

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 4 'Notifiable incidents' of Chapter 2 of the Biosecurity Regulation introduces a mandatory requirement to report symptoms and conditions that may indicate the presence of high-risk biosecurity matter.

Currently, the prescribed circumstances include specific symptoms in honey bee (*Apis mellifera*) colonies and cases of tick fever.

Proposed amendment

A change in the risk profile for a suite of exotic bee viruses has identified additional symptoms of exotic bee viruses, similar to Parasitic Mite Syndrome (**PMS**), that should be added to the notifiable incidents list. This would ensure that notifications remain targeted and contemporary, and support early detection and EPPRD responses.

Honey bees

Varroa mites (*Varroa destructor*) are a serious parasite affecting honey bees, honey production, and the pollination services of Queensland's most significant crops. Varroa mites are known to be carriers of exotic bee viruses.

The establishment of varroa mite in Queensland in 2025 has significantly increased the risk of incursions by exotic bee viruses, which can significantly impact the health and viability of European honey bees. The presence of viruses would greatly exacerbate the damage caused by varroa mites.

Overseas, varroa mites are major vectors of viruses such as Deformed Wing Virus, Acute Bee Paralysis Virus, and Slow Bee Paralysis Virus, which cause deformities, paralysis, colony collapse and major production losses.

Unlike bacterial diseases such as American foulbrood (**AFB**), PMS is a cluster of symptoms associated with heavy infestations of varroa or tropilaelaps mites and the

viruses they transmit. PMS is not a single disease but a syndrome. Exotic bee virus symptoms (similar to PMS) are characterised by:

- deformed bees, including deformed wings
- dead bees at the hive entrance
- bees unable to move or showing irregular movement
- perforated brood cappings and deformed bees.

PMS is a major contributor to colony losses globally. For example, in the United States, varroa mites are considered one of the leading causes of colony losses, with mortality rates exceeding 30% in some years.[64]

While Queensland's varroa mite population is not currently associated with exotic viruses, this could change rapidly. Early detection of exotic viruses is critical to preventing disease establishment, poor biosecurity outcomes, and triggering a costly response under the EPPRD.

The current Biosecurity Regulation does not include key exotic bee virus symptoms or PMS indicators. Amending the notifiable incident section to include symptoms of exotic bee viruses that are similar to PMS will ensure that the rules remains relevant and support the early detection of any exotic viruses.

Notification to a biosecurity inspector is currently completed via a phone call and followed up by an 'advice of notifiable incident' form available on the DPI website.

Tick fever

Tick fever— caused by *Babesia bovis*, *Babesia bigemina,* or *Anaplasma marginale*—poses a significant biosecurity risk to Queensland's cattle industry. It is a nationally notifiable animal disease when detected in tick-free areas, reflecting the importance of notification in in supporting national surveillance and response arrangements.

Notification of suspected cases plays a critical role in identifying the presence of cattle tick within the cattle tick-free zone and monitoring potential breaches of zone boundaries. Early detection and reporting enable timely response actions to eradicate cattle ticks before they establish, thereby maintaining the integrity of the tick-free zone.

Maintaining a tick-free zone is essential to meeting national biosecurity obligations and preserving domestic and international market access for Queensland cattle. Failure to detect and respond to incursions could result in the loss of market access, increased production costs, and significant economic impacts on the livestock sector.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Honey bees

Access to Western Australia is restricted for live bees and apiary products (requires heat treatment and/or irradiation). The live bee market is already restricted due to varroa

[64] vanEngelsdorp, D., et al. (2012). "A national survey of managed honey bee 2010–2011 winter colony losses in the USA: results from the Bee Informed Partnership." Journal of Apicultural Research, 51(1), 115-124.

mite, and the honey market is restricted due to small hive beetle, and European foul brood, requiring heat treatment.

Tick fever

In Australia, tick fever in cattle is a notifiable disease, meaning there is a legal, national, and state-based responsibility to report suspected or confirmed cases to agricultural authorities.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Attachment 2 provides a summary of regulated parties, direct compliance costs and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

Honey bees

Notifiable incident requirements under the Biosecurity Regulation relating to honey bee colonies exhibiting symptoms affects 5,022 people and 271 businesses, with a sector value of $184.3 million in 2022–23 (Australia).[65] The estimated cost to Queensland is negligible as it is the cost of a phone call.

Government and industry groups face funding obligations under EPPRD in the case of an exotic disease outbreak. Early detection through notification requirements means that a more effective response can be mounted, reducing the biosecurity risk.

Tick fever

Notifiable incident requirements under the Biosecurity Regulation relating to presence of tick fever in a cattle tick carrier within the cattle tick-free zone affects 3,240 businesses (as of the 2021 census) and 12,338 businesses across Queensland, with a sector value of $6.5 billion in 2022–23.[66] The estimated cost to Queensland is negligible as it is the cost of a phone call.

A 2022 report "*Cost of Endemic Diseases Update 2022*" stated that the annual cost of cattle tick in northern Australia is estimated to be $128.2 million, including treatment costs, prevention costs, and production losses, and the New South Wales' Department of Primary Industries states that a cattle tick outbreak could cost the New South Wales cattle industry up to $30 million annually.[67]

Objectives of government action

The requirement to report notifiable incidents, as outlined in Section 47 of the Biosecurity Act, is a critical tool to ensure the early detection of, and rapid response to, potential high risk biosecurity threats. Prompt notification allows inspectors to assess and address incidents quickly, minimising the risk of further spread and potential harm

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[65] www.transparency.gov.au/publications/agriculture-fisheries-and-forestry/rural-industries-research-and-development-corporation/agrifutures-australia-annual-report-2022-2023/section-2---focus-area-and-industry-reports/honey-bee-%26-pollination

[66] 2021 census; 2022-23 GVP

[67] https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1640120/Cattle-Tick-Owner-Treatment-Scheme-Manual.pdf

to industries. The Biosecurity Regulation supports this by prescribing specific notifiable symptoms or conditions, enabling a targeted and effective approach to managing risks.

This model of shared responsibility between government, industry, and community strengthens the likelihood of an incursion being eliminated.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Effectiveness:
Honey bees

Notification of incidents is an effective measure for the early detection of bee pests and diseases, benefiting both beekeepers and the government. Section 19 of the Biosecurity Regulation currently includes bee symptoms of some bee illnesses, but there is a need to include additional symptoms associated with exotic bee viruses as varroa mite is currently spreading in Queensland. The reporting requirement for unusual symptoms due to the proposed additional PMS or exotic bee virus symptoms would help to ensure any exotic bee pests and diseases are eradicated or reduced before they can establish. Updating the Biosecurity Regulation will:

- support early detection and rapid response.
- protect market access and reduce the likelihood of costly EPPRD responses.

Tick fever

The tick-free zone is a critical biosecurity asset for Queensland. Reporting tick fever cases helps to monitor and address any breaches in the zone's tick-free status. Effective reporting ensures that cattle ticks, which transmit tick fever, are eradicated before they can establish a population in the tick-free zone. Maintaining the tick-free zone also ensures continued market access for Queensland cattle, both domestically and internationally.

Efficiency:

Honey bees

The integration of reporting capabilities into the varroa mite notification, monitoring, and surveillance system, known as Bee123, is intended as a component of Queensland's Transition to Management program. This initiative aims to address general hive health inquiries and provide notifications regarding endemic diseases, such as AFB. Beekeepers have demonstrated proficiency in utilising Bee123, making the system efficient and of low burden. It can easily be adapted to facilitate surveillance and notification processes concerning additional bee pests and diseases.

Tick fever

Reporting is integrated into broader surveillance and monitoring systems including government diagnostic laboratories and the current disease reporting mechanisms for restricted matter and cattle tick.

Jurisdictional comparison

Honey bees

Other jurisdictions, such as Victoria, regulate bee pests through a notification requirement. Queensland differs in that it lists exotic bee virus symptoms to enable earlier notification and rapid response, minimising the risk of the bee pest spreading or establishing. The proposed additional notifiable symptoms would add an extra level of protection against establishment of serious viruses in Queensland bee populations.

Tick fever

In other jurisdictions, tick fever is a notifiable or reportable disease under biosecurity or livestock related legislations. At the Commonwealth level, infections with *Babesia bovis*, *Babesia bigemina*, or *Anaplasma marginale* in tick-free zones are nationally notifiable.

Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 5 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with amendment. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 5 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking notifiable incidents with amendments

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – expiry of the notification requirements	The expiry of Part 4 of Chapter 2 of the Biosecurity Regulation would result in short-term benefits by reducing the costs to industry for complying with notification requirements. However, this would substantially weaken the operation of the biosecurity legislative framework, limiting its ability to mitigate biosecurity risks and respond effectively to incidents.	Government and industry would lose an early-warning system for detecting exotic bee viruses and PMS-like symptoms, and tick fever in tick-free areas. As a result, the biosecurity risk may not be managed as effectively due to delayed detection, increasing management and response costs on industry and government. The tick-free zone integrity may be weakened, introducing potential risk to market access. Communities may experience increased bee colony losses and reduced pollination services.
Option 2 – remake notification	Notification of current bee symptoms and conditions would	Symptoms of PMS similar to exotic bee viruses can be mistaken for

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
requirements with no amendment	be retained, but there would be a gap in reporting of the additional symptoms and conditions of high risk exotic bee viruses that are carried by varroa mite. For industry and community, the management of additional exotic bee disease symptoms would rely on the GBO or through the requirement to report the presence of varroa mite (Varroa destructor) given that it is restricted matter (category 2) The environment could see exotic viruses of bees result in the decline of feral honey bee populations. As a result, there would be a reduction in disruption to native pollination systems, less competition for native pollinators, increased availability of essential habitat (tree hollows), and less competition for floral resources.	other endemic pests and diseases. A delay in reporting would expose both the honey industry and the cropping sector, which are reliant on pollination services, to avoidable risk through lack of action in the early response phase of an incursion. Community-based recreational beekeepers would face greater risk of hive collapse due to exotic viruses of bees spread through Varroa mite infestations. This could significantly impact the productivity of crops reliant on the pollination services and of honey production, impacting food supply and the economy. AHBIC is a signatory to the EPPRD and would be more likely to face incursion response costs. Unmanaged exotic bee virus spread through lack of early notification and intervention would increase cost to Governments (including other jurisdictions) through the triggering of an EPPRD response which has cost-sharing obligations. It would also undermine the objectives of the Biosecurity Act through not supporting early awareness of impactful incidents.
Option 3 (recommended) – Remake with amendment to add symptoms of exotic bee viruses as a notifiable incident, and maintain cattle tick as notifiable Amend section 19(2) to include:	Early reporting would provide the best chance of eradicating exotic bee pests and diseases before they can establish a population. Remaining free of exotic pests and diseases also supports domestic and international market access. Community would receive protection of recreational hives.	The additional regulatory burden for industry is nil at this time as exotic viruses have not yet been detected in Australia. Should they arrive in Australia, notification could be achieved by a phone call or email to DPI which is considered a negligible cost.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
a. deformed bees, including deformed wings b. dead bees at the entrance of hives c. bees not able to move or with irregular movement.	DPI would be upholding best practice and supporting Queensland agriculture and EPPRD outcomes through protection against emergency response costs. This protects the honey industry, worth $184.3 million to Australia in 2022–23.	

Consultation and outcomes

Queensland Beekeepers Association have noted that the current list of symptoms is too broad in description and more clarity is needed.

Feedback themes included strong support for adding exotic bee pest symptoms and maintaining tick fever rules. Stakeholders emphasised the importance of early detection. There was no specific consultation on the proposed suite of amendments.

Recommended option

Option 3 is recommended – to remake the existing regulation with amendments to include symptoms of additional exotic bee diseases similar to PMS to the notifiable incident Section 19(2) to include:

- deformed bees, including deformed wings
- dead bees at the entrance of hives
- bees not able to move or with irregular movement.

This option strengthens early detection, protects Queensland's bee and cattle industries, supports market access, aligns with national biosecurity obligations and imposes negligible cost.

If this part of the Biosecurity Regulation was allowed to expire, key symptoms of high priority diseases would no longer need to be reported. This would jeopardise the cattle, bee keeping and pollination reliant industries through increased risk of disease spread and establishment.

Survey questions – See *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey
Survey questions 19–24 The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the existing regulation with an amendment to require beekeepers to notify DPI if specified symptoms of exotic bee viruses that may be a part of Parasitic Mite Syndrome, are detected or suspected to protect honey production, market access and pollination services.

Survey questions – See *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey
Question 19: Do you support the recommended option?
Question 20: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business?
Question 21: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.
Question 22: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?
Question 23: If so, please explain.
Question 24: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 5 – Maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carrier

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 5 'Maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers' of Chapter 2 of the Biosecurity Regulation prescribes the maximum permissible levels of contaminants permitted in a carrier. These levels align with the maximum levels of contaminants and natural toxicants set in the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (**ANZFSC**) schedules 19 and 21 (the relevant subsections).

This part of the Biosecurity Regulation minimises the likelihood and severity of adverse impacts on Queensland's economy by managing the risk of contaminants entering or spreading through carriers such as soil, water, feed, fertiliser, plants, animals, and other agricultural inputs.

Contaminants may arise through manufacturing, processing, storage, transport, or environmental exposure, and can harm agricultural production, animal and plant health, food safety and market access.

This part also provides ways and obligations for managing risks posed to livestock production from contaminants. This not only allows for mitigating human health risks from direct consumption of contaminated food, but also from eating animals that have been contaminated through consuming foods with inappropriate contaminant levels.

Queensland has millions of vehicle and machinery movements annually, sees large volumes of soil, sand, and gravel transported, and has multiple biosecurity zones where movement controls apply. Ensuring contaminants in carriers remain below acceptable levels is essential to preventing biosecurity incidents and protecting agricultural industries.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

There are no direct obligations linked to Part 5 of Chapter 2 of the Biosecurity Regulation. Sections 20 and 21 of the Biosecurity Regulation simply reference the ANZFSC schedules, however, the ANZFSC does not refer to the Biosecurity Regulation. .

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Attachment 2 provides a summary of regulated parties, direct compliance costs, and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

The Biosecurity Regulation for the maximum level of contaminants in carriers affects 67,100 businesses, which have a sector value of over $20 billion (Queensland agriculture, 2024–25).[68]

A 2013 case study found that contaminants in livestock feed must be managed to protect animal health, and to minimise residues in livestock products that might affect the health of human consumers or impair marketing and international trade.[69]

Objectives of government action

The objective of Part 5 of Chapter 2 is to minimise the likelihood and severity of adverse impacts on Queensland's economy by managing the risk of contaminants entering or spreading through carriers.

It aims to ensure contaminants in agricultural inputs are identified, controlled, and not supplied or used where they pose unacceptable risk, to protect plant and animal health, food safety, the environment and market access, and to provide a clear, enforceable mechanism for meeting the GBO in relation to contaminants.

Effective regulation ensures that contaminants do not compromise plant and animal health, food safety, the environment or market access for Queensland's agricultural products.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Effectiveness: Queensland's inclusions of maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers in the Biosecurity Regulation provide a straightforward compliance pathway. The section effectively links the relevant ANZFSC schedules to biosecurity-related carriers such as plants or animals.

Efficiency: Sections 20–22 are efficient because they reference the ANZFSC schedules and thereby enforce it in a biosecurity context. This avoids regulatory complexity, ensures consistency with national standards, and provides a simple mechanism for industry to meet their GBO.

Jurisdictional comparison

Other jurisdictions similarly regulate contaminants through both food legislation and agricultural production laws, aside from New South Wales which relies on the GBO to manage risks associated with contaminants. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

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[68] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

[69] www.era.dpi.qld.gov.au/id/eprint/3746/1/AnimProdSc_MacLachlan2013.pdf

Options considered and impacts

Table 6 provides an analysis of two potential options for this part of the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 6 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking the maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – expiry of the provisions regarding the maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers	The expiry of Part 5 of Chapter 2 would result in short-term benefits including reduced compliance costs and industry costs in complying. As a result, the regulatory burden for industry and government would be reduced. However, this would substantially weaken the operation of the biosecurity legislative framework, limiting its ability to regulate contaminants that have the potential to cause biosecurity risks, to protect agricultural production systems and environmental health.	The costs to industry would increase asdifficulty in complying with national standards increases, resulting in a higher chance of non-compliance, leading to a potential loss of market access. Communities and the environment would be at risk of contaminated food products and the impacts of contaminants upon plants and animals. The government would face higher likelihood of biosecurity incidents and response costs.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 2 (recommended) – Remake the provisions regarding the maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers	The remake of the provisions for the maximum acceptable level of contaminants would see industry have clear, simple guidance to ensure contaminants do not harm livestock, crops, ecosystems or human health, supporting compliance and market access. This would result in public confidence in their food and environmental protections from contaminants. The government would maintain alignment with national standards, support GBO compliance, and ensure that Queensland's over $20 billion agriculture industry is safeguarded.	Industry would face compliance costs related to ensuring contaminants in feed for livestock are managed to protect livestock health and human safety, and the government would face regulatory burden.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the existing regulation to provide an on-going means by which those who deal in biosecurity matter can meet their GBO regarding minimising risk when dealing with contaminants in carriers, where they reasonably ought to understand the risks. This ensures contaminants in carriers are managed consistently with national standards, protects agricultural production, food safety, and markets, and imposes no additional regulatory burden. It is the most effective, proportionate, and practical approach.

If these provisions were allowed to lapse, contaminants would be more likely to enter agricultural systems, posing risks to animal health, food safety, and market access due to a lack of awareness and reliance solely on the GBO.

Survey questions– See the *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 25–30 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the existing regulation to provide an on-going means by which those who deal in biosecurity matter can meet their GBO regarding contaminants in carriers. Question 25: Do you support the recommended option? Question 26: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 27: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 28: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 29: If so, please explain. Question 30: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 6 – Diagnostic testing [proposed amendment to expand scope and clarify approval process]

Nature and scope of the problem

The 'Diagnostic testing' part of Chapter 2 ensures that diagnostic test kits or methods for exotic animal diseases, as defined in Schedule 11 of the Biosecurity Regulation, are appropriately restricted and subject to approval so that biosecurity decisions and responses are based on reliable and authorised evidence.

This framework is critical for minimising biosecurity risks, protecting human and animal health, and maintaining confidence in Queensland's disease-free status and market access.

Accurate diagnostic testing is critical to biosecurity. Unapproved or substandard tests can produce false positives, triggering unnecessary emergency responses, movement controls, stock destruction, and market access disruptions, or false negatives, allowing serious diseases to spread undetected.

Proposed amendments

The current Biosecurity Regulation is outdated. Key definitions such as "exotic disease" no longer reflect contemporary biosecurity risks and do not clearly cover important diseases that are not "exotic" like Hendra virus. Generally, this part of the Biosecurity Regulation has been interpreted as diseases and pathogens that are not generally reported in the State due to the definitions of positive and negative result in Schedule 11, however, these terminology inconsistencies create ambiguity in how the framework is applied. The approval process also relies on Animal Health Committee (**AHC**) endorsement, which can delay decision-making.

Section 25 currently restricts only the use of diagnostic test kits, while Section 26 allows the chief executive to approve both the supply and use of these kits. To address this

inconsistency, both sections would be amended to regulate both supply and use, ensuring clarity and alignment across the Biosecurity Regulation. These changes aim to improve the Biosecurity Regulation's clarity, efficiency, and effectiveness in managing biosecurity risks and maintaining Queensland's disease-free status.

The proposed amendments will modernise and strengthen the framework by:

- expanding the scope from "exotic diseases" to all notifiable and reportable diseases (terrestrial and aquatic)
- updating definitions of "diagnostic test kit or method", "positive result", and "negative result"
- regulating both the supply and use of diagnostic kits
- requiring the chief executive to consider AHC recommendations rather than rely on formal approval; and
- introducing clear approval criteria, including biosecurity risk management, fitness-for-purpose, testing conditions, user competency, and quality assurance.

Without these controls, there is a risk that unvalidated or inaccurate diagnostic methods could be used, leading to incorrect results. False positives may trigger unnecessary emergency response activity, impose significant costs on industry and government, and undermine confidence in Queensland's biosecurity system. False negatives may allow exotic diseases to spread undetected, jeopardising Queensland's area freedom status, and creating market access implications for affected industries. Ensuring that only approved diagnostic kits and methods are used supports proper management of biosecurity risks and maintains confidence in Queensland's surveillance and response systems.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

The AHC provides national policy, technical, and regulatory advice on diagnostic testing for terrestrial and aquatic notifiable diseases. AHC guidance supports nationally consistent diagnostic standards and informs Queensland's approval process. Accurate diagnostic testing underpins national market access arrangements and supports Queensland's ability to demonstrate area freedom for key diseases. AHC sits under the National Biosecurity Committee (**NBC**).[70]

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Attachment 2 provides a summary of regulated parties, direct compliance costs and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

Lack of scientific rigour in animal disease diagnostic testing could put at risk Queensland's livestock sector which had an estimated GVP of $10.3 billion in 2024–25.[71]

[70] www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/policy/partnerships/nbc
[71] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

In the 2021 census, there were 22,463 jobs in the livestock sector (excluding the supply chain).[72]

There are three laboratories that have collectively held ten approvals for diagnostic test kits for diseases currently identified as exotic. Six of the approvals remain active.

The Biosecurity Regulation of exotic disease diagnostic testing currently affects three businesses directly, however the veterinary laboratory sector value is not calculable as it involves private business records and is not reportable under biosecurity legislation. The information required to calculate the additional lab sector is therefore unavailable or cannot be determined due to the lack of sufficient data. The estimated compliance cost to Queensland for the first year for the three known labs is $16,250 and for 10 years is $48,826. These costs are due to educational, record keeping, and preparing and applying for permissions.

Australia's 2007 equine influenza outbreak provides a clear example of why diagnostic testing for exotic animal diseases must be regulated and assured. The Equine Influenza Inquiry[73] found that effective disease control depended on timely, accurate, and authoritative confirmation, and regulatory decision making relied on the confidence that laboratory results were scientifically valid. This experience shows that if exotic disease testing were undertaken using unregulated or non-validated tests, false positives could trigger unnecessary movement controls while false negatives could delay response and exacerbate spread.

Objectives of government action

The objective is to ensure diagnostic testing outside of approved labs used for regulatory decisions is scientifically valid, nationally consistent, and defensible.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Effectiveness: This part of the Biosecurity Regulation is considered effective as it supports the reliability of diagnostic test results. However, amendments are proposed to address confusing wording in the Biosecurity Regulation, outdated terminology, and unclear definitions, which create uncertainty about which diseases require approved test kits. The current focus on "exotic diseases", which are diseases not usually diagnosed in the state, does not adequately cover nationally reportable diseases already present in Australia, such as Hendra virus.

Users may also be unaware that chief executive approval is required before using certain diagnostic kits, as some kits are supplied without any indication that approval is necessary.

Efficiency: The current approval process applies only to the use of diagnostic kits. Allowing manufacturers or suppliers to seek approval for both the supply and use would streamline compliance and reduce administrative burden for laboratories and end-users.

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[72] www. qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/

[73] www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/pests-diseases-weeds/animal/eiimplementation

Replacing the requirement for formal AHC approval with a requirement for the chief executive to consider AHC recommendations will also improve timeliness and efficiency, while maintaining recognition of AHC's national oversight.

Jurisdictional comparison

Other jurisdictions similarly regulate diagnostic testing through measures such as laboratory accreditation or test restrictions, but Queensland's framework is comparatively more comprehensive. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 7 provides an analysis of three potential options for this part of the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with some amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 7 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking diagnostic testing with amendments

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – expiry of these provisions in the Biosecurity Regulation	The expiry of Part 6 of Chapter 2 would result in short-term benefits in reducing compliance costs and industry costs in complying. As a result the regulatory burden for industry and government would be reduced. However, this would substantially weaken the operation of the biosecurity legislative framework, limiting its ability to confidently assess and determine biosecurity risks.	Industry would face a higher risk of false results leading to unnecessary biosecurity incident responses or undetected disease spread. Confidence in Queensland's surveillance and response systems would be undermined with the removal of quality controls, creating market access risks. Moreover, this could see creation of uncertainty about which tests are acceptable, impacting industry. The government could face greater likelihood of costly emergency responses and potential loss of area freedom certification for some diseases.
Option 2 – Remake and maintain the current scope and process for approval of diagnostic test kits	The remake of this section would see no requirement on industry or government to amend the current processes.	The industry may be exposed to market access interruptions and reputational risk due to being unaware of occurrences of nationally notifiable diseases because of inaccurate test results and a lack of clear linkages with national notification obligations. The government would be maintaining weakness in the national biosecurity system.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
		Current direct compliance costs are estimated at $16,250 in the first year and $48,826 over a ten-year period.
Option 3 (recommended) – Remake with amendments to expand test approvals to include nationally reportable diseases, and remove reliance on AHC approvals	The remake of these provisions with amendments would allow researchers and diagnostic laboratories to be consistent with national testing standards. There would also be an efficiency gain from not being bound to considering AHC approval timeframes – noting that their advice rather than approval would remain a consideration in testing approvals. Communities and the environment would have the support of reliable detection of diseases that may impact public health outcomes and ecosystems. Government would have protection against mistaken triggering of the national cost share agreements, EADRA and NEBRA, in the case of false positives, protecting Queensland's livestock sector which had an estimated GVP of $10.3 billion in 2024–25.	Current estimated direct compliance costs are estimated at $16,250 in the first year and $48,826 over a ten-year period. This would be imposed on researchers and diagnostic laboratories who would be required to seek approval for use of a broader range of diagnostic test kits. The government would face a minor additional administrative burden from potential new applications under expanded approval scope.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 3 is recommended – to remake the Biosecurity Regulation with amendments. This option strengthens Queensland's diagnostic testing framework by ensuring all notifiable and reportable diseases, not just exotic ones, are covered, improving clarity, national alignment, and scientific rigour. It reduces delays by removing need for extra

approvals, introduces clear decision-making criteria for the chief executive, and ensures both the supply and use of diagnostic kits are properly regulated. This delivers a more efficient, consistent, and reliable system for managing biosecurity risks.

If allowed to lapse, the Biosecurity Regulation's expiry would eliminate the approval framework for diagnostic test kits and methods, leading to reliance only on the GBO. This could create uncertainty around acceptable tests, increase the risk of inaccurate results, weaken surveillance and response systems, and jeopardise Queensland's ability to prove disease-free status and maintain market access.

Survey questions – See *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey
Survey questions 31–36 The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the Biosecurity Regulation with an amendment to expand the scope of test kit approvals to include nationally reportable diseases that are known to be in Australia, shift the need for the chief executive to consider Animal Health Committee approval on test kits, and clarify the need for approval on both supply and use of kits. Question 31: Do you support the recommended option? Question 32: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 33: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 34: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 35: If so, please explain. Question 36: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 7 – Bees and apiaries [proposed expiry of distance rules]

Nature and scope of the problem

Apiary distances

Part 7 'Bees and apiaries' of Chapter 2 in the Biosecurity Regulation contains provisions relating to the management of bees and apiaries. Sections 30–31 prescribe minimum distances between apiaries and queen bee breeding apiaries, a requirement introduced in 1931 to reduce the spread of AFB and to protect queen bee breeding lines. This was seen to have an important role but is now outdated and impractical.

Distance does not prevent AFB or other diseases, because bees interact freely with feral colonies that carry long-lived AFB spores, and drone bees can infiltrate queen-breeding lines regardless of spatial separation.

The distance rules now function more as a mechanism for allocating floral resources than as a biosecurity tool. No other state uses distancing requirements, and contemporary risk management is delivered through best-practice hive management

and the *Australian Honey Bee Industry Biosecurity Code of Practice.*[74] The distance rules also raise human-rights concerns by restricting the use of private land without a clear biosecurity purpose and limiting opportunities for new entrants into the industry. In short, the rules are outdated, unenforceable, and provide no meaningful protection for bee health or queen-breeding integrity.

Asian Honey Bees

Under the Biosecurity Act, Asian honey bees (AHB) (*Apis dorsata, A. florea, A. cerana* other than *A. cerana javana*) are considered prohibited matter affecting plants, making it illegal to deal with them. The one subspecies that is excluded, *A. cerana javana*, is considered restricted matter with category 1 (reporting requirement) applied. Section 32 of the Biosecurity Regulation prohibits the keeping or moving of live AHB without a biosecurity authorisation. This section ensures that all subspecies of AHB including *A. cerana javana* are subject to these requirements.

AHB are an invasive species capable of establishing wild populations, competing with European honey bees, robbing hives and transmitting pests and diseases. This prohibition remains necessary to protect Queensland's beekeeping and pollination-dependent industries, which are valued at $184.3 million nationally.[75]

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

There are no national, market access, or deed obligations relating to apiary distance requirements. All Australian jurisdictions regulate the keeping or movement of AHBs, but Queensland's prohibition operates independently of interstate movement controls.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Attachment 2 provides a summary of regulated parties, direct compliance costs, and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

The distance rule applies to large apiary sites of 40 hives or more and to queen bee breeding apiaries. Apiary operations of this size are commercial businesses. There are currently 414 RBEs for bees (i.e. registered beekeepers) that have 40 or more registered hives in Queensland.

The Biosecurity Regulation of keeping and moving AHBs protects two industries (honey and pollination services), which have a sector value of $184.3 million (Australia).[76] The estimated direct compliance cost to Queensland for the first year is $2,208 and over the next 10 years would be $8,202.

According to a 2017 case study, "Asian honey bees are likely to impact on commercial beekeepers and farmers who rely on the pollination services of managed honey bees.

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[74] www.honeybee.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2505261.pdf

[75] www.transparency.gov.au/publications/agriculture-fisheries-and-forestry/rural-industries-research-and-development-corporation/agrifutures-australia-annual-report-2022-2023/section-2---focus-area-and-industry-reports/honey-bee-%26-pollination

[76] www.transparency.gov.au/publications/agriculture-fisheries-and-forestry/rural-industries-research-and-development-corporation/agrifutures-australia-annual-report-2022-2023/section-2---focus-area-and-industry-reports/honey-bee-%26-pollination

By competing for floral resources, robbing managed hives, and transmitting disease, AHBs could have detrimental impacts on European honey bees, which themselves are an invasive species that harm the natural environment."[77]

Objectives of government action

The Biosecurity Regulation aims to prevent the spread of biosecurity matter, such as AFB, between apiaries.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Apiary distances

The distance rules (between hives and distances from queen bee breeding hives) are no longer effective or efficient in a biosecurity context and are proposed to be removed. The objective is to modernise Queensland's regulatory framework for honey bees and apiaries by removing outdated provisions and retaining only those that provide genuine biosecurity value. Removing obsolete apiary distances would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, align Queensland with other states, and support a more equitable and market-driven approach to resource allocation.

Asian Honey Bees

Queensland is the only state where the AHB is currently present. In New South Wales, the AHB is classified as prohibited matter. The Northern Territory declared the AHB a pest and notifiable in June 2015. The prohibition on keeping or moving AHBs remains effective in preventing establishment and spread of this invasive species. The remade Biosecurity Regulation would contain the provision to prevent keeping of AHB to maintain protection against associated biosecurity risks.

Jurisdictional comparison

All Australian jurisdictions have regulations regarding apiary placement, though they vary between states and local councils, focusing on biosecurity, public safety, and nuisance mitigation. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Queensland is the only jurisdiction where the AHB is currently present. In New South Wales and the Northern Territory, the AHB is similarly classified as prohibited matter or a notifiable pest, respectively. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 8 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

[77] www.invasives.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Case-Study-Asian-honey-Bee.pdf

Table 8 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking bees and apiaries with amendments

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – expiry of the apiary distance rule and AHB provisions	The expiry of Part 5 of Chapter 2 would result in short-term benefits in reducing compliance costs and industry costs in complying. As a result, the regulatory burden for industry and government would be reduced. In addition, there would be benefits to industry and government as outdated distance rules would not be in effect.	The industry would face a risk of AHB establishment and associated hive robbing, disease transmission, competition for floral resources, and pollination losses. Communities would have reduced pollination services affecting food supply, and the environment would be at increased risk of invasive bee species establishing. The government would face higher response costs and loss of area freedom.
Option 2 – remake the apiary distance rule and AHB provisions with no amendments	The remake of the apiary distance rule and the AHB provisions would result in minimal practical benefits for industry in relation to maintaining purity of queen bee breeding lines (which is not a biosecurity concern), or in relation to biosecurity risk minimisation.	Apiarists cannot comply with the distance rule as queen bee breeding sites are not easily identified and it unnecessarily limits opportunity for other beekeepers. Government will face maintenance of unenforceable rules, directing compliance resources away from priority risk incidents as the rule does not serve a biosecurity function.
Option 3 (recommended) – remake with amendments to allow apiary distance rule to expire, remake the AHB provisions	Remaking the AHB provisions while allowing the apiary distance rule to expire would see industry benefit from the removal of unnecessary regulatory burden while retaining protections from AHB incursions. This protects the honey sector, valued at $184.3 million in 2022–23 (Australia).	The estimated direct compliance cost to Queensland for the first year is $2,208 and over the next 10 years would be $8,202.

Consultation and outcomes

Preliminary feedback has indicated that the limitation on apiary distances should be retained and strengthened around queen bee breeding requirements. Feedback also suggested that the distance rule provided competitive advantageous for commercial beekeepers.

From the period July 2018 to 28 November 2025 the Customer Service Centre received:

- two complaints about distance infringements (within 2km of a queen bee breeder), and
- ten enquiries seeking clarification on the distance rule.

Recommended option

Option 3 is recommended – to allow the apiary distance rule to expire and remake the AHB provisions. The distance rule is obsolete, unenforceable, and provides no biosecurity benefit. Removing it reduces regulatory burden, supports equitable access to resources, aligns Queensland with national practice, and respects property rights.

Retaining the AHB provisions ensures continued protection against a significant invasive species threat. Removing the restrictions on AHB would greatly increase the risk of their establishment and spread, causing significant impacts on pollination services, honey production, and agricultural industries.

Survey questions – See *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 37–42 The recommended option (option 3) is to allow the section related to aviary hive and queen bee breeder distance to expire given it being unenforceable and having no valid biosecurity benefit, and to remake the Asian Honey Bee provisions only. Question 37: Do you support the recommended option? Question 38: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 39: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you from a biosecurity perspective. Question 40: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 41: If so, please explain. Question 42: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 8 - repealed

Part 8 of Chapter 2 was recently repealed through the Biosecurity (Prohibited and Restricted Matter) Amendment Regulation 2026. It previously prescribed a way for a person to meet their GBO in relation to taking reasonable steps to minimise risk when dealing with non-native invasive ornamental fish (formerly listed in Schedule 5), where they reasonably ought to understand the risks.

Non-native invasive ornamental fish are now considered as part of the noxious fish list in the prohibited matter list (Schedule 1, Part 6). . For more information please, refer to *Biosecurity in Queensland: a review of the prohibited and restricted matter lists*.[78]

Part 9 – Restricted Animal Material (RAM) statements [proposed amendment to align requirements with national rules]

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 9 "RAM Statements" of Chapter 2 of the Biosecurity Regulation sets out requirements for RAM statements. These requirements are essential for maintaining Queensland's negligible bovine spongiform encephalopathy (**BSE**) risk status, protecting human and animal health, and ensuring continued access to international markets for ruminant animals and ruminant-derived products.

RAM includes material derived from vertebrate animals that, if fed to ruminants, can transmit transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (**TSE**s), such as BSE. TSEs are a class of rare brain diseases that affect the central nervous system causing death. There are no validated live animal tests, treatments, or vaccines for these diseases.[79]

To mitigate this risk, the Australian Ruminant Feed Ban prohibits feeding RAM to ruminants (e.g. cows, sheep, goats, deer).[80] Clear, consistent labelling of stockfeed containing RAM is critical to prevent accidental feeding to ruminants, ensure compliance with the GBO, and maintain market confidence.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

RAM statement requirements support Australia's national TSE prevention framework and ensure compliance with World Organisation for Animal Health (**WOAH**) BSE standards. These standards underpin international market access for beef, dairy, and other ruminant-derived commodities.

Under the EADRA, states and territories must maintain enforceable feed bans and systems that prevent TSEs. RAM statements ensure that feed containing RAM is clearly labelled so producers can avoid inadvertently feeding it to ruminants. Without these requirements, the risk of misfeeding, contamination and loss of market confidence would increase significantly.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Attachment 2 summarises regulated parties, direct compliance costs and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

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[78] https://dpi.engagementhub.com.au/biosecurity-prohibited-restricted-matter

[79] www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/maintaining-australias-freedom-from-tses/

[80] www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/australian-ruminant-feed-ban/

These provisions impact Queensland's $4.6 billion stockfeed industry[81] and the broader $9 billion ruminant livestock industry (2024–25 livestock GVP excluding poultry and eggs).[82]

Objectives of government action

RAM labelling requirements are necessary to prevent the transmission of ruminant diseases through animal feed in order to protect human health, maintain market access, and comply with WOAH standards.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Nationally agreed standards for preventing the feeding of RAM to ruminants have been developed through collaboration across the human health, animal health, livestock production, feed manufacturing, and food safety sectors. Queensland implements these standards through the Queensland Ruminant Feed Ban Surveillance Program (**QRFBSP**), which demonstrates high levels of compliance.

Occasional non-conformances occur, typically due to unintentional mixing of RAM in feed intended for ruminants or inconsistent labelling by small-scale retailers. These are managed through standard regulatory responses which include instructions to rectify the non-conformance.

Proposed amendments

Government action is required to improve clarity, remove outdated provisions, and align Queensland's RAM labelling requirements with national standards. Updating the Biosecurity Regulation will reduce ambiguity, support efficient compliance, and ensure feed manufacturers, retailers, and producers can meet their obligations under the national Ruminant Feed Ban.

The Biosecurity Regulation is generally effective but contains some inefficiencies that amendments would resolve. These include updating font size labelling requirements to align with national standards, replacing "aquarium fish" with "ornamental fish" for clarity, and relocating RAM labelling provisions to the *CoP for Feed for Food Producing Animals* in Schedule 3 to consolidate all stockfeed labelling requirements.

The direct impact of the proposed amendments is minor, given that RAM labelling requirements are already well-established, and the changes will provide national consistency rather than additional regulatory burden.

Jurisdictional comparison

All other jurisdictions implement the national Ruminant Feed Ban and prohibit feeding RAM to ruminants, with each state embedding the ban and labelling requirements in its own livestock or biosecurity legislation. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

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[81] www.feedlots.com.au/overview

[82] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

Options considered and impacts

Table 9 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 9 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking RAM statements with amendments

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the provision	The expiry of the RAM statement provisions would have short-term benefits for industry and government in the form of reduced regulatory and administrative burden.	The expiry of these provisions would see industry face a loss of clear RAM labelling rules and potential increased risk of accidental non-compliance and misfeeding. This could lead to a loss of market access for the livestock export market. Community would have reduced confidence in feed safety, and the environment could be at higher risk of TSE exposure through misfeeding. Government would face a weakened alignment with national Ruminant Feed Ban and potential impacts on Queensland's negligible BSE status and export market access.
Option 2 – remake with no amendments	Remaking the RAM statement provisions as they stand would retain protections gained from RAM labelling and result in no changes to industry by avoiding adjustment costs. Government would have no change to requirements, no administrative effort or costs for implementing, communicating, or enforcing updated regulations.	Remaking the RAM statements with no amendments would see industry subject to continued inefficiencies, confusion from ambiguous terminology, and challenges for businesses operating across jurisdictions due to inconsistent labelling standards. Government would face misalignment with national standards and loss of opportunity to minimise printing costs.
Option 3 (recommended)– Remake with minor amendments: to	Remaking the RAM statement provisions with amendments would see industry receive reduced printing costs, improved	Industry would face short-term negligible transition costs, operational adjustments, and

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Reduce the required font size for RAM statements on from 10mm to 3mm; and replace the term "aquarium fish" with "ornamental fish" to clarify labelling exemptions for feed intended for non-food-producing fish; and move RAM labelling requirements from Part 9 (Sections 35–41) to Schedule 3 (Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals) to consolidate all stockfeed labelling requirements in one section.	clarity, and alignment with national standards for efficient operations. There would also be administrative efficiencies through consolidation of feed production rules into one Code of Practice. Government would receive improved compliance, reduced administrative burden, and alignment with national standards, maintaining protections for the $9 billion ruminant livestock industry (2024–25 GVP).	potential temporary disruptions to business processes.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation with industry regarding the changes to the Biosecurity Regulation prior to this C-IAS.

Recommended option

Option 3 is recommended – to remake this section with minor amendments. This includes aligning the font size for RAM statements with national standards, revising terminology, and moving RAM labelling requirements to the CoP in Schedule 3. This approach would enhance clarity, lower printing costs, promote national consistency, and improve compliance.

If allowed to lapse, Queensland's specific requirements for RAM statements would be removed, leaving feed manufacturers and sellers reliant solely on the GBO to prevent RAM being fed to ruminants. This would weaken alignment with national Ruminant Feed Ban standards, reduce industry clarity on labelling obligations, and heighten the risk of misfeeding or contamination. The absence of clear, enforceable RAM labelling rules could jeopardise Queensland's negligible BSE risk status and threaten access to key export markets reliant on strict TSE prevention measures.

Survey questions – See *Animal biosecurity (excluding bees)* survey

Survey questions 43–48

The recommended option (option 3) is to standardise font size requirements for RAM labelling to align with other jurisdictions, replace the term "aquarium fish" with "ornamental fish" for clarity and consistency, and relocate RAM labelling provisions to the Code of Practice for Food Producing Animals for operational convenience.

Question 43: Do you support the recommended option?

Question 44: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business?

Question 45: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.

Question 46: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?

Question 47: If so, please explain.

Question 48: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

5.3 Chapter 3 – Matters relating to local governments

Chapter 3 prescribes the formula for calculation of the maximum amount a local government can be required to pay into the Land Protection Fund (the **LPF**) in a financial year. Established under the Biosecurity Act, the LPF seeks to provide for activities that support local governments in meeting their biosecurity responsibilities of managing invasive animals and plants including research, education, and training programs, maintenance of a barrier fence, and taking action under a biosecurity program.

The formula stated in the Biosecurity Regulation multiplies the average annual amount of general rates levies ('R'), for all parcels of ratable land in the local government area (LGA) for the three most recent financial years, multiplied by a determined percentage which considered the population size of the LGA and whether it is an operational area of a barrier fence ('X').

DPI has analysed growth in population sizes across the local governments since the introduction of the formula and found that population growth has not been substantial enough to require a change to the population categories. The categories are still considered an appropriate grouping for population sizes for local governments.

Nature and scope of the problem

Under the Biosecurity Act, local governments are required to ensure that invasive biosecurity matter is managed within their area. The Queensland Government assists local governments with the management of invasive plants and animals by providing

services and conducting activities. The Biosecurity Act also provides that the Minister may request local governments pay an amount for these services.

Providing a maximum contribution formula relative to averaged local government rates, population, barrier fence presence, and land use ensures that the cap on contributions to the LPF is proportionate to a local government's revenue.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Nil.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Within Queensland, there are 77 local governments, with 60 contributing to the LPF. The remaining 17 local governments include Aboriginal and Torres Strait local governments and the Weipa Town Authority. These local governments are not required to contribute as they do not have general rates levied for parcels of land within their LGA. This is part of the regulatory formula that determines a maximum amount for each local government. The maximum contribution rate also takes into account whether the local government benefits from a barrier fence, with those benefiting contributing more.

The maximum contribution rate has not been reached in any given year since the introduction of the Biosecurity Act and Biosecurity Regulation.

Objectives of government action

The objective of chapter 3 is to safeguard local governments from excessive payment requests above a stated maximum, proportionate to a local government's revenue.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The maximum contribution rate calculation was previously agreed to by local governments and is considered an appropriate and transparent method to decide a maximum payment amount.

The establishment of a maximum contribution rate formula that draws upon local government rates averaged over three years (to ensure the data does not reflect an anomaly), population, barrier fence presence, and land use ensures that it is proportionate to local governments' revenue considering land use and population density parameters.

Jurisdictional comparison

Other jurisdictions fund biosecurity differently, with most not requiring local governments to contribute directly. For example, Western Australia collects rates from landholders, whilst South Australia requires local governments to contribute through boards without a maximum monetary cap. Queensland's approach most aligns with South Australia, however, it provides additional safeguards through the capped formula. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 10 outlines the costs and benefits of allowing expiry of this section, remaking this section, or achieving the funding cap through a separate policy. It demonstrates why option 3 – remaking the current approach – is the recommended way forward.

Table 10 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking the maximum contribution calculation for local governments

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the maximum contribution formula	The expiry of the maximum contribution formula could see the state government charge local governments without a legislative maximum. This could benefit the LPF by increasing monetary contributions, but risk local government budgets.	The expiry of the maximum contribution formula would have local governments face increased uncertainty surrounding payments to the LPF. It would be possible for local governments to be charged more than what is feasible, resulting in funds allocated to other areas being redirected and impacting other responsibilities. Expiry of the formula could also result in unequitable contributions from local governments that do not benefit from a barrier fence.
Option 2 – State the maximum contribution formula in an operational policy document	Remaking the maximum contribution formula in an operational policy would make the calculation more easily amendable for government and would likely maintain the cap on contributions and equitable contributions from local government areas which benefit from a barrier fence.	Placing the maximum contribution formula in an operational policy document may not provide a stable safeguard or sufficient government oversight, and may not hold enough power to effectively operate as a safeguard.
Option 3 – (recommended) – Remake maximum contribution formula to maintain safeguards for local governments	Remaking the maximum contribution formula in the Biosecurity Regulation would allow local governments to be safeguarded by a maximum contribution limit that is reflective of population, land use, and barrier fence presence.	There would be no compliance costs associated as this is an administrative provision.

Consultation and outcomes

Local governments were consulted in the original development of the maximum contribution formula. Some local governments have suggested a review of the formula. Other feedback has focused on the current contribution formula used in practice, which sits outside of the Biosecurity Regulation. The maximum contribution rate has not been met in any given year since the introduction of the Biosecurity Act and Biosecurity Regulation, suggesting that it is serving the intended purpose.

Recommended option

Option 3 is recommended – to remake the existing regulation regarding setting a maximum contribution from LGAs for managing invasive biosecurity matter with the funds from the LPF.

If allowed to lapse, local governments would face increased uncertainty regarding payments to the LPF, potentially leading to unaffordable charges that could divert funds from other essential responsibilities and may result in unequitable maximum contribution outcomes for local governments who do not benefit from barrier fences.

Survey questions – see *Invasive plants and animals including matters relating to local government* survey
Survey questions 49–54 The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the existing regulation regarding setting a maximum contribution from LGAs for managing invasive biosecurity matter with Land Protection Funds to provide clarity to LGAs and safeguard LGAs with a maximum contribution rate. Question 49: Do you support the recommended option? Question 50: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 51: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 52: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 53: If so, please explain. Question 54: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

5.4 Chapter 4 – Invasive animal barrier fencing

Nature and scope of the problem

Chapter 4 of the Biosecurity Regulation is divided into two parts:

- Part 1 – Invasive animal boards
- Part 2 – Barrier fence

Invasive animal boards

Part 1 provides for invasive animal boards, including administrative matters for the Darling Downs–Moreton Rabbit Board (**DDMRB**) such as the number of directors, purpose, and area for which the board is responsible.

The DDMRB area covers eight LGAs including Ipswich, Toowoomba, Lockyer Valley, Scenic Rim, Gold Coast, Logan, Southern Downs, and Western Downs. Its operations are primarily funded through annual payments collected by DPI from these councils.

There has been a rabbit board in place for 130 years in Queensland, working alongside Queensland farmers and other land managers to keep rabbits out of prime agricultural lands and natural areas.

Barrier fences

Part 2 establishes that the responsible building authority for a wild dog check fence is the local government for the LGA stated on the barrier fence map.

Wild dog check fences are local government assets, and local governments consider the infrastructure through business operations such as maintenance expenses, insurance, and depreciation. Local governments are considered to have the expertise and coordination as well as the existing stakeholder networks and collaborations required to effectively maintain wild dog check fences in their LGA.

Wild dogs present a number of economic, environmental, and social problems, especially for agricultural business. These impacts include stock losses, predation of small native remnant populations (e.g. koalas), loss of biodiversity, spread of hydatids with potential to spread to domestic animals and humans, and attacks of pets (mainly in urban fringe areas).[83]

The wild dog check fences were built to protect animals in cropping and grazing lands. Although the check fences do not physically link up to the wild dog barrier fence, they play an important role in wild dog control in southern Queensland. Some sections of the DDMRB fence are top-netted to wild dog-proof standard, and these form part of the check fences.

Local governments have had responsibility for wild dog check fences within their LGAs since the 1980s. Local governments that have check fences are Southern Downs, Toowoomba, Goondiwindi, and Western Downs Regional Councils.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Nil.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Please refer to Attachment 2 for a summary of regulated parties, direct compliance costs, and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

Invasive animal boards

Today, rabbits are one of Australia's major agricultural and environmental pests, costing approximately $200 million annually.[84] Rabbits eat pasture and crops, compete with native animals, cause soil erosion, and prevent regeneration of native vegetation. A 2021

[83] www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/farms-fishing-forestry/agriculture/biosecurity/animals/invasive/restricted/wild-dog

[84] www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/pests-diseases-weeds/pest-animals-and-weeds/priority-pest-animals

paper indicated "that rabbits threaten 322 plant and animal taxa listed under Australia's Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act".[85]

Barrier fences

Four local governments hold responsibility for wild dog check fences in Queensland: the Southern Downs, Toowoomba, Goondiwindi, and Western Downs Regional Councils. The 2021 census shows 4,904 livestock jobs, with 4,878 businesses, across these four LGAs. In 2022–23, the livestock industry across these LGAs had a combined GVP of $419,940,039 compared to $6.5 billion in all of Queensland for the same year.[86] It is estimated that wild dogs cost the sheep and beef industries $64 million to $111 million annually. In 2009, Queensland production losses caused by wild dogs were $16.9 million to the sheep and goat industries, $5.2 million in livestock disease management, and $19.9 million in management costs.[87]

Objectives of government action

The objective of government action in relation to the DDMRB and the wild dog check fence is to prevent the further spread and establishment of rabbits and wild dogs outside of their existing range, in order to protect agricultural production such as crops, pasture and livestock, prevent environmental and business impacts, and support ongoing food supply.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The part related to invasive animal boards is considered effective in fulfilling the requirements of the Biosecurity Act (section 62(2)). Further, the DDMRB 2024–25 Annual Report found the DDMRB to be effective and efficient in fulfilling its mandate of successfully maintaining the rabbit barrier fence, preventing rabbit incursions into Queensland's agricultural lands, and upgrading 40% of the fence to dog height for additional wild dog control benefits.[88]

The part related to barrier fences is considered effective as it clearly provides which local governments are responsible for the sections of the wild dog check fence.

Jurisdictional comparison

Invasive animal boards

Queensland's approach to protecting against rabbits is similar to, but more targeted than, other jurisdictions. The DDMRB has specific responsibilities for managing rabbits and maintaining fences. In comparison, South Australia and New South Wales rely on boards that address pest management as part of broader responsibilities, while Western Australia requires landholders to fund groups for pest control. Other jurisdictions do not

[85] onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rec.13552
[86] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[87] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/62431/wild-dog-strategy-2021-26.pdf
[88] www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Work-of-the-Assembly/Tabled-Papers/docs/5825T1429/5825t1429.pdf

have equivalent systems or boards. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Barrier fences

Unlike Queensland, other jurisdictions rely on private landholders to construct and maintain exclusion fencing. Queensland is the only state with a government-managed exclusion fencing system, ensuring a coordinated approach to protecting agricultural and environmental assets from impacts of wild dogs, rabbits, and deer. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 11 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 11 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking Darling Downs-Moreton Rabbit Board and Wild Dog Barrier Fence provisions

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow the provisions for the DDMRB and Wild Dog Barrier Fence to expire	The expiry of the DDMRB and Wild Dog Barrier Fence provisions would result in short-term benefits by reducing industry and government compliance burden, but risk Queensland's livestock industry, valued at $10.3 billion in 2024–25.	The expiry of these provisions would undermine Queensland's biosecurity frameworks, resulting in rabbit and wild dog spread, leading to damages to crops and livestock. Communities and the environment would face impacts of roaming wild dogs such as attacks to pets, spread of disease, predation of native wildlife, and potential for unmanageable populations. Government would also face increased control costs.
Option 2 (recommended)– Remake provisions for the DDMRB and Wild Dog Barrier Fence	The remake of the DDMRB and Wild Dog Barrier Fence provisions would continue protections by limiting rabbit and wild dog spread. This would reduce impacts to crops and livestock, protect communities and the environment from roaming wild dogs, and protect Queensland's livestock	Local governments would be responsible for costs associated with the barrier fence (both the wild dog and the rabbit fence) through contributions to the LPF and will need to consider this in their business expenses. Government would face administrative burden.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
	industry, valued at $10.3 billion in 2024–25.	

Consultation and outcomes

Preliminary feedback indicated that Chapter 4 has an ongoing purpose and should be retained. Some councils have suggested adjustments to board membership, however the board area is not contained in the Biosecurity Regulation and is outside the scope of this review.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the invasive animal boards and barrier fence parts of Chapter 4 to continue to provide effective provisions for collaborative fencing initiatives to prevent rabbit and wild dogs spreading and impacting agricultural production and food supply, as well as the environment.

If these provisions of the Biosecurity Regulation expired, local governments would no longer be the established building authority responsible for managing the rabbits or wild dog check fence. As a result, the chief executive of DPI would become the building authority for the fences. This would cause inefficiencies and resourcing issues as the local governments are considered to have the expertise and coordination, resource allocation, detailed understanding enforcement related to rabbits and barrier fences, as well as existing stakeholder networks and collaborations.

If the Biosecurity Regulation expired, the DDMRB would no longer be responsible for the rabbit fence or managing the European rabbit within the operational area.

Survey questions – See *Invasive plants and animals including matters relating to local government* survey
Survey questions 55–60 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake Chapter 4 to maintain the Darling Downs–Moreton Rabbit Board (DDMRB) and the wild dog check fence provisions setting out local government responsibilities. Question 55: Do you support the recommended option? Question 56: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 57: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 58: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 59: If so, please explain. Question 60: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

5.5 Chapter 5 – Prevention and control measures for biosecurity matter

Chapter 5 of the Biosecurity Regulation provides for prevention and control measures for biosecurity matter. The chapter contains 13 parts which establish a range of regulatory requirements, including:

- Parts 1 and 2 – risk minimisation requirements and moving samples for testing
- Part 3 – statewide entry restrictions
- Part 4 – far northern pest biosecurity zone
- Part 5 – fire ant biosecurity zone
- Part 6 – electric ant biosecurity zone
- Part 7 – banana pest biosecurity zone
- Part 8 – cattle tick biosecurity zone
- Part 9 – grape phylloxera biosecurity zone
- Part 10 – papaya ringspot biosecurity zone
- Part 11 – sugar cane pest biosecurity zone
- Part 12 – white spot biosecurity zone
- Part 12B – polyphagous shot-hole borer zone
- Part 13 – biosecurity management plans

Parts 1 and 2 – Risk minimisation requirements and moving samples for testing [proposed amendment to moving samples to reduce risks]

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 1 of Chapter 5 provides preliminary matters for the Chapter and contains two sections. Section 46 outlines how a person can ensure biosecurity matter or a carrier is dealt with in accordance with a risk minimisation requirement for the matter or carrier (in line with the Biosecurity Manual). Section 46A prescribes how a sample of a carrier may be moved into Queensland or between biosecurity zones, including how the carrier must be secured.

Biosecurity Manual

A risk minimisation requirement in this chapter may also refer to instructions stated in the Biosecurity Manual.[89] The Biosecurity Manual sits separately from the Biosecurity Regulation due to the contents being highly detailed technical requirements, or due to the need for rapid amendment because of the discovery of a new pest or the spread of a new or current pest in another State.

Several provisions in this part of the Biosecurity Regulation prescribe that a person may move a carrier or biosecurity matter if the carrier or biosecurity matter meets the risk minimisation requirements for dealing with the carrier or biosecurity matter in a 'stated way'. The 'stated way' may be a stated chemical product with specific application rates, treatment with a stated temperature, surveillance to have been conducted in a stated way, or a stated procedure; and may stipulate the appropriate level of qualification a person undertaking these instructions may need to have.

Most of the provisions in the Biosecurity Regulation that reference the Biosecurity Manual relate to movement restrictions on fruit and vegetables from interstate and within the State. It is not considered practical to include all details in the Biosecurity Regulation as there are a significant number of combinations and permutations relating to the required treatment of produce entering the State. These changes can be expected to take place within 24 hours of notification and any corresponding movement restrictions need to be adjusted to ensure trade in fruit and vegetables and nursery products are maintained without significant supply chain disruption.

Including these requirements in the main Regulation could result in a delay of many months, which would risk poor biosecurity or market access outcomes.

The technical requirements in the Biosecurity Manual have been reviewed and are current and effective.

Part 2 sets out the relationship between Chapter 5 of the Biosecurity Regulation and the GBO established in the Biosecurity Act. Section 47 prescribes a way of discharging a person's GBO in relation to dealing with biosecurity matter or a carrier, or carrying out an activity. However, unless otherwise stated the Biosecurity Regulation doesn't provide all of the actions a person must take to meet their GBO.

The Biosecurity Regulation allows for the movement of a sample of a carrier into or out of the State, or into or from a biosecurity zone if it's being moved to an approved facility for testing and is quarantine secured. Large volumes of samples are routinely sent for pest, disease, and agronomic diagnostics, and to a lesser extent for quality control testing and accreditation purposes. If this provision was removed, financial and administrative burden would be imposed on submitters as biosecurity certificates would then be required to send each sample.

[89] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/379138/qld-biosecurity-manual.pdf

The Biosecurity Regulation also sets out the technical requirements for sample packing for safe transportation such that it is considered 'quarantine secured'.

There are proposed amendments to this section of the Biosecurity Regulation. Current sample packaging rules in the Biosecurity Regulation do not meet the standards for transporting infectious substances, lacking leak-proof and other safety measures, which pose risks to public health and the environment. While the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (**ADG Code**) and International Air Transport Association (**IATA**) regulations provide strong hazardous materials guidelines, they do not fully address biosecurity concerns for diagnostic biosecurity samples and require staff to be fully trained regarding both regulations. Strengthening packaging requirements in the Biosecurity Regulation will align with the ADG Code and address biosecurity needs, minimising transport risks.

The proposed amendments will strengthen the use of a triple-layer packaging system, including a leak-proof primary receptacle, a durable and leak-proof secondary container, and a rigid outer packaging of adequate strength. Absorbent material will also be required between the primary and secondary layers to contain any leaks. These changes will align with the ADG Code while being tailored to the specific risks associated with biosecurity matter. It is expected these strengthened requirements would add negligible compliance costs, however there is opportunity in the survey question to raise any concerns.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

The movement and handling of diagnostic samples must comply with national and international transport and biosecurity requirements designed to minimise the risk of spreading pests and diseases.

The ADG Code applies to the transport of infectious substances by road and rail, and mandates the use of the internationally recognised triple-packaging system to ensure samples are securely contained during transport.

For air transport, the IATA Substances Shipping Regulations provide detailed packaging, documentation and handling requirements across all transport modes. Compliance with these frameworks is essential to avoid delays that could impede timely laboratory diagnosis and biosecurity response actions.

At the Commonwealth level, *the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth)* imposes conditions on the movement and handling of biosecurity samples once imported into Australia.

Together with the proposed amendments, these obligations ensure that diagnostic samples moved under sections 46 and 46A are transported safely, consistently, and in a manner that supports Queensland's broader biosecurity objectives, including maintaining market access and meeting national standards for managing biosecurity risks.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The risk minimisation requirements set out in this chapter are established to protect Queensland's over $20 billion agriculture sector (2024–25).[90] The establishment of the link to the GBO and the rules in the Biosecurity Manual serve to clarify to regulated parties the relationship between the Biosecurity Act, Biosecurity Regulation, and Manual.

The provisions for moving samples for testing protect Queensland's large and diverse agricultural and livestock industries which rely heavily on diagnostic testing to manage biosecurity risks and maintain productivity. Agricultural producers, livestock industry members, and transport providers must be aware of and comply with proposed updates to packaging requirements to ensure the safe movement of diagnostic samples. The 10 approved diagnostic facilities, which form a critical part of this process, also need to understand and implement these changes. Approved facilities are predicted to experience a distributed cost of $23,309 in Queensland for the first year with no ongoing costs. These startup costs are predicted to be from the addition of new facilities and their related education and record keeping costs.

Although DPI is not aware of any significant breaches in sample packaging, the ADG Code highlights the complexity and scale of transporting such materials. Strengthening the rules for securely packaging diagnostic test samples that may pose a biosecurity risk is essential. Clear and specific guidelines are crucial to ensure consistent handling, prevent contamination or leakage, and minimise the risk of spreading pests or diseases.[91]

Objectives of government action

The objective is to maintain clarity for regulated parties on the relationship between GBO, biosecurity zones, and the Biosecurity Manual to support compliance and management of biosecurity risks.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Effectiveness:

Section 46 is effective in describing the ways to ensure risk minimisation to overarch the proceeding parts. This is the preliminary section.

The current standards for shipping infectious substances, particularly for samples that contain potential pathogens that cause disease in animals, are inconsistent with the ADG Code and IATA, indicating a need for strengthened requirements.

Section 47 is effective as it links the prevention and control measures contained in statewide entry restrictions and biosecurity zones is linked to a person's GBO in minimising risks associated with dealing with biosecurity material where a person reasonably ought to have known of the risks.

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[90] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

[91] https://www.ntc.gov.au/sites/default/files/assets/files/ADG%20Code%207.7_0_0.pdf

Efficiency:

Although the ADG and IATA rules apply, the requirements set out in the Biosecurity Regulation require strengthening in the context of biosecurity risks.

The provisions relating to movement of samples removes the financial and regulatory burden of obtaining biosecurity certificates where there is a high volume of samples sent for routine pest, disease, and agronomic diagnostics including for not-for-profit research related activities. It also resolves an inconsistency where a person may apply for a biosecurity instrument permit which does not attract any fees for the movement of the same diagnostic samples to a facility that is not required to be an approved facility**.**

Jurisdictional comparison

Queensland's approach is generally more detailed and prescriptive than most Australian jurisdictions, providing clearer guidance to regulated parties and supporting more consistent compliance outcomes. Queensland is unique in explicitly regulating the movement of biosecurity matter for diagnostic testing.

Importantly, Queensland's GBO is broadly aligned with the duty-based frameworks in other jurisdictions. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 12 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with some amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 12 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking prevention and control measures for biosecurity matter with some amendments

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – Allow expiry of opportunities provided for movement of samples for testing, clear links to Biosecurity Manual, and clear link to GBO	The expiry of the opportunities for movement of samples for testing, clear links to the Biosecurity Manual and the GBO would result in short-term benefits relating to reduced regulatory burden, but risk Queensland's over $20 billion agriculture industry.	The expiry of these sections would see industry will face higher compliance burden as stakeholders revert to permits for sample movement, uncertainty about requirements, and delays to diagnostics. In addition, there would be a weakened understanding of link between zone and interstate provisions, the Biosecurity Manual, and GBO. Communities and the environment would face increased risk of biosecurity incidents due to inconsistent packaging and movement of samples. Government would also face increased enforcement challenges and higher likelihood of costly biosecurity responses.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 2 – Remake without amendment – maintain provisions for movement of samples for testing, clear links to Biosecurity Manual, and clear link to GBO	The remake of these sections as they currently stand would see protection for communities, industry, and the environment by maintaining opportunities to move samples for testing safely and maintaining the overarching framework linking to the GBO. However, amendments are proposed to improve the safety of test sample transportation.	The remake of these sections as they currently stand would see misalignment with national transport standards. This would see industry face inconsistent packaging requirements and potential IATA access fees, and the community face biosecurity risks from potentially improperly packaged materials.
Option 3 (recommended) – Amend sample packaging requirements. Remake overarching GBO and Biosecurity Manual provisions.	The remake of these sections with amendment would provide industry with clear, consistent requirements without the burden of permits and support for efficient diagnostics. Communities and the environment would have improved biosecurity protection with minimal disruption, and the government will have a proportionate regulatory tool with minimal administrative load. In all, these provisions would protect Queensland's over $20 billion agriculture industry.	The estimated compliance cost for the 10 approved facilities recognised in the Biosecurity Regulation to meet the strengthened packaging requirements would be $23,309 in the first year, with no ongoing costs. Industry would face moderate compliance adjustments to meet strengthened packaging requirements. Government will face minor updates to guidance and administration.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 3 is recommended to remake the existing parts 1 and 2 of this section which would re-establish the current linkages with GBO, the Biosecurity Manual, and sample movement requirements. Option 3 also recommends strengthening sample packaging requirements to support the secure transport of samples of biosecurity matter without imposing the high administrative burden of permits. It would also align packaging expectations with national transport standards, closing gaps in the current requirements. This option would improve biosecurity protection while keeping compliance costs low and requirements easy for stakeholders to understand and apply.

If these sections were allowed to lapse, industry would face higher compliance burdens, communities increased biosecurity risks, the environment greater pest escape risks, and government heightened enforcement challenges and costly responses.

Survey questions – See *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey

Survey questions 61–66

The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the risk minimisation requirement and strengthen test sample packaging requirements, to provide clearer requirements, align with national standards, reduce administrative burdens, and support efficient diagnostics.

Question 61: Do you support the recommended option?

Question 62: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business?

Question 63: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.

Question 64: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?

Question 65: If so, please explain.

Question 66: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 3, Division 1 – Statewide entry restrictions [proposed amendments to banana pest carrier, citrus canker and mediterranean fruit fly controls]

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 3, Division 1 establishes statewide entry restrictions for a range of biosecurity risk carriers including banana pest carriers, branched broomrape carriers, cucurbit virus carriers, European house borer carriers, giant pine scale carriers, mango malformation disease carriers, Mediterranean fruit fly carriers, pyriform scale carriers, potato pest carriers, tomato/potato psyllid carriers, and citrus canker carriers. These restrictions are designed to identify high-risk pest and disease carriers and outline the obligations for individuals dealing with them.

The entry restrictions help manage the risk of pests and diseases being transported into Queensland through human-assisted movement of carriers. Generally, the restrictions apply to the movement of a carrier originating from a state or territory where the pest or disease has been detected, with permissions provided for certified disease or pest-free states, or with some form of clearance that satisfies risk minimisation requirements (e.g. biosecurity authorisation or biosecurity certificate from the originating jurisdiction).

Carriers may include both organic or inorganic materials known to carry the pest or disease, such as soil, hay, produce, planting equipment, or used packaging.

Table 13, below, outlines the risks and rationale for imposing restrictions on the carriers listed in this division. Some opportunities for de-regulation (amendments) are set out within the analyses.

Table 13 Risks and rationale for statewide entry restrictions

Carriers	Risks	Rationale
Banana pest carrier	Banana pests entering Queensland from other states or territories that are known to have or previously had the pests, causing damage to Queensland's banana production systems. Threats include: • **Banana bunchy top virus (BBTV)** – a serious viral disease of bananas that prevents fruit production, with no cure for infected plants. It is present in New South Wales. • **Banana freckle** – a serious viral disease that reduces plant health, productivity, fruit quality, and appearance. It is present in the Northern Territory. • **Panama TR4** – affects nearly all banana varieties, including the main commercial cultivar. This is present in the Northern Territory and Queensland. • **Cavendish-competent Panama disease tropical race 1** – poses minimal risk as it only causes disease in very specific climatic conditions which are not relevant to Far North Queensland growing regions (e.g. drought stress). There is a **proposed amendment** to omit Cavendish competent Panama disease tropical race 1 from the movement restrictions due to the minimal biosecurity risk to Queensland production.	In 2023–24, Queensland supplied 94% of Australia's bananas, making Queensland the most valuable contributor for this commodity. [92] For financial year ending 2025, the value of the Queensland banana industry was $624 million.[93] Due to the multi-million dollar value of this industry, state-wide entry restrictions are considered appropriate to support ongoing production. There is a **proposed amendment** to omit Cavendish competent Panama disease tropical race 1 from the Biosecurity Regulation due to the minimal biosecurity risk which will be dealt with under existing entry conditions for banana planting material.
Branched broomrape carrier	Branched broomrape is a parasitic weed that affects a wide range of broad-leaved plants including crops, pasture species, weeds, and some Australian flora.	For financial year 2025, the value of the Queensland's produce by commodity was:[94]

[92] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[93] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[94] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

Carriers	Risks	Rationale
	Commercial crop hosts at risk include beans, cabbage, canola, carrot, chickpea, clovers, onion, tomato, and potato. With potential crop losses of 30-70%, branched broomrape poses a serious threat to Queensland's agriculture, impacting production and export trade. A single plant can produce 20,000 seeds annually, which may persist in the soil for up to 12 years. It is present in the Murray Bridge area of South Australia, where it is expected to persist and may spread to other jurisdictions. Branched broomrape has not been detected in Queensland.	• beans – $64.3 million • carrot – $25.4 million • chickpea – $812.5 million • onion – $36.8 million • tomato – $70.5 million • potato – $63.1 million Individual commodity value unknown: • cabbage • canola • clovers Due to the multi-million dollar value of these industries, state-wide entry restrictions are considered appropriate to support ongoing production.
Cucurbit virus carriers	Cucurbit pests entering Queensland from other states or territories that are known to have or previously had the pests, causing damage to Queensland's cucurbit production systems. Cucurbit virus comprises: • **cucumber green mottle mosaic virus (CGMMV) (*Tobamovirus viridimaculae)*** – a seed-borne virus that has caused serious losses in cucurbit (mainly cucumber and melon) crops globally. It spreads easily through contact, survives in water and soil, and is transmitted via infected seed and plants. It is present in the Northern Territory, with outbreaks also recorded in Queensland (2015 and 2017) and Western Australia (2016). In Queensland, the virus is confined to three properties and there is a containment strategy in place to prevent further spread.	For financial year 2025, the value of the Queensland's produce by commodity was:[95] • Melons – (rock and cantaloupe) – $39.5 million • Melons (watermelon) – $60.8 million The individual commodity value of cucumber is unknown. Due to the multi-million dollar value of these industries, state-wide entry restrictions are considered appropriate to support ongoing production.

[95] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

Carriers	Risks	Rationale
	• **melon necrotic spot virus (MNSV) *(Gammacarmovirus melonis)*** – causes a serious disease of cucurbit crops, including cucumber, honeydew melon, rockmelon and watermelon. It has been detected sporadically in Australia, in New South Wales (2012), Victoria (2016), and Queensland (2018). Unlike overseas, MNSV infection has not persisted after detection in Australia, possibly due to climate and/or the limited distribution of its main vector, *Olpidium bornovanus*.	
European house borer carriers	European house borer (*Hylotrupes bajulus;* **EHB**) is a destructive pest that targets untreated seasoned pine (*Pinus* spp.) and Oregon Douglas fir (*Pseudotsuga* spp.), commonly used in construction and furniture. Damage is caused by the beetle's larvae and can result in significant structural issues, particularly in roofing timbers. It is present and under official control in Western Australia, where a containment program and restrictions are in place to prevent its spread. Nationally adopted model legislation ensures harmonised measures to manage the risk of EHB spreading to other states and territories.	For financial year ending 2025, the value of the Queensland forestry industry was $244 million.[96] Due to the multi-million dollar value of this industry, state-wide entry restrictions are considered appropriate to support ongoing production.
Giant pine scale carrier	Giant pine scale is a sap-sucking scale insect that targets introduced *Pinus* spp. and related trees, however it can affect all trees. Whilst primarily a forestry pest, giant pine scale also affects amenity trees in gardens and parks, including ANZAC memorial pines. Severely infested trees can become dehydrated, leading to wilt, needle drop, branch dieback and eventual death. Infested trees are weakened and more susceptible to attacks by other pests.	For financial year ending 2025, the value of the Queensland forestry industry was $244 million.[97] Due to the multi-million dollar value of this industry, state-wide entry restrictions are considered appropriate to support ongoing production.

[96] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[97] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

Carriers	Risks	Rationale
	Its impact on commercial softwood forestry plantations is not fully understood, but severely infested trees can experience reduced wood strength and density, defoliation, smaller growth increments, and lower wood quality. It is present in Victoria and South Australia on four *Pinus* species. The pest has not been found in Queensland.	
Mango malformation disease carrier	Mango malformation disease, caused by several *Fusarium* species (*F. mangiferae, F. mexicanum and F. sterilihyphosum*), leads to abnormal flower, leaf, and shoot growth in mango plants, severely reducing fruit yield as malformed flowers do not fruit. Young nursery plants can be severely stunted. The disease is widespread in mango production areas globally and is challenging to manage. Estimated crop losses from mango malformation disease have been reported to be as high as 80–100% in some regions of the world.[98] *F. mangiferae* is present in the Northern Territory. Queensland successfully eradicated an isolated incident in 2009 and remains free of the disease.[99] *F. mexicanum* has not been detected in Australia, while *F. sterihyphosum* has been found on other host plants but not in association with mango malformation disease.	In 2023–24, Queensland supplied 46% of Australia's mangoes, making the state an important contributor for this commodity.[100] For financial year ending 2025, the value of Queensland's mangoes was $94 million.[101] Due to the multi-million dollar value of this industry, state-wide entry restrictions are considered appropriate to support ongoing production.
Mediterranean fruit fly carrier	Mediterranean fruit fly is a highly destructive agricultural pest, capable of infesting over 200 types of fruit and vegetables, with significant impacts on stone fruits, pome fruit, citrus, and guava.	For financial year ending 2025, the value of Queensland's fruit and nut industry was $2.15 billion and for the vegetable industry, $1.58 billion.[103]

[98] www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/farms-fishing-forestry/agriculture/biosecurity/plants/priority-pest-disease/mango-malformation-disease#:~:text=Mangoes%20are%20an%20important%20crop,trees%20is%20safe%20to%20eat
[99] www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/farms-fishing-forestry/agriculture/biosecurity/plants/priority-pest-disease/mango-malformation-disease#:~:text=Mangoes%20are%20an%20important%20crop,trees%20is%20safe%20to%20eat
[100] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[101] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[103] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

Carriers	Risks	Rationale
	Currently, it is present in Western Australia with occasional outbreaks in South Australia and the Northern Territory which are quickly managed to prevent establishment.[102] If it were to establish in Queensland, it could behave differently from endemic species of fruit fly, potentially causing severe impacts on domestic and international trade. A supporting schedule of the Biosecurity Regulation (Schedule 6) identifies Mediterranean fruit fly carriers, aligning with current scientific and industry knowledge of carriers. **Proposed amendments** to this list can be found at Attachment 6.	Given the wide range of fruit and vegetable host species that contribute to Queensland's $20 billion per annum agricultural industries, state-wide entry restrictions are considered appropriate to support ongoing production. Scientific review of the current Mediterranean fruit fly carrier list has resulted in **proposed amendments** to the carrier list (Attachment 6).
Pyriform scale carrier	Pyriform scale is a sap-sucking insect that threatens Queensland's horticulture industries, including avocado, citrus, mango, banana, passionfruit, forestry, and nursery/garden sectors, as well as urban and natural environments. It produces honeydew, which fosters sooty mould, reducing photosynthesis and further harming host plants. Infestations lead to poor plant growth, leaf drop, and reduced fruit size and quality with impacts varying by species. It is present in Western Australia. Queensland remains free of pyriform scale. A supporting schedule of the Biosecurity Regulation (Schedule 7) identifies pyriform scale carriers that have entry restrictions.	Given the wide range of fruit, forestry, and nursery host species that contribute to Queensland's $20 billion per annum agricultural industries, state-wide entry restrictions to prevent entry of this disease into Queensland are considered appropriate to support ongoing production.
Potato pest carrier	Potato pests entering Queensland from other states or territories that are known to have or previously had the pests, causing damage to Queensland's potato production systems. Threats include: • the golden potato cyst nematode (*Globodera rostochiensis*) (**GPCN**)	Queensland grows approximately 4% of Australia's potatoes. While potato production in Queensland is small in comparison to southern states, it is an important commodity that supports regional economies.

[102] onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1440-6055.2011.00842.x?msockid=2b83be0a91136a4039baa910901b6b0a

Carriers	Risks	Rationale
	• the white potato cyst nematode (*Globodera pallida*). These serious pests can significantly reduce crop yield, increase production costs and impact market access, with overseas infestations causing up to 80% crop losses. GPCN is present in parts of Victoria under strict quarantine with movement restrictions in place to prevent its spread.	For financial year ending 2025, the value of the Queensland potato industry was $63.1 million. Due to the multi-million dollar value of this industry, state-wide entry restrictions are considered appropriate to support ongoing production.
Tomato/potato psyllid carrier	The tomato/potato psyllid (*Bactericera cockerelli*) (**TPP**) is an important economic pest of vegetable crops, such as tomato, potato, capsicum, chilli, and sweet potato. It affects crops by feeding on plant sap and causing poor growth, reduced productivity, and low-quality misshapen produce. TPP can also reproduce and develop on some *Convolvulaceae* species such as sweet potato and field bindweed. Queensland faces a major threat from TPP, which is present in Western Australia and Victoria. The pest could disrupt domestic and export markets, increase control costs, and harm home gardens.	For financial year ending 2025, the value of Queensland's produce by commodity was:[104] • tomato – $70.5 million • potato – $63.1 million • capsicum – $130.5 million • chilli – $8.7 million • sweet potato – $63.2 million Given the wide range of fruit and vegetable host species that contribute to Queensland's $20 billion per annum agricultural industries, statewide entry restrictions are considered appropriate to support ongoing production.
Citrus canker carrier	Citrus canker is a pest of citrus fruits that impacts production. It has national pest status and poses a significant risk to the economic value of Queensland's citrus industry when it is present in other states. A supporting schedule of the Biosecurity Regulation (Schedule 7A) identifies citrus canker carriers. However, as of April 2021, there are no known or suspected detections of citrus canker in Australia.[105]	Australia was officially declared citrus canker free in April 2021. The **proposed amendment** is to allow expiry of the statewide entry restrictions for citrus canker carriers due to there being no biosecurity risk. This removes the risk that interstate citrus growers may still be arranging citrus canker free certification of carriers when there is no longer a need to incur that cost.

[104] https://www.daf.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm/horticulture
[105] www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/pests-diseases-weeds/plant/identify/citrus-canker

Carriers	Risks	Rationale
	It is **proposed** to allow the citrus canker statewide entry restriction to expire as there is no longer a risk to be managed.	

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Listed biosecurity risk carriers may be subject to legally binding biosecurity agreements between the Australian Government, all state and territory governments, and peak industry bodies. This includes the EPPRD, which outlines governance and investment to respond and eradicate emergency plant pests and the NEBRA, which outlines national agreements for responding to an incursion of exotic pests and diseases that impact the environment and our way of life.

In addition, biosecurity risk carriers may be subject to various other obligations as outlined in Table 14.

Table 14 Obligations for biosecurity risk carriers

Obligation	Explanation	Prescribed biosecurity risk carriers
Area freedom certification	Official documents that verify specific pests and diseases are free from either parts of the state or the whole state that are used to support domestic and/or international export.	• BBTV • Panama TR4 • banana freckle • cucurbit virus • giant pine scale • pyriform scale • European house borer • golden potato cyst nematode • Mediterranean fruit fly • mango malformation disease • tomato potato psyllid
National management plan	Commonwealth, state, and territory governments agree to a national management plan to address biosecurity risks that are present in Australia in a uniform manner.	• EHB • Mediterranean fruit fly • potato pest • TPP • citrus canker (proposed removal)
Official control	An internationally recognised status with conditions that recognise a specific disease as being under control by the jurisdiction and subject to stringent control and/or eradication actions.	• mango malformation disease • potato pest

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The statewide entry restrictions for carriers of certain pests and diseases primarily impose obligations on businesses or individuals in other Australian jurisdictions seeking to transport specified carriers into Queensland. Collectively, these statewide restrictions protect Queensland's horticulture industry, valued at $4.8 billion in 2024–25.[106]

Queensland producers may be affected by statewide entry restrictions in the instance that they want to import seedlings, cuttings, or other relevant material, however the imposition is considered minimal and beneficial to their enterprise. Maintaining statewide entry restrictions prevents the entry of pests into Queensland, thereby supporting Queensland producers in accessing markets that accept area freedom claims while also supporting production.

Objectives of government action

The objective of the statewide entry restriction provisions is to prevent significant pests and diseases from entering Queensland, thereby protecting the state's vital primary industries, ensuring food security, and preserving access to domestic and international markets.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

It is considered that the statewide entry restrictions under Part 3, Division 1 have been effective in their objective to prevent the spread of stated biosecurity matter into Queensland, evidenced by no reported detections in Queensland since the introduction of the Biosecurity Regulation for:

- banana freckle
- branched broomrape
- citrus canker
- giant pine scale
- mango malformation disease
- Mediterranean fruit fly
- pyriform scale
- potato pests
- TPP

Statewide entry restrictions have been effective in preventing or reducing further incursions of cucurbit virus which is contained to a single property and managed at the property level.

[106] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

Furthermore, the statewide entry restrictions have supported area proof of freedom for BBTV and Panama TR4, enabling producers to continue exporting from the recognised areas of freedom.

Since the Biosecurity Regulation was introduced in 2016, DPI has not been made aware of any significant issues, barriers, or proposed efficiencies to statewide entry restrictions. Preliminary consultation with industry on the Biosecurity Regulation did not raise any issues with the restrictions.

Proposed amendments

Some opportunities for de-regulation and updates to risk pathways have been identified in this review. The suite of proposed amendments for this division is:

- removal of Cavendish-competent Panama disease tropical race 1 from Banana pest carrier controls due to minimal biosecurity risk, and
- removal of citrus canker statewide entry restriction as eradication within Australia has been successful, and
- updates to the Mediterranean fruit fly carrier schedule to reflect current scientific understanding (Attachment 6).

Jurisdictional comparison

All other jurisdictions use entry restrictions. Whilst some jurisdictions may have entry restrictions for the same biosecurity matter as Queensland, not every jurisdiction will have entry restrictions for the same biosecurity matter as this will often depend on the jurisdiction's susceptibility to the particular biosecurity matter. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 15 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment and remake with amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 15 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking statewide entry restrictions

OPTIONS	Benefits	Disadvantages
Option 1 – Allow expiry and allow statewide entry restrictions to no longer apply.	There are limited, short-term benefits to expiry for the Queensland industry as the restrictions apply to interstate businesses and people. There may be some benefits to Queensland businesses that want to import interstate plants or cuttings by no longer having to obtain a biosecurity clearance or authorisation. Government will also see short term reduced enforcement costs due to no regulation, however the incursion response costs in the longer term could be significant.	Lack of statewide entry restrictions is likely to increase the frequency of previously regulated pest and disease incursions into Queensland. This may result in the establishment and/or spread of the pest or disease, impacting Queensland's $20 billion per annum agricultural industries by causing potential reductions in crop yields, quality and reducing market access. In addition, this could increase biosecurity management costs to industry in pest and disease management. Such increased costs may be passed to consumers. Moreover, there may be escalating industry funded and government funded eradication costs if a national eradication response is triggered under the EPPRD. The environment may see impact from pests and diseases with a wide host range, such as Pyriform scale. These pose threat to native plants causing poor growth and plant health.
Option 2 – remake statewide entry restrictions as is	The remake of the statewide entry restrictions would maintain Queensland's protections from pests and disease. This would protect agricultural industries at risk of identified pests and disease, native species susceptible to broad host pests, the food supply from pest-induced shortages, and the government from disease incursion costs. However, amendment is proposed for some statewide entry restrictions to reduce unnecessary burden on industry and government.	Remaking the statewide entry restrictions without amendment will result in the industry being exposed to continued unnecessary regulation in relation to citrus canker and Cavendish-competent Panama tropical disease race 1 restrictions, and the government retaining regulatory burden which is no longer required. There may be some disadvantage to Queensland businesses that want to import interstate plants or cuttings by having to obtain a biosecurity clearance or authorisation.
Option 3 (recommended) – statewide entry	The remake of the statewide entry restrictions would maintain Queensland's protections from pests	Remaking with amendment will see the industry face limited disadvantages, as the restrictions

OPTIONS	Benefits	Disadvantages
restrictions are remade with amendment	and disease. This would protect agricultural industries at risk of identified pests and disease, native species susceptible to broad host pests, the food supply from pest-induced shortages, and the government from disease incursion costs. There would also be reduced industry and government expenditure due to potential triggering of costly national responses under the EPPRD. With amendment, the remake will also remove unnecessary regulatory burden upon industry and government in relation to citrus canker and Cavendish-competent Panama disease race 1 restrictions. Overall, this protects Queensland's horticulture industry, valued at $4.8 billion in 2024–25.	generally apply to interstate businesses and people. There may be some disadvantage to Queensland businesses that want to import interstate plants or cuttings by having to obtain a biosecurity clearance or authorisation. Government will face compliance costs associated with enforcing the Biosecurity Regulation.

Consultation and outcomes

No feedback was received on statewide entry restrictions during preliminary consultation.

Recommended option

Option 3 is recommended – to remake the existing statewide entry restrictions to protect against significant pest and disease incursions, ensure industry productivity and market access, and reduce biosecurity outbreak costs, to remove citrus canker and Cavendish-competent Panama disease tropic race 1 restrictions, and to amend the Mediterranean fruit fly carrier list.

If allowed to lapse, the lack of statewide entry restrictions would increase the risk of pest and disease incursions, leading to their spread, higher biosecurity and eradication costs, reduced agricultural productivity, and potential economic losses. This could result in higher consumer prices, restricted access to local produce, and threats to native plants and ecosystem.

Survey questions – See *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 67–72 The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the existing statewide entry restrictions for biosecurity risk matter to protect against significant pest and disease incursions, to remove citrus canker and Cavendish-competent Panama disease tropical race 1 restrictions, and to amend the Mediterranean fruit fly carrier list, as provided at Attachment 6. Question 67: Do you support the recommended option? Question 68: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 69: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 70: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 71: If so, please explain. Question 72: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 3 Division 2 – Eradicating cattle tick from infested land

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 3, Division 2 establishes statewide pest management requirements and contains only one section. Section 61 requires a person who owns or occupies land infested with cattle tick to act to eradicate cattle tick and comply with any stated procedure (if stated in the Biosecurity Manual).

The Biosecurity Manual sits separately to the Biosecurity Regulation and contains additional biosecurity risk management requirements in a highly detailed, technical form. The Biosecurity Manual includes specific methods and requirements for eradicating cattle tick such as a chemical treatment program, destocking, or pasture spelling. These methods have specific techniques associated in order to achieve a successful outcome. This includes instructions for chemical application rates and frequency of treatment. A landowner must choose from the techniques provided, and follow the procedures and guidelines provided to achieve the technique.

The requirement to eradicate applies to both the tick-free zone and the tick infested zone. The Biosecurity Regulation recognises that cattle tick incursions into the tick-free zone can occur as a result of weather changes but requires landowners to also take part in the shared management principle which underpins all Queensland cattle tick legislation.

Cattle tick is important to eradicate due to its animal welfare and production impacts. Cattle over-burdened with tick can develop tick-worry or blood loss, both resulting in a loss of condition and production in the animal. This over-burden can also result in death. Cattle tick can also transmit tick fever which causes illness and death in cattle.[107]

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Interstate jurisdictions rely on Queensland maintaining the cattle tick-free zone, having legislative control over cattle tick incursions in the free zone via livestock movement restrictions, and the requirement to eradicate cattle tick from the free zone. This is reflected in the processes the livestock industries apply to livestock movements and transactions, as well as established industry supply chain flows within Queensland, and for interstate and international trade via live export.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The 2021 Census provides that there are 12,338 cattle businesses across Queensland. This is divided into 3,240 businesses within the tick-free zone and 9,098 businesses within the tick-infested zone.[108] These producers face estimated cattle tick eradication costs of $133.04 to $167.78 per head of cattle[109].

Queensland contains approximately 49% of the national cattle herd population[110] and accounts for 60% of national cattle feedlot turn-off.[111] The 2022–23 production value of the Queensland cattle industry alone was $6.5 billion.[112]

A 2015 research paper estimated that annual on-farm cattle tick expenditure (production losses and control costs) costs the Australian cattle industry approximately $146 million.[113]

Objectives of government action

The objective of Part 3, Division 2 is to control the spread of cattle tick beyond the infested zone and ensure any spread outside of the infested zone is contained and eradicated.

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[107] www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/farms-fishing-forestry/agriculture/biosecurity/animals/diseases/guide/cattle-tick
[108] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[109] Estimated costs based on real world scenarios experienced over the last ten years.
[110] https://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm/livestock
[111] https://www.mla.com.au/globalassets/mla-corporate/prices--markets/documents/trends--analysis/fast-facts--maps/mla_beef-fast-facts-2025_301025.pdf
[112] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[113] www.mla.com.au/research-and-development/animal-health-welfare-and-biosecurity/parasites/identification/ticks/

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The requirement to eradicate cattle tick is an effective means of dealing with biosecurity risk because successful cattle tick eradication will achieve the regulatory objective of maintaining the integrity of the cattle tick free zone. This current approach is consistent with the shared responsibility principle utilised in the creation cattle legislation across both the Biosecurity Act and the Biosecurity Regulation. A landowner's failure to manage an outbreak can be appropriately managed by issue of a biosecurity order.

The requirement to eradicate cattle tick is an efficient means of dealing with biosecurity risk because successful cattle tick eradication will achieve the regulatory objective of maintaining the integrity of the cattle tick free zone. The current approach is consistent with the shared responsibility principle utilised in the creation of cattle legislation across both the Biosecurity Act and the Biosecurity Regulation.

DPI and producers involved have consistently proven that the tick eradication programs described in the Biosecurity Manual are considered effective, although there is recognition that there are many variables that must be managed to deliver an effective program.

Jurisdictional comparison

Other jurisdictions have similar provisions for the mandatory treatment of cattle tick. However, in these jurisdictions, the legislation allows authorities to impose or mandate eradication requirements, whereas Queensland has a proactive automatic legislative requirement that requires landholders to eradicate cattle tick. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 16 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 16 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking the requirement to eradicate cattle tick from infested land

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of cattle tick eradication requirements	The expiry of the cattle tick eradication requirements would result in short-term benefits of reduced regulatory burden for industry, but risk Queensland's cattle sector, valued at $6.5 billion in 2022–23, through production losses associated with cattle tick outbreaks.	The expiry of the cattle tick eradication requirements would undermine Queensland's biosecurity frameworks by reducing requirements for cattle tick eradication. Industry would lose cattle tick free declared areas, and face increased costs and higher rates of treatments and property level prevention methods. Increased spread of cattle tick introduces a higher risk of production loses due to tick-borne illnesses and loss of condition in cattle, in addition to animal welfare concerns. Community also faces increased risk of cattle tick and tick-borne illness spreading to pet animals and to smaller hobby farms. In addition, the environment will likely see cattle tick and tick-borne disease spread amongst wild animals such as wild brumby.
Option 2 (recommended)– Remake the cattle tick eradication requirements to maintain the declared cattle tick free area	The remake of the cattle tick eradication requirements would maintain Queensland's protections from the spread of cattle tick and maintain the declared cattle tick free area. This would protect production and income from the negative impacts of cattle tick. The community and environment will also maintain protections for pet animals, hobby farms, and wild animals. In all, this protects Queensland's cattle sector, valued at $6.5 billion in 2022–23.	The estimated compliance costs would take the form of eradication costs of $133.04 to $167.78 per head of cattle. This would be imposed on businesses. The government would also see regulatory, compliance, and response activity costs.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the existing regulation regarding eradicating cattle tick from infested land to protect Queensland's cattle industry.

If this portion of the Biosecurity Regulation were to expire there would be detrimental impacts on the Queensland cattle industry. Cattle tick would proliferate through the tick free zone and undermine the integrity of zone declaration.

Survey questions – See *Animal biosecurity (excluding bees)* survey
Survey questions 73–78 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the existing regulation regarding eradicating cattle tick from infested land. Question 73: Do you support the recommended option? Question 74: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 75: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 76: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 77: If so, please explain. Question 78: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 4 – Far northern pest biosecurity zone

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 4 of Chapter 5 establishes the Far Northern Pest Biosecurity Zones (**FNBZ**) and sets out regulatory provisions to manage biosecurity risks specific to this region, including restrictions on moving a pest or carrier between or from a biosecurity zone, planting or cultivating a banana plant in a biosecurity zone and treating an unmanaged banana plant.[114] Part 4 is primarily focused on the banana industry and aims to protect northern Queensland's banana production industry by regulating movement of pest carriers. This part aims to prevent the spread of biosecurity matter beyond the two FNBZs and impact on other parts of Queensland.

A total of 19 far northern pests are listed in Schedule 8 of the Biosecurity Regulation, each one a risk to the agricultural industry in Far Northern Queensland, including Black Sigatoka and Red Banded Mango Caterpillar.

[114] https://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/377604/Far-northern-biosecurity-zone-1-and-2.pdf

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

The zones support the nationally cost-shared Torres Strait Exotic Fruit Fly Eradication Program. The zones also support area freedom claims for quarantine pests of concern through containment measures, as well as complementing the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy (**NAQS**), Strait Protected Zone, and the Torres Strait Permanent Biosecurity Monitoring Zone which manage risk presented by movement of people and goods.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The FNBZ 1 regulates the sugar cane, banana, citrus, melon, and mango sectors across the Cook, Torres, Torres Strait Island, and Northern Peninsula LGAs to protect them from serious economic pests of these crops. The combined production values of the four LGAs in these sectors was an estimated $29.6 million, compared to $2.4 billion for all of Queensland in 2022–23.[115] In the 2021 census, there were 115 jobs in the fruit and nut and sugar cane sectors operating in the four LGAs, compared to 11,988 jobs across Queensland in these sectors.[116]

The FNBZ2 regulates serious pests affecting the sugar cane, banana, citrus, melon, and mango sectors in the Aurukun and Cook LGAs. The combined production value of these sectors, in the two LGAs was an estimated $29.6 million, compared to $2.4 billion for all of Queensland in 2022–23.[117]

It has been predicted that an Australia-wide establishment of Black Sigatoka, a far northern pest, could result in estimated losses of $60 million annually[118] while the eradication of Black Sigatoka from the Tully area in 2001-2005 cost $17 million.[119]

Objectives of government action

The objective is to prevent the incursion and spread of serious pests, including those classified as far northern pests, into other parts of Queensland by controlling the movement of high-risk carriers such as plants, soil, machinery, and equipment.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Evidence suggests that restrictions on moving far northern pest carriers has been reasonably effective. Some formerly scheduled pests, such as mango leaf hoppers, have been found outside the zone, which are likely to have been transported by human assisted movement (hitch-hiker pests). These pests can be difficult to control in any biosecurity management system, and this is not considered to be a failure of the Biosecurity Regulation.

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[115] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[116] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[117] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[118] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261219413000987
[119] https://library.dpird.wa.gov.au/bs_research/22/

Zoning is relatively efficient, but the remote nature of the area poses challenges for compliance.

Jurisdictional comparison

Queensland is unique in being located close to other nations and therefore needs legislative tools to manage these unique risk factors. Some other Australian jurisdictions are responsible for managing biosecurity risks to offshore islands within their jurisdiction, e.g. Tasmania and King Island, and South Australia and Kangaroo Island. However, these jurisdictions do not face the same biosecurity challenges as Queensland, which must address unique threats due to the close proximity of neighbouring countries, conducive climatic conditions, and restricted seasonal access. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 17 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 17 Analysis of options and impacts remaking the Far Northern Biosecurity Zones with amendment

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the FNBZs	The expiry of the FNBZs would result in short-term benefits by reducing compliance costs and regulatory burden for industry and government.	The expiry of the FNBZs would undermine Queensland's biosecurity frameworks and threaten industry, community, and the environment by removing protections from far northern pests. Industry would see an increased probability of production losses incurred from far northern pest introduction, increasing threats to Queensland's sugar cane, banana, citrus, melon, and mango sectors, with a combined value of $2.4 billion in 2022–23.
Option 2 (recommended) Remake the FNBZ regulatory provisions	The remake of the FNBZs would maintain protections from far northern pest introduction for industry, community, and environment. This would protect Queensland's sugar	The estimated compliance costs are not calculable due to the unknown frequency of diseased plants. Community would be subject to cultivation limits and increased costs to comply with risk minimisation requirements.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
	cane, banana, citrus, melon, and mango sectors, with a combined value of $2.4 billion in 2022–23.	The government would also see regulatory, compliance, and response activity costs.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the FNBZs to maintain protections from far northern pests.

If allowed to lapse, key plantation and vegetable cropping systems would be at increased risk from far northern pests.

Survey questions – See *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 79–84 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the provisions for the far northern pest biosecurity zone, to retain protections from far northern pests. Question 79: Do you support the recommended option? Question 80: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 81: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 82: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 83: If so, please explain. Question 84: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 5 – Fire ant biosecurity zone

Nature and scope of the problem

RIFA are highly adaptable invasive ants that can be unknowingly transported in a range of carrier materials if storage and movement requirements are not followed. The spread of RIFA through human-assisted movement to areas outside the fire ant biosecurity zones presents a significant risk to the success of the eradication program.

If allowed to establish more broadly in Australia, modelling by Central Queensland University estimated ongoing annual costs to the Australian economy of more than $1.25 billion (in 2021).[120] Updated estimates indicate these costs are now closer to $2 billion annually.[121] These impacts would arise from damage to agriculture, the environment, infrastructure, and risks to human health.

Sections 66–73 set out the regulatory requirements for how RIFA carrier materials must be managed within fire ant biosecurity zones to reduce the risk of RIFA spreading through human-assisted movement.[122]

Obligations – national, market access, deed, or other

The NFAEP operates under national cost-sharing arrangements between governments. Sections 66–73 play a critical role in containing the infestation within the biosecurity zone and complement the national eradication effort to free Australia from RIFA by 2032.

Sections 66–73 outline how RIFA carrier materials are managed within the biosecurity zones in Queensland. Market access requirements for these materials are determined by individual jurisdictions and, in several instances, do not align with the requirements set out in sections 66–73.

For example, RIFA carrier materials are not consistently defined across jurisdictions, which can result in additional regulatory requirements applied by some jurisdictions. In addition, New South Wales has implemented stricter controls on certain carriers, including a total ban on the movement of both turf and hay sourced from within the Queensland fire ant biosecurity zones into New South Wales.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The current fire ant biosecurity zone covers approximately 1.1 million hectares and is predominantly located in South-East Queensland.[123]

RIFA can spread through the human-assisted movement of carrier materials such as soil, hay, mulch, manure, mining and quarry materials, turf, potted plants, and appliances

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[120] Assessing the Impacts of the Red Imported Fire Ant Report for Biosecurity Qld, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=d409aa7f-d4e5-4e23-b8b8-7f0514864b8b&subId=751052

[121] www. australiainstitute.org.au/report/red-imported-fire-ants-the-benefits-of-avoiding-a-national-disaster/

[122] https://www.fireants.org.au/stop/biosecurity-zones/fire-ants-zones-map

[123] https://www.fireants.org.au/stop/biosecurity-zones

with soil attached. Movement restrictions apply to any person or business dealing with fire ant carrier materials sourced from within the biosecurity zones.

As RIFA can be transported through a wide range of carrier materials, the regulatory requirements do not affect a single industry but apply across multiple sectors, including agriculture, landscaping, construction, nursery, mining and quarrying transport, and the associated supply chains.

Please refer to Attachment 2 for a summary of regulated parties, direct compliance costs and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

Objectives of government action

To eradicate RIFA from Australia and avoid the substantial environmental, economic, and social harm that would result from their widespread establishment.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The Biosecurity Regulation has been effective in establishing fire ant biosecurity zones where movement controls have functionally applied. These zones can be updated in a timely manner to align with the known distribution of RIFA, supporting a responsive and risk-based approach to reducing the spread of RIFA.

The current movement controls applied to regulated fire ant carriers have generally been successful in limiting the spread of RIFA. Notwithstanding this, the NFAEP has been working with affected industries to review the current controls. This review has identified opportunities to introduce additional measures that provide industry with greater flexibility to manage risk and reduce regulatory burden, as well as areas where existing controls need to be strengthened to address unacceptable levels of risk.

Most importantly, the review undertaken by the NFAEP has identified that controls relating to soil, and to businesses that create favourable habitat for RIFA establishment, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the risk of RIFA being spread through the movement of soil.

Jurisdictional comparison

All jurisdictions have implemented entry conditions to manage the risk of RIFA being introduced from infested areas. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

While the NFAEP review continues, the sunset review provides another opportunity to consider the effectiveness and efficiency of the fire ant biosecurity zones and associated movement controls.

Table 18 sets out the costs and benefits of retaining the fire ant zone compared with allowing it to expire with the current Biosecurity Regulation. It demonstrates the continued need for the zone as the recommended option.

Table 18 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking the keeping and moving of RIFA and RIFA carriers

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – Expiry of the fire ant biosecurity zone regulatory provisions	The expiry of Part 5 would result in short-term benefits reducing compliance costs and industry costs in relation to compliance. As a result, the regulatory burden for industry and government would be reduced. However, this would substantially weaken the operation of the biosecurity legislative framework, removing the fire ant biosecurity zones and associated movement controls to limit the spread of RIFA.	Eradication objectives would be significantly compromised without the biosecurity zone in place, increasing the risk of RIFA spreading and establishing more broadly in Queensland. While the costs associated with managing RIFA to meet regulatory requirements would cease if the Biosecurity Regulation were allowed to expire, these short-term savings would be outweighed by the significantly greater long-term economic, environmental, and social costs of living with established RIFA populations. In addition, industries would face increased risk of adverse interstate market access decisions, as other jurisdictions apply their legislative frameworks to maintain RIFA-free status, potentially resulting in trade restrictions and loss of market access for Queensland producers. These impacts are outlined in the Case Study: Impact of Red Imported Fire Ants in Chapter 5.
Option 2 (recommended) – remake fire ant biosecurity zone regulatory provisions	Remaking the Biosecurity Regulation would maintain the existing biosecurity zones and movement controls, restricting the movement of identified carriers with the aim of limiting spread from the fire ant biosecurity zones. This aims to protect the rest of Queensland outside the 1.1 million hectares the fire ant biosecurity zone encompasses, protecting Queensland industries and the agriculture industry valued at $17.6 billion in 2022-23, and the community's way of life.	As RIFA can be transported through a wide range of carrier materials, the regulatory requirements do not affect a single industry but apply across multiple sectors, including agriculture, landscaping, construction, nursery, and mining and quarrying. Regulated parties would continue to incur compliance costs associated with meeting existing movement and management requirements for carrier materials. These associated costs are generally offset as they enable market access to areas not currently affected by RIFA. It is estimated that initial costs for businesses in the first year are $1.6 million, with a cost of $12 million over

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
		the first 10 years. These costs are considered proportionate to the level of biosecurity risk and are outweighed by the significantly greater costs associated with living with established RIFA populations.

Consultation and outcomes

Consultation on RIFA related movement controls has been undertaken separately by the NFAEP as part of its broader review. This includes transitioning away from a multi zone approach to simplify movement controls, introduce uniformity to risk mitigation requirements for soil in line with other carriers, and place more responsibility on those responsible for favourable habitat creation.

The NFAEP review has considered the effectiveness of the establishment of the biosecurity zone, ensuring it reflects the distribution of RIFA and effectively controls movements in the NFAEP operational areas.

In 2025, the NFAEP commissioned an independent Pest Risk Analysis undertaken by Dr John Virtue to assess the effectiveness of existing movement controls. The assessment will inform potential updates to the Biosecurity Regulation and support greater harmonisation of RIFA movement controls across jurisdictions. The analysis largely supports the existing regulatory requirements and, in several cases, identifies additional controls that may further reduce the risk of spread.

Recommended option

As the NFAEP review and the sunset review are occurring concurrently, the recommended option relating to the sunset review is to remake the Biosecurity Regulation in its current form. This will ensure that existing controls, including the establishment of biosecurity zones for RIFA, remain in place while the NFAEP review is completed.

Survey questions – See *Invasive plants and animals including matters relating to local government* survey
Survey questions 85–90 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the fire ant biosecurity zone to maintain protections from RIFA establishment. Question 85: Do you support the recommended option? Question 86: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business?

Question 87: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.

Question 88: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?

Question 89: If so, please explain.

Question 90: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 6 – Electric ant biosecurity zone

Nature and scope of the problem

Electric ants *(Wasmannia auropunctata*) were first detected in Smithfield, a northern residential suburb of Cairns, on 11 May 2006. Electric ants are listed as category 1 restricted matter under the Biosecurity Act, meaning they are a high-risk biosecurity pest, that pose a significant threat to the economy, environment, or human health. There are strict reporting requirements in place, where an authorised person must be notified within 24 hours. The establishment of a biosecurity zone[124] and associated movement controls reflects the significant risks electric ants pose to the environment, the economy, and social amenity.

Electric ants are highly adaptable and can be unknowingly transported in a range of carrier materials if storage and movement requirements are not followed. The spread of electric ants through human-assisted movement to areas outside the electric ant biosecurity zone presents a significant risk to the success of the eradication program.

The cost of failing to eradicate electric ants was assessed by the former Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries (Antony 2006).[125] The analysis estimated that after 30 years of infestation, approximately 350,000 houses could become infested, with the annual cost to residents and industry for treatment reaching almost $14 million.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

The National Electric Ant Eradication Program (**NEAEP**) operates under a nationally agreed response plan developed in accordance with the principles of the NEBRA. The response plan was established prior to the formal introduction of NEBRA and is therefore referred to as NEBRA-like.

The response plan provides the national framework for delimiting, containing, and eradicating electric ants in Queensland, including agreed governance, operational arrangements, and cost-sharing commitments between governments.

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[124] https://www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/5b23c3ed-72a0-422a-8906-9a6795599ce4/electric-ant-biosecurity-zone-map.pdf?ETag=ad88f2d18379b6dd971ce6a5b02e6ae4

[125] Antony, G 2006, 'Wasmannia auropunctata (electric ant)—Draft Initial Economic Impact Assessment', report for the Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries, Economic and Statistical Analysis, 30 December 2006.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The electric ant biosecurity zone is in place in five LGAs in Far North Queensland, reflecting the known location of electric ant infestations. The electric ant biosecurity zone regulates electric ant carriers and impacts multiple industries within the agriculture (including turf and nurseries), residential, mining (including quarries), and commercial sectors. The 2022–23 GVP for agriculture in the regulated LGAs was over $1.6 billion, compared to $17.6 billion for all of Queensland's agriculture. In the 2021 census, there were 5,487 combined livestock, horticulture, and broadacre jobs in these LGAs compared to 54,165 in all of Queensland.

At the time of publication, 18 businesses have applied for biosecurity instrument permits to move materials from within the electric ant biosecurity zone. The cost of not eradicating electric ants to Queensland and Australia out-weigh the impact on restrictions mitigating the movement of carriers.

Objectives of government action

To eradicate electric ants from Australia and avoid the substantial environmental, economic and social harm that would result from their widespread establishment.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Section 74 – 77 allows for the effective establishment of:

- the biosecurity zone accommodating for areas subjected to restrictions as well areas with lesser restrictions.
- controls restricting the movement of identified electric ant carriers from a place within biosecurity zone to areas outside or direct to identified waste facilities.
- processes for keeping of live electric ants by the NEAEP for odour detection dogs training and displays for education purposes.

Jurisdictional comparison

While electric ants are currently only found in Far North Queensland, they are governed by national and state-level biosecurity frameworks across Australia to prevent their spread. They are officially listed on the National Priority List of Exotic Environmental Pests, Weeds and Diseases (2020), highlighting their status as a major threat to Australia's environment and economy. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland’s alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 19 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 19 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking the electric ant biosecurity zone regulatory provisions

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the electric ant biosecurity zones regulatory provisions	The expiry of the electric ant biosecurity zones regulation would result in short-term benefits of reducing compliance costs and regulatory burden for industry and government.	The expiry of the electric ant biosecurity zone regulation would undermine Queensland's biosecurity framework by removing control of electric ants. This would increase the risk of electric ant spread, threatening Queensland's agricultural sector, valued at over $20 billion in 2024-25. This would also threaten communities living with electric ant populations. The cost of failing to eradicate electric ants was assessed at almost $14 million annually in treatment costs after 30 years of infestation (Antony 2006).[126]
Option 2 (recommended) – Remake the electric ant biosecurity zone regulatory provisions	The remake of the electric ant biosecurity zones would maintain Queensland's controls on potential electric ant outbreaks. The eradication of electric ants was reviewed in 2024, with the review concluding the current approach remained technically feasible. It was determined that the Biosecurity Regulation was effectively mitigating the spread to allow the objectives of the eradication program to be achieved. The remake of this biosecurity zone would protect Queensland's	The estimated compliance cost to Queensland stakeholders managing electric ant biosecurity threats would be $10,962 in the first year and $82,382 for the first 10 years. These costs would be imposed upon businesses. DPI has received 18 biosecurity instrument permit applications from businesses seeking approval to move regulated carriers outside the biosecurity zone, indicating that regulatory requirements may impose some operational constraints on businesses. Government would be exposed to regulatory, compliance and response activity costs.

[126] Antony, G 2006, '*Wasmannia auropunctata* (electric ant)—Draft Initial Economic Impact Assessment', report for the Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries, Economic and Statistical Analysis, 30 December 2006.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
	agricultural sector, valued at $17.6 billion in 2022–23.	

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

The eradication of electric ants was reviewed in 2024, with the review concluding that eradication remains technically feasible under the current approach.[127]

As eradication continues to be the primary objective, the review also confirmed that the existing controls relating to the movement of electric ant carriers remain justified and effective in managing the risk of spread.

It is therefore recommended that the Biosecurity Regulation sections relating to electric ants be remade without amendment.

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the existing electric ant biosecurity zone provisions to protect Queensland from possible electric ant incursions.

Survey questions – See *Invasive plants and animals including matters relating to local government* survey
Survey questions 91–96 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the electric ant biosecurity zone to maintain protection from electric ant incursions. Question 91: Do you support the recommended option? Question 92: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 93: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 94: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 95: If so, please explain. Question 96: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

[127] www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/c2e35f19-0f4b-4eaf-9e2b-249db3fc6c82/surveillance-program-electric-ants-2025.pdf?ETag=34c38074055d7e99694ccf7e02065669

Part 7 – Banana pest biosecurity zone [proposed amendment to remove Northern banana biosecurity zone]

Nature and scope of the problem

Regulated pests of bananas pose a serious threat to Queensland's banana industry which generated an annual production value of $563 million in 2022–23.[128] These pests impact the production of banana plants and can result in the death of the plant.
The banana pest biosecurity zone prevents the spread of banana pests in Queensland, through the Northern Banana Biosecurity Zone (**NBBZ**) and the Southern Banana Biosecurity Zone (**SBBZ**).[129] These zones aim to regulate the movement of banana pest carriers to protect the state's banana industry from serious threats such as Panama TR4 and BBTV. However, a review of the current regulations has identified the need for amendments to ensure their continued relevance and effectiveness.

The NBBZ was established to manage Panama TR4 and exclude BBTV. However, Panama TR4 is now successfully contained to the property level, with the most effective management of spread being property-level biosecurity management. Additionally, pests such as BBTV are successfully excluded from the area covered by the NBBZ by the Far Northern Biosecurity Zones 1 & 2 and the SBBZ. These factors render the NBBZ redundant.

As the NBBZ is no longer required to mitigate biosecurity risks associated with Panama TR4, maintaining the NBBZ may give growers a false sense of security, therefore undermining efforts to increase industry uptake of on-farm biosecurity practices. Removing the NBBZ would ease regulatory burdens on the banana and sugar cane industries without increasing biosecurity risks, which are already managed through other measures. Its maintenance imposes unnecessary restrictions on carrier movements and the industry's clean planting scheme. The SBBZ remains necessary for the management of BBTV at the southern end of the zone.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Properties with a Panama TR4 detection have obligations for moving banana pest carriers (such as fruit). Panama TR4 is listed as an emergency plant pest in the EPPRD, which is a legally binding biosecurity agreement between the Australian Government, all state and territory governments, and peak industry bodies outlining governance and investment to respond and eradicate emergency plant pests. Queensland maintains partial area of freedom for Panama TR4, supporting industry market access. The containment of BBTV via zone provisions is maintained by industry and government surveillance activities.

[128] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[129] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/377602/Banana-biosecurity-zones-seperated.pdf

Size of problem and who is affected by it

An estimated 94% of Australian bananas are grown in Queensland.[130] The NBBZ and SBBZ cover 26 LGAs, with the NBBZ recorded as containing 551 fruit and nut businesses alone in the 2021 census.[131] The introduction and spread of banana pests within Queensland would have detrimental impacts not just on industry but on the community due to the potential development of food security issues.

Objectives of government action

The objective of government action is to protect the Queensland banana industry from pests by introducing movement restrictions to protect banana production and maintain market access for banana plants and planting materials.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The SBBZ is effective and efficient in achieving its aim of containing BBTV. BBTV has been roughly contained to the current boundaries since 1948. There have been only two outbreaks of BBTV in Far North Queensland (Innisfail in 1926 and 1954) prior to the introduction of clean planting material, which were promptly detected and eradicated.

The NBBZ has been identified as redundant due to Panama TR4 being managed on a property level and the effectiveness of the SBBZ at containing BBTV to southern Queensland. In the absence of the NBBZ there would be minimal impacts to market access as Queensland would continue to maintain statewide entry restrictions to prevent further incursions of BBTV and Panama TR4 into Queensland.

Jurisdictional comparison

Jurisdictions with sizeable banana industries, including New South Wales, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, maintain similar controls for the movement of specific banana pest carriers. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 20 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with amendment. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

[130] abgc.org.au/our-industry/

[131] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/

Table 20 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking the Northern and Southern Banana Biosecurity Zones

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the SBBZ and NBBZ	Industry and government would receive a reduction in regulatory burden and costs.	The industry located in SBBZ would be at risk of the spread of diseases previously managed by the zone (e.g. BBTV). The spread of these diseases could impact production and income.
Option 2 – Remake the SBBZ and NBBZ with no amendments	Under this option, industry would face continued movement restrictions. The community would maintain continued protection of home-grown banana plants through banana pest carrier movement restrictions remaining.	Industry would be subject to unnecessary regulatory burden by remaking the redundant NBBZ. The banana industry as a whole would continue to face direct compliance costs estimated at $246 for the first year, and $1,849 for the first 10 years.
Option 3 (recommended)– Remake the SBBZ but allow for expiry of NBBZ	Government would maintain prevention and control measures for banana pest carriers, supporting the industry and its role in the Queensland economy, while seeing a reduction in regulatory burden and costs. Industry would have reduced regulatory burden and increased freedom of movement with the removal of the NBBZ. This option would effectively protect Queensland's banana industry, valued at $563 million in 2022–23.	The banana industry as a whole would maintain current estimated compliance costs of $246 for the first year, and $1,849 for the first 10 years. This is considered reasonable given the value of the industry.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 3 is recommended – to remake the SBBZ, but allow for the expiry of the NBBZ. This option will allow for the continued protection of Queensland's banana industry and reduce unnecessary regulatory burden on producers.

If the SBBZ is allowed to lapse, there is a risk of BBTV spreading beyond the SBBZ and industries within the SBBZ would face increased risk from BBTV, potentially leading to reduced production and income losses.

Survey questions – See *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 97–102 The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the Southern Banana Biosecurity Zone, but allow for the expiry of the Northern Banana Biosecurity Zone, continuing protection from banana pests while removing unnecessary regulatory burden. Question 97: Do you support the recommended option? Question 98: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 99: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 100: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 101: If so, please explain. Question 102: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 8 – Cattle tick biosecurity zone

Nature and scope of the problem

Cattle tick is an external parasite that mainly affects cattle but can also be found on other animals such as horses and goats. Cattle ticks pose a significant risk to Queensland's agriculture industry by reducing livestock productivity through weight loss, anaemia, and decreased milk production, as well as transmitting diseases such as tick fever. Their presence can lead to substantial economic losses for farmers due to increased costs for treatment, prevention, and management. The current regulation for cattle tick was introduced in July 2016 and takes a risk-based approach to managing cattle tick. It requires cattle owners and other stakeholders who deal with cattle to take reasonable and practical measures to prevent, manage, and respond to biosecurity risks they ought to reasonably be aware of, under the GBO. The Biosecurity Regulation supports property owners to take a self-management approach for biosecurity measures, including monitoring and treating for livestock. Prior to July 2016, cattle tick was regulated under the *Stock Act 1915* and subordinate legislation.

Part 8 of Chapter 5 of the Biosecurity Regulation establishes the cattle tick biosecurity zones to prevent cattle ticks from spreading through Queensland and contains notification and movement requirements. It establishes the cattle tick-infested zone

(sometimes referred to as the cattle tick zone) and cattle tick-free zone, with the two zones meeting at the cattle tick line.[132]

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

The cattle tick-free zone in Queensland is critical for ensuring that livestock and livestock products can move freely from Queensland to other states and territories that are free of cattle ticks (e.g. South Australia). Movement controls and certification requirements for livestock moving from the infested zone to the tick-free zone or other states help safeguard market access by preventing spread.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

There were an estimated 12,338 cattle business within all of Queensland in the 2021 census. Of these, 9,098 operated within the cattle tick zone. The cattle tick zone regulates these businesses across 47 LGAs.[133] The Queensland cattle sector generated an annual production value of $6.5 billion in 2022–23, with over $4.5 billion generated in the zone area alone.[134] In the 2021 census, there were an estimated 17,357 cattle industry-related jobs across all of Queensland, with 12,985 within the regulated LGAs. Additionally, there are 79,166 registered cattle biosecurity entities across Queensland.

A 2022 report stated that the annual cost of cattle tick in Northern Australia is an estimated $128.2[135]. This cost includes treatments and production losses. Additionally, the New South Wales Department of Primary Industries predicts that a cattle tick outbreak could cost the New South Wales cattle industry up to $30 million.[136]

Objectives of government action

The objective of the cattle tick biosecurity zone regulatory provisions is to prevent the spread of cattle ticks outside the cattle tick-infested area.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The cattle tick biosecurity zone regulatory provisions have been generally effective in maintaining the integrity of the cattle tick-free zone and reducing the economic impact of cattle ticks on the livestock industry. However, the provisions do heavily rely on stakeholder awareness of obligations, supporting stakeholders, and regular inspections and enforcement of non-compliance penalties.

The provisions provide clear zoning of Queensland, with stricter controls in the cattle tick-free zone. The approach also promotes proactive management and reduces reliance

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[132] www.arcgis.com/apps/mapviewer/index.html?webmap=2498f88a4aea447786c4ab6bc1ad4c87&extent=134.3187,-29.8425,166.7723,-13.0066

[133] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/

[134] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/

[135] https://www.mla.com.au/globalassets/mla-corporate/research-and-development/final-reports/bahe0327_final-report_revised.pdf

[136] https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1640120/Cattle-Tick-Owner-Treatment-Scheme-Manual.pdf

on government intervention by placing responsibilities on stakeholders (shared responsibility).

Managing biosecurity risks has become more challenging due to increasing risks, the changing nature of risk, and increases in associated management costs. Some stakeholders may lack the knowledge or resources to implement effective biosecurity measures. Movement of livestock across state borders can complicate biosecurity efforts, requiring coordination with other jurisdictions. Cattle ticks may develop resistance to treatments, requiring ongoing research and adaptation of control measures. Furthermore, compliance monitoring can be resource-intensive and challenging especially in remote areas.

Jurisdictional comparison

All other jurisdictions maintain regulations for managing cattle tick through biosecurity zones, protected areas and/or movement restrictions. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 21 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 21 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking the cattle tick biosecurity zone

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the cattle tick biosecurity zone regulation	Industry and government would receive a reduction in regulatory burden and costs in the short term. There are no long-term benefits to allowing the expiry of the cattle tick biosecurity zone.	Under this option, industry would face increased risk of cattle tick spread. This would introduce an increased risk of illness and tick-borne disease, increased risk of production loss and income loss. It also would introduce risks to animal welfare. Communities would face increased risk of cattle tick and tick-borne disease spreading to pet animals or small hobby farms. Government could also face a large-scale outbreak due to the increased spread of cattle tick. An outbreak would result in increased costs for prevention measures, treatment of animals, and staff deployed in the response.
Option 2 (recommended) – Remake section	Under this option, industry would benefit from a reduced risk of spread of cattle tick, minimising impacts on productivity.	Industry will have estimated continued direct compliance costs estimated at $8.50 to $52 per head of

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
	The community would experience a lower risk of cattle-tick and tick-borne disease spreading to pet animals or small hobby farms. This option would protect Queensland's cattle sector, valued at $6.5 billion in 2022–23.	cattle when there is a need to move from the cattle tick-infested zone to the cattle tick-free zone[137].

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

A stakeholder consultation was conducted in the 2018 review of the tick management framework.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the existing cattle tick biosecurity zone to protect Queensland's cattle industry from widespread production losses and animal welfare concerns.

If allowed to lapse, the increased spread of cattle ticks could lead to illness, tick-borne diseases, production and income losses, risks to animal welfare, threats to pets and wildlife, and significant costs for prevention, treatment, and outbreak response efforts.

Survey questions – See *Animal biosecurity (excluding bees)* survey
Survey questions 103–108 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the cattle tick biosecurity zone regulation to maintain protections for Queensland's cattle industry and prevent widespread production losses. Question 103: Do you support the recommended option? Question 104: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 105: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.

[137] DPI estimates of different market pathways, seasonal and livestock age and size scenarios, noting that specific NLIS data is not able to be used for this purpose.

Survey questions – See *Animal biosecurity (excluding bees)* survey
Question 106: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?
Question 107: If so, please explain.
Question 108: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 9 – Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 9 of Chapter 5 of the Biosecurity Regulation establishes the grape phylloxera biosecurity zone, identifies grape phylloxera carriers (Schedule 9 of the Biosecurity Regulation), and sets out the movement restrictions and risk-mitigation requirements necessary to prevent the introduction and spread of grape phylloxera (*Daktulsphaira vitifoliae*) into Queensland. These provisions are critical to protecting the state's grape and wine industries, which contribute significantly to Queensland's economy through table grape production, wine manufacturing, and associated tourism, particularly in regions such as the Granite Belt and South Burnett.

Grape phylloxera is a highly destructive pest of grapevines, causing severe economic impacts on the grape and wine industries through significant production losses and vine death. Most commercial grapevines grown in Queensland are highly susceptible to phylloxera, and there are no effective chemical or biological controls for the pest. Management relies on the costly removal of infested plants and replanting with resistant rootstocks, making prevention of entry and spread the only viable control strategy. If phylloxera were to establish in Queensland, it would jeopardise the profitability of the state's grape industries and have significant trade implications for fresh fruit and plant product exports. Backyard growers and ornamental vine owners would also be affected.

Phylloxera is currently present in limited regions of Victoria and New South Wales,[138] where it is under official control through local legislation and national management protocols. Queensland remains free from grape phylloxera. Movement restrictions for carriers are critical to maintaining this status. The zone is made up of two areas, the State Grape phylloxera exclusion zone (**PEZ**) and the State Grape phylloxera risk zone (**PRZ**).[139]

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

These zones align with the national grape phylloxera management protocol, which is used by all Australian states and territories to manage the pest.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The grape phylloxera biosecurity zone regulates the grape industry in the Balonne, Banana, Central Highlands, Maranoa, North Burnett, Paroo, and Western Downs LGAs. In 2022–23, the GVP for the table grape sector in these LGAs was $19.2 million compared

[138] www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/pests-diseases-weeds/plant/identify/grape-phylloxera
[139] https://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/377605/Grape-Phylloxera-Exclusion-Zone.pdf

to $39 million across Queensland. In the 2021 census, there were 545 jobs in the fruit and nut sector in these LGAs, compared to 8,093 fruit and nut jobs in all of Queensland.[140]

An incursion could adversely impact Queensland's grape industry, with a report on the potential impact of grape phylloxera upon the Western Australian wine sector stating that "if strict quarantine measures to limit spread are not implemented, a phylloxera incursion could affect 60–70% of vines and cause cumulative losses of $150–290 million over a 50–year period. This is equivalent to a 3–6% annual contraction of winegrape production."[141]

If the current regulation expires, Queensland grape growers will face significant market access issues, as PEZ status enables interstate trade with reduced pest management requirements, lowering production costs, and enhancing competitiveness.

Objectives of government action

Government action is required to prevent the entry of grape phylloxera into Queensland, in order to protect Queensland's grape industries, maintain market access, and ensure alignment with national biosecurity protocols.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The current regulations have been effective in preventing the entry and spread of grape phylloxera in Queensland, as there have been no confirmed detections since the Biosecurity Regulation was introduced in 2016.

Victoria and New South Wales remain the only states with confirmed phylloxera detections, and Queensland's entry conditions for risk carriers align with national obligations to manage the pest across all jurisdictions. While efficient in maintaining pest-free status, the national system is under review and Queensland may need to adjust its regulatory framework to align with updated national protocols in the future.

Jurisdictional comparison

Other jurisdictions manage grape phylloxera through biosecurity zones under the national protocol, with some jurisdictions being entirely classified as PEZ. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 22 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

[140] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[141] onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1155/ajgw/4815715?msockid=3f03027a11926047379d148010916184

Table 22 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking the grape phylloxera biosecurity zone.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the grape phylloxera biosecurity zone.	Under this option, industry would receive a reduction in their regulatory burden, but Queensland's grape industry would be at risk.	Under this option, industry would face exposure to potential grape phylloxera incursions, damage to grape plants and increasing costs for treatment. Queensland would also be out of alignment with national regulation.
Option 2 (recommended)– Remake grape phylloxera biosecurity zone	Under this option, risks to Queensland's grape industry worth $39 million (in 2022–23), would be managed from phylloxera. Queensland would also be in alignment with a nationally consistent approach.	Businesses would have estimated direct compliance costs of $13,503 for the first year, and $101,480 in the first 10 years.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the grape phylloxera biosecurity zone regulation to maintain alignment with national regulation and protect Queensland's wine grape and table grape industries.

If allowed to lapse, the grape industry would face exposure to potential grape phylloxera incursion and damage to grape plants, and Queensland would not be aligned with the national regulation. Movement of phylloxera carriers into Queensland from infested states would be uncontrolled, significantly increasing the risk of pest introduction. This would compromise the viability of Queensland's grape industries, disrupt interstate trade, and increase production costs due to stricter pest management requirements. Given the limited control and eradication options for phylloxera, maintaining the current biosecurity zones and movement restrictions is essential to protect Queensland's grape production industries and broader public interests

Survey questions – See *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 109–114 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the grape phylloxera biosecurity zone regulation to maintain alignment with national regulation and protect Queensland's grape industry. Question 109: Do you support the recommended option? Question 110: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 111: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 112: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 113: If so, please explain. Question 114: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 10 – Papaya ringspot biosecurity zone

Nature and scope of the problem

Papaya production is important to Queensland as it supports regional economies, particularly in tropical areas like Far North Queensland, through fresh fruit supply, employment opportunities, and contributions to the state's agricultural exports.

Part 10 of Chapter 5 of the Biosecurity Regulation establishes the papaya ringspot biosecurity zones[142] and sets out the movement restrictions and risk-mitigation requirements necessary to prevent the further spread of papaya ringspot virus type P (**PRSV-P**) within Queensland. PRSV-P is a highly destructive plant virus that affects papaya (*Carica* spp.), cucurbits, and some members of the *Chenopodiaceae* family. The virus is currently confined to parts of South-East Queensland, including Bundaberg, Gin Gin, and northern Brisbane, where it has been present since its first detection in 1991.[143]

PRSV-P has been managed through biosecurity zones and movement restrictions to prevent its spread. The virus poses a significant threat to Queensland's papaya industry, particularly in North Queensland, where production relies on PRSV-P-susceptible varieties.

PRSV-P has no viable eradication or chemical control options, and its spread would compromise the viability of Queensland's papaya industry, disrupt market access, and impact home and community gardeners. Scientific evidence supports the inclusion of cucurbits in the biosecurity zones, as Queensland strains of PRSV-P can infect both *Carica* and *Cucurbita* species.

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[142] https://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/377606/Papaya-Ringspot-Biosecurity-Zones-1-And-2.pdf

[143] www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/farms-fishing-forestry/agriculture/biosecurity/plants/priority-pest-disease/papaya-ringspot-disease

Sections 90–92 of the Biosecurity Regulation establish the papaya ringspot biosecurity zone 1 to regulate the movement of carriers, including papaya, cucumber, melon, pumpkin, and squash, within 22 LGAs in South-East Queensland. Zone 2 regulates the same commodities in the Brisbane, Bundaberg, Logan, Moreton Bay, and Redland LGAs. These zones are designed to minimise the spread of PRSV-P by imposing movement restrictions on these carriers unless authorised by a permit or biosecurity certificate. By targeting these sectors and geographic areas, the sections provide a structured approach to containing the virus and protecting Queensland's broader agricultural and horticultural industries.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Maintaining part-state freedom by containing PRSV-P through movement restrictions on carriers leaving the containment zone has successfully kept the rest of Queensland free from the virus and supports market access for plants intended for planting in the Northern Territory.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The papaya ringspot biosecurity zone 1 regulates the papaya, cucumber, melon, pumpkin, and squash sectors in 22 LGAs. In 2022–23, the GVP for all fruit and nut production in these LGAs was $997.9 million compared to $1.9 billion in all of Queensland, while the specific GVP for melons and pumpkins in these LGAs was $56.3 million compared to $126.1 million in all of Queensland (no data for papaya, cucumber or squash). In the 2021 census, there were 8,681 jobs in the fruit and nut and vegetable sectors in these LGAs, compared to 13,286 fruit and nut and vegetable jobs in all of Queensland.[144]

The papaya ringspot biosecurity zone 2 regulates the papaya, cucumber, melon, pumpkin, and squash sectors in the Brisbane, Bundaberg, Logan, Moreton Bay, and Redland LGAs. In 2022–23, the GVP for all fruit and nut production in these LGAs was $520 million compared to $1.9 billion in all of Queensland, while the specific GVP for melons and pumpkins in these LGAs was $22.8 million, compared to $126.1 million in all of Queensland (no data for papaya, cucumber or squash). In the 2021 census, there were 4,135 jobs in the fruit and nut and vegetable sectors in these LGAs, compared to 13,286 fruit and nut and vegetable jobs in all of Queensland.[145]

The severe risk of PRSV-P was highlighted in 1992, when PRSV-P was detected in Hawaii. By 1998, Hawaii's papaya harvest had reduced by 50% and yields per acre reduced by 35%.[146]

[144] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[145]qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[146] https://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2004/Oct/17/op/op08p.html

Objectives of government action

Government action is required to protect papaya and cucurbits industries and market access by preventing the spread of PRSV-P in Queensland.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The current regulation is effective in containing PRSV-P within designated biosecurity zones, as there have been no detections outside these zones since the Biosecurity Regulation was introduced in 2016. Queensland remains the only state in Australia with confirmed detections of PRSV-P and movement conditions for risk carriers leaving the zones are critical to preventing its spread.

Jurisdictional comparison

Within Australia, papaya is primarily grown in Queensland, with smaller production in the Northern Territory and Western Australia. However, Queensland's papaya controls align with other jurisdictions, with the Northern Territory similarly enforcing movement restrictions on certain *Carica* species. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 23 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 23 Analysis of options and impact in remaking the Papaya ring spot biosecurity zone

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the papaya ringspot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions	Under this option, industry would have reduced compliance costs. However, Queensland's papaya and cucurbit industries would be at risk.	Industry would face an increased risk of PRSV-P spread, higher pest management costs, and potential large scale production losses. The community could face a loss of production in home grown pawpaws resulting in reduced supply chain availability. Government would face increased biosecurity response costs.
Option 2 (recommended)– Remake the papaya ringspot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions	Under this option, industry would maintain market access and pest-free production areas. This option would maintain containment and support biosecurity objectives.	Industry would face ongoing compliance costs for movement restrictions. This estimated to be $14,013 in the first year and $105,312 in the next 10 years. Government would have ongoing enforcement and monitoring costs.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
	The option protects Queensland's fruit and nut sector, valued at $1.9 billion in 2022–23.	

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation. However, during preliminary consultation, some representative stakeholder groups offered support for continuation of this zone.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the papaya ringspot biosecurity zones to protect Queensland's papaya and cucurbit industries, maintain market access by preventing incursions and prevent the spread of PRSV-P. If allowed to lapse, the industry would face greater risk of PRSV-P spread and resultant production losses.

Survey questions – See *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 115–120 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the papaya biosecurity zones to maintain protections for the papaya industry. Question 115: Do you support the recommended option? Question 116: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 117: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 118: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 119: If so, please explain. Question 120: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 11 – Sugar cane pest biosecurity zone [proposed amendment to zone 6]

Nature and scope of the problem

Sugar cane production is crucial to Queensland's economy, with the state accounting for over 95% of Australia's sugar cane output,[147] generating $6.5 million annually in sugar

[147] www.canegrowers.com.au/industry-facts-and-figures

exports, and holding a value of production of $1.6 billion in the financial year ending 2025.[148]

The Biosecurity Regulation establishes six sugar cane biosecurity zones[149] in Queensland to prevent the spread of sugar cane pests which could impact production. These zones impose restrictions on the movement of sugar cane pest carriers, such as plants, soil, and appliances, into and within the state. The movement restrictions aim to limit the risk of spreading biosecurity threats, particularly diseases like Fiji leaf gall virus, which can have significant economic and environmental impacts on sugar cane production. For example, in 1979 Fiji leaf gall virus was present in Queensland, resulting in 5–7% yield losses which equated to over 11,000 tonnes of lost crop.[150]

There have been some amendments identified to ensure the continued efficiency of the zone.

Proposed amendment

The sugar cane pest biosecurity zone 6 (Woodford Special), which includes a research station, affects parts of the Sunshine Coast, Moreton Bay, and Somerset LGAs. The biosecurity concerns could be more effectively managed under a restricted place declaration under the Biosecurity Act. This would reduce regulatory burden on the single property owner, while maintaining biosecurity protections.

The recommended approach is to re-establish the sugar cane pest biosecurity zones with amendments to remove Zone 6 (Woodford Special) and manage its risks under a restricted place declaration. This change balances the protection of Queensland's $1.5 billion sugar cane industry (2022-23)[151] with human rights considerations, such as property rights and privacy. Minor amendments are also proposed to improve interpretation of requirements for the remaining five zones.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

There are no restrictions upon moving sugar cane interstate in relation to sugar cane pests.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The sugar cane pest biosecurity zone regulates and protects the sugar cane sector across most of Queensland. In the 2021 census, there were 3,895 sugar cane and 3,926 sugar processing jobs in Queensland .[152] Production also supports regional economies in areas like the Burdekin, Mackay, and Wide Bay-Burnett.

[148] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[149] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/377607/Sugar-cane-biosecurity-zones.pdf
[150] https://elibrary.sugarresearch.com.au/server/api/core/bitstreams/6a2199b1-7f30-4dab-a24f-1c4e7eee4f55/content
[151] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[152] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/

The sugar cane pest biosecurity zone 6 (Woodford special) regulates the sugar cane sector in parts of the Sunshine Coast, Moreton Bay and Somerset LGAs.[153] In 2022–23, the GVP for the sugar cane sector in these LGAs was $3.2 million.[154]

Objectives of government action

Government regulation is required to prevent the spread of sugar cane pests and diseases, such as Fiji leaf gall virus, by maintaining biosecurity zones and restricting the movement of pest carriers into and within Queensland. This is based on known distribution of the relevant diseases in the state, and carrier pathways.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The Biosecurity Regulation has been effective in containing sugar cane pests and diseases, with no significant outbreaks reported outside the designated biosecurity zones since its implementation.

The zoning system has successfully protected pest-free areas and supported the sustainability of Queensland's sugar cane industry. However, the zoning system, which requires permits or biosecurity certificates for carrier movement, could be improved to enhance efficiency and industry compliance.

Proposed amendment

Zone 6 is proposed to be amended to transition to property-scale management under a Restricted Place Declaration.

Jurisdictional comparison

Queensland and New South Wales are the only jurisdictions that produce sugar cane in Australia.[155] Queensland takes a comprehensive approach by regulating the industry under biosecurity legislation, whereas New South Wales no longer regulates sugar cane pests. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 24 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with some amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

[153] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/377607/Sugar-cane-biosecurity-zones.pdf

[154] qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/

[155] www.canegrowers.com.au/industry-facts-and-figures

Table 24 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking the sugar cane pest biosecurity zones

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the sugar cane pest biosecurity zones	Under this option, compliance costs for industry would be eliminated, but Queensland's sugar cane industry would be at risk.	Industry would face increased risk of pest and disease outbreaks, leading to potential crop losses and higher pest management costs. Government would face increased costs for biosecurity responses and potential loss of industry confidence.
Option 2 – remake regulation as is	The option would afford continued protection from sugar cane pests for industry. It would also facilitate continued industry transparency in management of zone 6 through inclusion in the Biosecurity Regulation.	Under this option, compliance costs to industry would be maintained. This option would forego an opportunity for regulatory simplicity. There is a risk of delays in amendment of the Biosecurity Regulation in response to change in research site, or risk profile. This option would pose a significant resource burden for government in amending the Biosecurity Regulation for growing sites in zone 6. Direct compliance costs for the sugar cane industry are estimated to be $104,735 for the first year, and $787,106 for the first 10 years, which is a small fraction of the value of the industry.
Option 3 (recommended)– Remake section with an amendment to zone 6, replacing it with individual property level management.	This option would support maintenance of effective pest and disease containment, which would protect industry's production areas and market access. It would also ensure continued biosecurity protection and minimise outbreak risks. This option would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden for industry through the removal of zone 6. Biosecurity risk mitigation would be better able to be	Broader sugar cane industry members would have no visibility on zone 6 risk management, however this may not be of concern. Direct compliance costs for sugar cane industry are estimated to be $104,735 for the first year, and $787,106 for the first 10 years, which is a small fraction of the value of the industry. Government would have ongoing enforcement and monitoring costs.

	amended as needed through restricted place declarations, compared with a regulatory amendment process. This would protect the sugar cane industry, worth $1.5 billion in 2022–23.	

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no pre-consultation with industry regarding the proposal to remake the sugar cane pest biosecurity zone and managing zone 6 through a property specific declaration prior to this consultation**.**

Recommended option

Option 3 is recommended – to remake the sugar cane biosecurity zones 1 to 5 with an amendment to remove zone 6 and replace it with a site-specific management instrument under the Biosecurity Act (a Restricted Place Declaration) for continued protection of Queensland's sugar cane industry.

If allowed to lapse, there would be an increased risk of pest and disease outbreaks, leading to potential crop losses, higher pest management costs from the spread of pests like Fiji leaf gall virus, increased biosecurity response costs, and a potential loss of industry confidence.

Survey questions – See *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 121–126 The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the sugar cane pest biosecurity zones with a removal of zone 6 and replacement with property specific declaration, to maintain protection of Queensland's sugar cane industry. Question 121: Do you support the recommended option? Question 122: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 123: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 124: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 125: If so, please explain. Question 126: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 12 – White Spot Biosecurity Zone

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 12 of Chapter 5 of the Biosecurity Regulation establishes the white spot biosecurity zone and sets out the movement restrictions and risk mitigation requirements necessary to prevent the further spread of white spot syndrome virus (**WSSV**) within Queensland.

WSSV is a highly contagious pathogen causing white spot disease (WSD) in decapod crustaceans such as prawns, severely impacting global aquaculture due to the lack of vaccines or treatments. Infected animals must be destroyed, with prevention being the only control measure. While WSSV poses no risk to human health, its presence in Queensland has led to the loss of disease-free status in South-East Queensland wild-caught fisheries, reducing domestic sales and export approvals. Further spread could worsen economic losses, threaten fisheries, and heighten infection risks in aquaculture farms across Queensland.

The establishment of the white spot biosecurity zone in the Biosecurity Regulation aims to prevent the spread of WSSV by regulating the movement of specified carriers, such as prawns, shrimp, and polychaete worms, restricting fishing activities near prawn farm drainage and intake channels, and requiring prawn facilities to have signage.[156]

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

The regulated control program for WSSV established in Queensland allows trade from unaffected areas of Queensland and Australia to continue relatively unaffected. Some import conditions relating to prawns and prawn products (and some other crustaceans) could no longer be justified if regulation was removed.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

The white spot biosecurity zone regulates the prawn aquaculture, wild caught prawn and bait, and recreational fishing sectors in the Brisbane, Gold Coast, Ipswich, Logan, Moreton Bay, Redland, and Sunshine Coast LGAs. The wider Queensland prawn aquaculture sector had a value of production of $218.3 million in the financial year ending 2025, with the aquaculture as a whole sector employing 483 people in the 2024–25 financial year.[157]

The 2016–17 outbreak of WSD in prawn farms in the Logan River, Queensland, was estimated to have led to production losses of $43 million. The Australian Government provided funding of up to $21.9 million for control measures in the two years following the outbreak, while the Queensland Government provided $17 million for control measures in 2016–17, and set aside up to $9 million over the following two years.[158] The majority of this additional funding was not utilised.

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[156] https://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/1255525/white-spot-biosecurity-area1.pdf
[157] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[158] parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/9058462/upload_binary/9058462.pdf

Objectives of government action

Government action is required to prevent the spread of WSSV to uninfected areas, protect Queensland's aquaculture and wild-caught fisheries, and maintain disease-free status to support domestic and export markets.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

These measures have been effective in containing WSSV within the regulated area, ensuring that trade from unaffected regions continues relatively unimpeded. However, the absence of such regulations would prevent Queensland and other states from maintaining WSSV-free status, increasing the risk of pathogen spread through imports and threatening both aquaculture and wild crustacean populations. Approximately 20–25% of Queensland's prawn aquaculture production occurs in the Logan River area, which is part of the zone area. The continuation of these biosecurity measures is critical to protecting the industry and the broader environment.

Jurisdictional comparison

Until recently, Queensland was the only jurisdiction where WSSV had been detected. New South Wales is now managing a recent detection under two temporary Biosecurity Control Orders, which include movement restrictions that are similar to the Queensland legislation. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 25 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 25 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking the white spot biosecurity zone

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – this option would allow expiry of the white spot biosecurity zone.	Under this option, industry would see temporary reduced compliance costs as the biosecurity zone would not apply.	Under this option, industry would be at increased risk of WSSV spreading to uninfected areas and amplifying in aquaculture production facilities, leading to potential economic losses in aquaculture and wild-caught fisheries. Expiry would also lead to higher risk of environmental damage from the spread of WSSV through wild crustacean populations. Government would see increased costs for biosecurity responses and a potential loss of market confidence.
Option 2 (recommended) –	Maintaining effective containment of WSSV	The estimated ongoing direct compliance costs across industry are estimated at $17,982

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Remake provisions to maintain protections for Queensland's wild harvest fisheries and aquaculture industry.	protects aquaculture and wild-harvest fisheries, and remaking these provisions would ensure continued trade from unaffected areas, and maintain border control measures. It would also ensure continued biosecurity protection, minimising outbreak risks and supporting the maintenance of Queensland's disease-free status in unaffected areas. Maintaining effective containment would also reduce the risk of WSSV spreading, protecting wild crustacean populations and aquatic ecosystems. The prawn aquaculture sector was worth $218.3 million in 2024–25.	for the first year, and $76,562 for the first 10 years. Government would face continued minor regulatory burden in the form of responding to non-compliance.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the white spot biosecurity zone provisions to prevent the further spread of WSSV to uninfected areas of Queensland and protect the state's aquaculture industry and aquatic ecosystems.

If allowed to lapse, the spread of WSSV to uninfected areas could lead to economic losses in aquaculture and fisheries, environmental harm to wild crustacean populations, increased biosecurity response costs, and diminished market confidence.

Survey questions – See *Animal biosecurity (excluding bees)* survey
Survey questions 127–132 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the white spot biosecurity zone regulation to prevent the further spread of WSSV to uninfected areas of Queensland and protect the state's aquaculture industry and aquatic ecosystems. Question 127: Do you support the recommended option? Question 128: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 129: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 130: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 131: If so, please explain. Question 132: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 12B – Polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone

Nature and scope of the problem

The polyphagous shot-hole borer (**PSHB**) is an invasive beetle species that bores into a wide range of tree species, spreading fungal pathogens that can cause tree dieback and significant damage to agricultural, urban, and natural ecosystems.

It is a high-risk quarantine pest that can be introduced via unrestricted movement of carriers. PSHB has a high potential for establishment and spread through untreated carriers, currently comprising 582 species of plants. It is categorised as an emergency plant pest under the EPPRD and is currently under a nationally cost-shared eradication program.[159]

PSHB is now contained within a quarantine area around Perth which covers 30 local government areas.[160]

Part 12B of Chapter 5 of the Biosecurity Regulation establishes a PSHB biosecurity zone in Queensland, and contains definitions of key terms, restrictions on movement of 582 species of carriers (set out in the Biosecurity Manual)[161] , and the requirement to notify the presence of the pest. The goal of this provision to prevent the entry of PSHB into Queensland.

[159] www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/response-arrangements/emergency-plant-pest-response-deed-epprd/

[160] www.outbreak.gov.au/current-outbreaks/polyphagous-shot-hole-borer

[161] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/379138/qld-biosecurity-manual.pdf

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Queensland is a national cost-share partner of the eradication program in Western Australia through the EPPRD.

Western Australia is the only state with a confirmed detection of PSHB and carriers from that state need to meet Queensland entry conditions. Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Establishment of PSHB in Queensland would result in significant impact on urban amenity trees, native vegetation, plantation forestry, and fruit and nut tree crop industries.

The PSHB biosecurity zone protects all of Queensland's fruit and forestry sectors. Queensland's fruit and nut industry had an annual production value of $1.9 billion in 2022–23, with an estimated 8,093 jobs within the sector in the 2021 census. The GVP for Queensland's forestry and forestry processing sectors is forecast at $730 million for 2024–25, and there were 1,299 forestry and logging jobs in financial year 2025.[162] The value of native vegetation and home gardens is incalculable.

Case study – Projected cost of PSHB incursion in Western Australia

Without eradication, the incursion of PSHB in Western Australia is projected to cost $6.8 million annually within the next 30 years. Urban tree management, including pruning and insecticide treatments is predicted to represent 98% of these costs. The Western Australia avocado industry, valued at $106.9 million annually, could face yield losses of $90,000 by year 30. An eradication program, costing $43–45 million over three years, is expected to deliver long term net benefits of up to $155.8 million by year 30, despite initial negative returns.[163]

Objectives of government action

The objective of government action is to prevent the introduction of PSHB into Queensland through the use of movement restrictions and notification requirements.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The current controls on PSHB carrier entry into Queensland is effective as there has been no confirmed detection in the state.

Jurisdictional comparison

All other jurisdictions, aside from Tasmania, have legislative provisions for PSHB biosecurity zones. New South Wales and Victoria have also issued orders to specifically control the entry and movement of PSHB carriers. In Tasmania, prevention of PSHB

[162] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[163] resjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/afe.12566

incursion falls under the GBO. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 26 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 26 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking the polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of PSHB biosecurity zone sections of the Biosecurity Regulation	Under this option, trade in carriers from Western Australia would be unrestricted, however the risk of an incursion would be significantly increased.	Under this option, industry would face an increased risk of incursion, leading to increased risk to forestry and fruit tree production, and impacts to income. An incursion would result in a risk to food supply, loss of community gardens, urban areas, and trees of community significance. There would also be a significant risk to natural habitats, resulting in large scale damage across environments, including destruction of environmentally significant trees. Under this option, government would face increased risk of incursion. An incursion would result in costly eradication programs and preventative measures.
Option 2 (recommended)– Remake PSHB biosecurity zones with no amendments	Under this option, industry would have continued protection from incursion which ensures continued operation and production. Community would have continued protection from incursion. This ensures continued access to community urban gardens and natural areas. The environment would have continued protection from incursion, providing large scale environmental protections.	Under this option, government would maintain the same regulatory burden as present. Obligations fall on businesses from other jurisdictions.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
	Under this option, government would have protection from large scale incursion and eradication costs. This option would protect Queensland's fruit and nut sector (valued at $1.9 billion in 2022–23) and forestry sector (valued at $730 million in 2024–25).	

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake the PSHB biosecurity zone to protect Queensland's , plantation forestry, and fruit and nut tree crop industries, food supply, urban amenity trees, and native vegetation.

Survey questions – See *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 133–138
The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone to protect Queensland's urban amenity trees, native vegetation, plantation forestry, and fruit and nut tree crop industries.
Question 133: Do you support the recommended option?
Question 134: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business?
Question 135: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.
Question 136: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?
Question 137: If so, please explain.
Question 138: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 13 – Biosecurity Management Plans

Nature and scope of the problem

Part 13 of Chapter 5 establishes Biosecurity Management Plan (BMP) regulatory provisions, including their purpose, obligations for creating a BMP, and compliance requirements.

A BMP is a property-specific plan that may be developed by RBEsto identify and manage biosecurity risks on properties where animals are kept, such as farms, feedlots, and meat processing facilities.

Biosecurity risks can arise from biosecurity matter being moved on clothing, footwear, vehicles, or equipment, making stringent cleaning essential. Biosecurity risks may also develop from accessing infested parts of a property. BMPs aim to prevent the introduction or spread of pests, diseases, or contaminants caused by unauthorised entry or failure to follow biosecurity protocols. Failure to follow protocols tailored to the biosecurity risks at a property level could endanger production at the property, as well as leading to animal welfare and human health concerns.

It is important to acknowledge that anyone entering an RBE property may increase biosecurity risks. Properties where animals are kept may be accessed by:

- genuine visitors such as real estate agents, tradespeople, and service providers
- people with permission under other Queensland legislation such as power companies, mining, gas, or petroleum lease holders, or
- people intending to unlawfully enter for other purposes.

While existing laws, such as the *Summary Offences Act 2005*, addresses trespass and unlawful entry, these laws do not specifically target the biosecurity risks associated with unauthorised entry or entry without complying with a BMP or the GBO. The introduction of BMPs was originally intended to address these risks by allowing property owners to identify biosecurity risks on their property and outline appropriate management actions for persons to comply with. Site specific management of the risks from these and other visitors is still required into the future to maintain property level biosecurity protections.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Nil.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

There are 90,474 RBEs for livestock, with each property having different biosecurity risks and preferred methods for managing them. Complying with a property's BMP is integral to protecting livestock farming.

It is not known how many RBEs have elected to put in place a BMP as there is no requirement to notify DPI.

Please refer to Attachment 2 for a summary of regulated parties, direct compliance costs, and examples of biosecurity incident consequences.

Objectives of government action

Government action aims to support RBEs in managing the specific biosecurity risks at their property.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The current opportunity for RBEs to set out risk management rules in a BMP are considered effective in minimising the biosecurity risks from entry onto animal facilities. This is evidenced by the low number of penalty infringement notices (**PINs**) issued for non-compliance. Since their introduction, only four PINs have been issued, suggesting that BMPs are working to inform persons entering a property of relevant biosecurity risks and practices. In terms of efficiency, BMPs are straightforward to implement, with no requirement for regulatory approval.

Jurisdictional comparison

New South Wales, Victoria, and the Northern Territory have similar provisions to Queensland for BMPs, with detailed requirements and penalties for non-compliance. Other jurisdictions do not appear to have such legislative requirements. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 27 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 27 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking biosecurity management plan provisions

OPTIONS	Benefits	Costs
Option 1 – allow the BMP sections of the Biosecurity Regulation to expire	There is no benefit in allowing these sections of the Biosecurity Regulation to expire aside from short-term reductions in regulatory burden.	Producers and landowners could see an increased number of incursions on property, leading to increased costs for eradication and /or control actions such as destruction, disposal, or chemical treatments. An incursion could result in serious economic impacts for a producer, especially in cases that require destocking. There is a potential for increased eradication and control actions which impact the food supply chain (e.g. lack of local supply or availability) especially in relation to the destruction of livestock.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Costs
		Increased incursions could spread into the natural environment and impact native species. Increased incursions could lead to increased nationally cost-shared responses, meaning government would need to commit more money to responding to biosecurity incidents.
Option 2 (recommended) – Remake the BMP provisions	Industry would maintain the opportunity to elect to prepare a BMP to support on-farm biosecurity measures. The risk to environment would be reduced as a result of the reduction in overall risk for pest or disease incursions.	If a BMP is in place, property owners would be responsible for ensuring the plan meets regulatory requirements such as being titled 'Biosecurity Management Plan', making it available to visitors during business hours, and by installing informative signage noting that one is in place.

Consultation and outcomes

Preliminary consultation identified aspects of BMPs that are working well and aspects that could be improved. BMPs are considered to be working well in instances of unauthorised access, however, some industry stakeholders identified issues where persons who are authorised under another Act may not be complying with their GBO. This is often through a perceived lack of knowledge of property level biosecurity risks. Similarly, some stakeholders have experienced BMPs being utilised to prevent unwanted visitor entry, rather than for biosecurity purposes.

Recommended option

Option 2 is recommended – to remake this section of the Biosecurity Regulation to continue to allow RBEs to make a BMP for their property. This option allows RBEs to develop a BMP specific to the biosecurity risks present at their property and support visitors to follow appropriate biosecurity measures outlined in the BMP.

If allowed to lapse, RBEs would no longer be able to develop and provide a BMP specific to their property, in turn increasing the risk of biosecurity matter being introduced or spread on their property, potentially indirectly impacting productivity and the food supply chain.

Survey questions – See *Animal biosecurity (excluding bees)* survey
Survey questions 139–144 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the Biosecurity Management Plan provisions to continue to allow Registered Biosecurity Entities to make a BMP addressing the biosecurity risks relevant to their property, and outline requirements for making and complying with a BMP. Question 139: Do you support the recommended option? Question 140: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 141: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 142: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 143: If so, please explain. Question 144: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

5.6 Chapter 6 – Obligations for biosecurity entities and designated animal identification

Chapter 6 outlines the obligations for RBEs and the requirements for designated animals including hive identification. The Chapter is divided into two parts:

Part 1 - 'marking and maintenance of marked or branded hive identification numbers (HIN)' prescribes the way in which a beehive must be identified, including the location and size of the markings and updated markings on bee hives.

Part 2 - 'special designated animal identification and tracing system' contains provisions relating to the movement of special designated animals such as approved devices and information required for movement records.

Chapter 6 supports provisions of the Biosecurity Act that establish the broader framework for the National Livestock Identification System (**NLIS**) in Queensland. The NLIS is Australia's livestock traceability system, using electronic identification and a central database to track livestock movements throughout their lifecycle.

Part 2, Division 2 sets out requirements for the provision of information to the NLIS in specified circumstances, including when:

- a special designated animal, with or without a microchip, arrives at and is slaughtered at a livestock processing facility (sections 98–101)
- an animal, with or without a microchip, arrives at a saleyard or live export holding, and is subsequently moved from that location or exported from Australia (sections 102–107)
- an animal arrives at, or is moved from, a restricted agricultural show (sections 108–109)

- an animal with a microchip is delivered to a transit facility (section 110)
- an animal, with or without a microchip, is delivered to another place (sections 111–114)

These provisions ensure accurate and timely recording of livestock movements, supporting traceability, disease response and market access.

Part 1 – Marking and maintenance of marked or branded Hive Identification Number (HIN)

Nature and scope of the problem

Apiaries, or beekeeping operations, are an important part of Queensland's agricultural and environmental landscape. Queensland is home to a thriving beekeeping industry, which contributes significantly to pollination services for crops and native flora, honey production, and other bee-related products such as beeswax. Maintaining strong biosecurity measures is crucial to protecting the industry from pests and diseases that could threaten bee populations and the vital services they provide. One measure supporting biosecurity of the apiary sector in Queensland is the identification of bee hives.

Accurate data regarding the number of hives and beekeeper contact information informs decision-making that is essential for responding to pest incursions This is especially important as the honey production sector is highly migratory and hive locations may not be at the entities' residential address.

Hive labelling with HINs supports correct identification of hive ownership, enabling effective biosecurity measures to be taken should a biosecurity event occur. It also assists in determining if registered beekeepers are eligible for compensation if their hives are destroyed as a part of a national emergency pest plant response. For example, as part of the initial National *Varroa destructor* eradication program, New South Wales registered beekeepers were able to apply for owner reimbursement costs associated with hive destruction.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Victoria and South Australia are the most important Australian states for commercial beekeepers to access for agricultural pollination contracts. For these states, hives from interstate need to have the registered beekeeping brand (HIN) and the state of registration of the owner. "The Australian almond industry depends on honey bees for pollination with more than 200,000 hives required during the pollination season."[164]

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Both commercial and recreational beekeepers are obligated under this rule.

There are currently 10,631 registered beekeepers in Queensland, of which 676 are businesses. There are total of 172,107 hives reported. In Queensland, 9,955 (94%) of

[164] beeaware.org.au/pollination/pollinator-reliant-crops/almonds/

beekeepers are recreational, translating to 45,782 allocated HINs to mark. Additionally, 676 beekeepers, or 4% of beekeepers are commercial, and manage 126, 325 hives. Since only one in every 50 hives must be marked, each HIN will effectively mark 2,526 groups of 50 hives.

The honey production sector was worth $184.3 million in 2022–23.[165] Moreover, the industry is projected to have a value of $75 million in honey production and $3 billion in the pollination of Queensland's horticulture annually.[166] The direct compliance costs to Queensland for the first year of a remade Biosecurity Regulation is estimated to be $409,234 and over a 10–year period is estimated to be $3.6 million. The regulatory burden on this sector is outweighed by the protections it provides.

Objectives of government action

The objective of this requirement is to ensure that the apiarist responsible for a hive can be readily identified and contacted when necessary, particularly in the event of a biosecurity incident. All state governments require the registration and proper identification of hives to support biosecurity efforts and effective communication. Additionally, in some states, current registration is a prerequisite for accessing antibiotics to manage diseases like European foulbrood.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

This section is effective as it enables groups of hives to be attributed to the apiarist responsible for the hive for biosecurity purposes. It ensures that beekeepers can identify and trace their hives in a standardised way, which ensures that this information is available when needed, strengthening biosecurity outcomes should a relevant biosecurity event occur.

This section is considered efficient as it is not considered onerous to only mark one hive in each group of 50 hives, or one hive in a group less than 50 hives. Maintenance of the branded mark is also considered low administrative burden.

Case Study – Varroa Mite detection in Australia

In June 2022, the detection of *Varroa destructor* in New South Wales triggered a significant biosecurity response, including the establishment of eradication zones and the destruction of infested hives. Unmarked or unregistered hives posed a major challenge to these efforts, as owners could not be easily located or monitored. This highlighted the importance of hive registration and marking in managing biosecurity risks.

Surveillance programs relied on data from registered hives to map the spread of the Varroa mite and implement targeted control measures within eradication zones. Unmarked hives created gaps in this data, reducing the effectiveness of these

[165] www.transparency.gov.au/publications/agriculture-fisheries-and-forestry/rural-industries-research-and-development-corporation/agrifutures-australia-annual-report-2022-2023/section-2---focus-area-and-industry-reports/honey-bee-%26-pollination

[166] www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lcdocs/other/22743/24-111-value-of-pollination.pdf

programs. Unmarked hives may have delayed the identification of infested areas, giving the mite more time to establish in the environment and spread.

Jurisdictional comparison

Registration and marking of hives is required in all states of Australia and it is a condition of entry to move live bees in hives into Victoria[167] and South Australia.[168]

Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 28 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 28 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking marking and maintenance of marked or branded Hive Identification Number (HIN)

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of HIN marking requirements	Under this option, industry would have no compliance costs and hive marking would be voluntary.	Expiry of this section would prevent section 158(5) of the Biosecurity Act from working as intended. Apiarists would face a loss of access to some antibiotics. Queensland would be out of step with nationally consistent requirements. During a biosecurity event, a reliance on voluntary branding would undermine traceability and affect Queensland's ability to respond.
Option 2 (recommended)– Remake hive marking requirements	Provides a standardised means to identify hives which is linked to ownership, improving traceability capabilities. This option would help to protect the bee industry, worth $184.3 million in 2022–2023.[169] Moreover, the industry is projected to have a value of $750 million in honey	Beekeepers would be obligated to purchase either spray paint and symbol stencils or hive marking pens for marking purposes and have (minor) labour costs. Industry would face continued compliance costs estimated at $479,397 for the first year, and $3.6 million for

[167] www.view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fagriculture.vic.gov.au%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fword_doc%2F0003%2F1063767%2FIntroduction-of-bees-apiaries%2C-colonies-and-or-used-beekeeping-fittings-into-Victoria.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK

[168] www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/437401/bee-records.pdf

[169] www.transparency.gov.au/publications/agriculture-fisheries-and-forestry/rural-industries-research-and-development-corporation/agrifutures-australia-annual-report-2022-2023/section-2---focus-area-and-industry-reports/honey-bee-%26-pollination

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
	production $30 billion in pollination of Queensland horticulture across 10 years.[170]	the first 10 years.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no preliminary consultation on these options, however an industry representative group are supportive of hive marking requirements.

Recommended option

Option 2, to remake this provision, is the recommended option due to the public (for recreational apiarists) and private (for commercial apiarists) benefit of protecting honey production worth $75 million and the pollination of $3 billion worth of Queensland horticulture production annually.[171]

If allowed to lapse, there would be disruptions to national consistency, and weakened traceability during biosecurity events.

Survey questions – See *Plant biosecurity, bees and product integrity* survey
Survey questions 145–150 The recommended option (option 2) is to remake the hive marking requirement to protect Queensland's honey production and horticulture production sectors. Question 145: Do you support the recommended option? Question 146: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 147: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you. Question 148: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 149: If so, please explain. Question 150: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Part 2 – Special designated animal identification and tracing system

[170] www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lcdocs/other/22743/24-111-value-of-pollination.pdf
[171] www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lcdocs/other/22743/24-111-value-of-pollination.pdf

Division 1 – Approved devices and movement records (section 96–97)

Nature and scope of the problem

Movement requirements for goats under section 96 of the Biosecurity Regulation provides exemptions for the movement of 'harvested rangeland goats', or wild goats to move without having an NLIS tag applied as long as they have not been in captivity for more than 10 days. This allowed for the practice of rangeland goat harvesting, where feral goats are harvested as part of the goat meat industry.

However, the *Agriculture and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2020*[172] amended relevant sections of the Biosecurity Act to provide for goat movements under a travel approval. Requiring a travel approval removes the ability for wild goats to be moved without an NLIS tag within 10 days of harvesting, making section 96 redundant. As section 96 is redundant, it will be removed and no further analysis undertaken.

Section 97 provides for additional information to be included in movement records, in addition to what is required under the Biosecurity Act. Traceability of livestock and records showing exposure to materials of interest is a critical component for market access[173]. Occasionally, some international markets require additional information to be recorded to prove product safety. The information for a movement record section allows for flexibility to address these critical industry needs, supporting the $10.2 billion industry (financial year ending 2025).[174]

Currently, this section provides for additional information requirements in movement records relating to whether cattle have ever been treated with a HGP and whether a special designated animal excluding pigs, has been fed RAM.

Whilst Australia permits the use of HGPs in cattle, a number of trading partners require meat and meat products to be produced from HGP free animals. An active notice from the Commonwealth food safety unit reinforces the existing requirement to comply with importing country's HGP free (HGP FREE) requirements.[175] Currently, these countries are Egypt and New Caledonia, but this may change at any time.

The Commonwealth Government can only certify exports to countries requiring HGP-free product when appropriate systems are in place to provide confidence the requirements are satisfied. Failure to address these requirements would mean that exports to these countries would no longer be accepted.

If section 97 lapsed, it would put the livestock and livestock product market access at risk through gaps in traceability requirements.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

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[172] https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2020-003

[173] https://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/export/controlled-goods/meat/elmer-3/notices/2017/mn17-05

[174] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

[175] www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/export/controlled-goods/meat/elmer-3/notices/2017/mn17-05

Movement records are a key pillar of the nationally agreed Australian traceability system and demonstrates Queensland's compliance with export countries' requirements.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

In 2025, Queensland's livestock industry contributed $10.3 billion[176] in GVP. There are 90,484 RBEs for livestock in Queensland. In the 2021 census, there were 22,463 jobs in the livestock sector (excluding the supply chain).[177]

Objectives of government action

To ensure that the Queensland livestock industry complies with movement records requirements related to HGP and RAM, to ensure ongoing export market access.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

HPG and RAM requirements are managed in line with the nationally agreed systems.

The requirement for specified information to be included in a movement record has facilitated the collection of relevant information for traceability purposes alongside the movement of cattle and special designated animals. The movement record requirements provide official record of adhering to these practices and protects market access as an increasing number of markets will not accept products that are treated with HGPs or have been fed RAM.

Movement records are aligned with the livestock industry quality assurance systems. They facilitate and enable access to international markets worth over $10 billion to Queensland.[178] Queensland's Biosecurity Regulation is effective in ensuring livestock producers are compliant with these systems.

The record keeping requirements represent low administrative burden and are simple to achieve.

Jurisdictional comparison

All other jurisdictions manage HGP and movement record requirements in line with nationally agreed standards. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 29 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

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[176] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[177] www,qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au/AGTrendsSpatial/
[178] https://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

Table 29 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking special designated animal identification and tracing system

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of the additional information requirements for movement records under section 97 of the Biosecurity Regulation	This option would result in a reduction in burden on industry to keep movement records.	Expiry of this section would prevent section 158(5) of the Biosecurity Act from working. Reputational risks and being out of step with the national system would significantly risk access to international markets not only for Queensland but for Australia.
Option 2 (recommended)– Remake section 97 to maintain the additional information requirements for movement record (HPGs and RAM).	Government would achieve consistency with nationally agreed standards. Industry would achieve the maintenance of traceability standards and access to export markets. This option would protect the $10.3 billion livestock sector in Queensland (2024–25 GVP).	A movement record is already required under the Biosecurity Act. The requirement to include additional details relating to HPG and would add negligible administrative burden.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no specific consultation on the proposal to remake this part of the Biosecurity Regulation.

Recommended option

Option 2, to remake section 97 is recommended in order to maintain market confidence in livestock exports, in relation to keeping movement records for HPG treatment in cattle and RAM feeding to specified designated animals other than pigs.

If allowed to lapse, the livestock industry may no longer keep movement records on whether cattle have been treated with HGP or whether special designated animals other than pigs have been fed RAM, putting the Australian livestock export industry at risk.

Survey questions – See *Animal biosecurity (excluding bees)* survey

Survey questions 151–156

The recommended option (option 2) is to remake movement record requirements for HGP in cattle and RAM in special designation animals other than pigs, to meet export requirements.

Question 151: Do you support the recommended option?

Question 152: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business?

Question 153: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.

Question 154: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?

Question 155: If so, please explain.

Question 156: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

Division 2 – National Livestock Identification System (section 98–114)

Nature and scope of the problem

The NLIS, implemented in 2005, is Australia's nationally agreed livestock traceability system. It records information for individual animals including cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, bison, and buffalo from birth through to their final destination, such as an abattoir or export facility. This ensures reliable traceability, which is critical for effective disease outbreak response and maintaining domestic and international market access.

Sections 98–114 of the Biosecurity Regulation prescribe information requirements for livestock movements across a range of scenarios, including movements to processing facilities, saleyards, export holdings, transit facilities, and agricultural shows. While requirements vary depending on the type of movement, they generally include key data such as the date of movement, property identification code (**PIC**) of origin, movement record details, and the number of animals moved.

The NLIS is essential for both disease traceability and the integrity of Australia's livestock export systems, which underpin billions of dollars in trade. The Biosecurity Regulation supports compliance with national traceability requirements and safeguards Queensland's livestock industry by maintaining biosecurity, protecting market access, and supporting confidence in the safety and quality of agricultural products.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

The NLIS is a national system managed consistently across all jurisdictions, with Queensland formally agreeing to comply with these arrangements. Additionally, aspects of the supply chain, such as the abattoir sector, have heavily invested in supply chain tracking systems integrated with the NLIS, guaranteeing traceability throughout the entire supply chain and underpinning billions of dollars in livestock exports.

This whole-of-life traceability provides a competitive advantage for Australian livestock products, especially as importing countries increasingly require lifetime traceability.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Queensland holds 49% of Australia's national cattle herd[179] and accounts for 60% of national cattle feedlot turn-off,[180] making it a significant player in Australia's livestock industry. Non-compliance with NLIS information requirements could affect market access and jeopardise Australia's $10.3 billion livestock industry.[181] Those most affected would include livestock producers, abattoirs, exporters, and regional communities that rely on the industry for economic stability and employment.

Objectives of government action

The objective of government action is to ensure compliance with NLIS information requirements, thereby maintaining effective livestock traceability. This supports Queensland's obligations under the national frameworks, protects the livestock industry from biosecurity risks, and upholds Australia's reputation for a world-class traceability system.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The current regulatory framework is effective and efficient, with information requirements aligned to national standards and industry practices. The NLIS is fully embedded in paddock-to-plate traceability systems, enabling efficient recording and transfer of livestock movement data. This integration minimises compliance burden while maintaining robust traceability and supporting domestic and international market access.

Jurisdictional comparison

All other jurisdictions manage NLIS requirements to the same nationally agreed standards. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 30 provides an analysis of two potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry or remake. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 30 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking national livestock identification system provisions

OPTIONS	Benefits	Disadvantages

[179] https://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm/livestock

[180] www.mla.com.au/globalassets/mla-corporate/prices--markets/documents/trends--analysis/fast-facts--maps/mla_beef-fast-facts-2025_301025.pdf

[181] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm

Option 1 – Expiry of the NLIS provision	Under expiry, industry and government would have reduced administrative burden through no longer being required to satisfy NLIS, however, these requirements would remain in place through the national system.	Industry would face reduced traceability capability, reduced market access, and increased risk of disease incursion and spread. Communities would face increased risk of disease incursion and spread affecting food supply. Government would face increased risk of funding disease incursion response and be out of step with other jurisdictions.
Option 2 (recommended)– Remake the NLIS provisions	Industry would maintain confidence in Queensland's biosecurity system, traceability capability, and market access. Communities would maintain safe food supply. Government would have decreased risk of failed traceability system. This option would protect the $10.3 billion livestock sector in Queensland (2024–25 GVP).	There would be no direct compliance cost as this is a national requirement under the NLIS. Government would face maintained regulatory burden of NLIS.

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no preliminary consultation on these options.

Recommended option

Option 2 to remake this provision is necessary to maintain compliance with NLIS requirements and ensure the continued integrity of livestock traceability systems. Without these provisions, Queensland would face increased biosecurity risks, reduced disease response capability, and potential loss of market access. Given the absence of viable alternatives, remaking the provision is the only option that maintains effective traceability and supports industry confidence.

Survey questions – See *Animal biosecurity (excluding bees)* survey

Survey questions 157–162

The recommended option (option 2) is to remake information record requirements to meet nationally agreed NLIS requirements, supporting market access and traceability.

Question 157: Do you support the recommended option?

Question 158: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business?

Question 159: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.

Question 160: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?

Question 161: If so, please explain.

Question 162: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

5.7 Chapter 7 – Prohibited and restricted matter permits [proposed amendments]

Nature and scope of the problem

The Biosecurity Act establishes the broader framework for prohibited and restricted matter permits. These permits allow individuals and businesses to legally deal with listed invasive species, pests or diseases for authorised purposes such as research, biological control, and commercial use, in ways or for purposes that would otherwise be unlawful. The biosecurity risks associated with permits are managed through strict permit conditions.

The Biosecurity Act allows for additional types of permits to be established in Biosecurity Regulation. The Biosecurity Regulation currently adds two permit types:

- an educational use permit to enhance community understanding of biosecurity risks, and
- a noxious fish recreational use permit as a transitional provision from other legislation, for the life of the fish.

This part of the Biosecurity Regulation also prescribes detailed requirements in relation to prohibited and restricted matter permit applications, laboratory standards, and standard permit conditions which support consistency in decision making, allow prompt responses to escaped or stolen biosecurity matter under permit, and minimise administrative burden on permit applicants.

Several issues have been identified with the current framework, necessitating amendments to the following elements:

- Public liability insurance: Permit holders are currently required to have public liability insurance to cover potential damages caused by prohibited or restricted matter. However, such insurance is often unavailable for activities like disposing of prohibited matter or the recreational use of noxious fish. Proposed amendments would provide the chief executive with discretion for this requirement with consideration given to whether it is for a commercial or non-commercial purpose (e.g. eradication of prohibited matter) and whether the biosecurity risks are adequately mitigated through a permit plan. This ensures essential biosecurity activities can proceed without being hindered by potentially impractical insurance requirements.
- Notifications: permit holders are currently required to report the theft, escape, or accidental release of biosecurity matter "as soon as practicable," which can cause delays and increase risks for high-risk matters. Proposed amendments will standardise reporting timeframes to 24 hours for prohibited matter and Category 1 and 2 restricted matters, ensuring prompt responses and minimising biosecurity risks.

These changes will provide clarity and flexibility for permit holders, while ensuring timely and consistent reporting of biosecurity incidents to reduce risks to Queensland's environment, agriculture, and communities.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Nil.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

DPI regularly receives permit applications for scientific research purposes (for both prohibited and restricted matter) and for the purpose of disposing of prohibited matter and for educational purposes (e.g. local governments wanting to show plant species at public events). Additionally, permit applications are received from biological control agent breeding facilities. In the last 10 years, approximately 385 prohibited and restricted matter permits have been applied for.

Direct compliance costs would not be altered by the proposed amendments.

Objectives of government action

Government action is required to minimise biosecurity risks inherent with particular biosecurity matter. Continuing provisions that allow for the application of permits will provide opportunities to deal with regulated biosecurity matter in approved ways that would otherwise not be allowed, whilst also ensuring that biosecurity risks are managed effectively.

The proposed amendment to insurance provisions will ensure that insurance requirements take into consideration insurance product availability and the nature of the activity proposed to be undertaken under permit, supporting stakeholders in important biosecurity operations that otherwise may not otherwise be undertaken due to lack of insurance coverage. The proposed amendment to notification of theft, escape,

or accidental release of prohibited matter and restricted matter Category 1 and 2 held under permit will support timely responses to biosecurity incidents that could otherwise significantly impact a biosecurity consideration.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

The Biosecurity Regulation provides for additional permit types that are currently in use. It also provides an efficient framework for assessing and approving permits, balancing biosecurity management with regulatory practicality. This clear guidance reduces administrative burdens and ensures consistent decision-making.

However, targeted amendments could improve its efficiency. For example, the public liability insurance requirement under Section 120(1)(a) has been problematic given the availability of insurance in some situations. Allowing discretion where insurance is unavailable or unnecessary would enhance practicality while managing biosecurity outcomes. Similarly, a shortened notification timeframe would support more effective responses to escaped or stolen biosecurity matter.

Overall, the Biosecurity Regulation effectively manages biosecurity risks, but amendments to insurance requirements and reporting timeframes would further improve its efficiency and adaptability to emerging threats.

Jurisdictional comparison

Other jurisdictions provide frameworks for managing biosecurity matters through permits, registrable dealings, and regulations, aligning with Queensland's approach.

Permit holder insurance *may* be required for permit holders in New South Wales, Tasmania, and South Australia with similar legislation to Queensland. However it is not a standard requirement applying to all biosecurity matter permits as is currently the case in Queensland. Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 31 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment and remake with some amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 31 Analysis of options and impacts of remaking prohibited and restricted matter permits

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – allow expiry of supporting provisions relating to prohibited and restricted matter permits	This part of the Biosecurity Regulation provides opportunity and certainty for regulated parties, and so there is limited benefit from allowing expiry.	Loss of ability to keep legacy noxious fish recreationally, or restricted matter for educational purposes. Prescribed conditions for prohibited and restricted matter permits would no longer apply, reducing administrative efficiencies as they would not to be specifically conditioned under the permit. Additional information requirements for permit plans, which form part of a prohibited or restricted matter permit application, would no longer be provided, limiting government's decision-making ability.
Option 2 – remake chapter - supporting provisions relating to prohibited and restricted matter permits	Regulated parties will continue to be able to apply for educational use or noxious fish recreational use (where applicable) permits to provide for activities that would not otherwise be permitted under the Biosecurity Act. Communities and the environment will have protection from permitted matter being dealt with through the use of appropriate permit conditions. Government will maintain awareness of prohibited and restricted matter locations and access to information vital to emergency responses.	Potential for biosecurity incidents to be more serious due to delay in reporting issues. Maintenance of mismatch between insurance requirements under permit conditions, biosecurity risk profiles, and product availability. Failure to address regulatory gaps could lead to biosecurity breaches. Compliance costs are estimated at $36,825 for the first year, and $276,752 for the first 10 years would be maintained for permit holders.
Option 3 – Remake with amendments public liability insurance requirements and reporting timeframes for theft, escape, or	Industry will continue to be able to apply for permits to allow business operations that would not otherwise be permitted under legislation. Communities and the environment will have protection from permitted matter being dealt with through the use of appropriate permit conditions.	Government may need to assist with incident response in the case of no public liability insurance. Compliance costs are estimated at $36,825 for the first year, and $276,752 for the first 10 years would be maintained for the permit holding community.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
accidental release of biosecurity matter to 24 hours.	Alignment of insurance requirements to risk profile and product availability. Improved responsiveness to biosecurity incidents. Government will maintain awareness of prohibited and restricted matter locations and access to information vital to emergency responses, including the prompt notification of accidental release or escape.	

Consultation and outcomes

There has been no preliminary consultation for the proposed remake of this section or for the proposed amendments.

Recommended option

Option 3 – remake with amendment –is recommended as it supports risk-based decision-making, recognises public benefit of low-risk activities, addresses gaps in insurance availability, and enhances biosecurity management through streamlined reporting timeframes.

If allowed to expire, Queensland's biosecurity framework would be significantly weakened as there would be impacts to government, community, universities, and conservation groups who deal with regulated matter for educational and recreational benefits. For example, DPI and local government staff across several regions in Queensland have current educational permits that allow them to move and keep restricted matter under approved dealings, for specimen displays for public awareness.

Survey questions – See *Invasive plants and animals including matters relating to local government* survey

Survey questions 163–168

The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the chapter of the Biosecurity Regulation outlining specific requirements for prohibited and restricted matter permits, with amendments. These include providing the decision maker with discretion regarding public liability insurance requirements to recognise low risk or public benefit activities or where insurance may not be obtainable; and aligning reporting timeframes for theft, escape, or accidental release of permit matter to within 24 hours.

Question 163: Do you support the recommended option?

Question 164: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business?

Question 165: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.

Question 166: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation?

Question 167: If so, please explain.

Question 168: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

5.8 Chapter 8 – Miscellaneous [proposed amendments]

Chapter 8 of the Biosecurity Regulation provides a range of supporting provisions necessary for the effective implementation of the Biosecurity Act. The chapter prescribes specific technical and administrative matters that clarify how certain provisions of the Biosecurity Act operate in practice.

- Parts 1 and 2 identify materials that are not considered RAM that is otherwise prohibited feed for pigs and poultry, or providing clarity to industry about what feed substances may be used while maintaining safeguards to prevent the introduction or spread of serious animal diseases.
- Part 3 supports the regulatory framework by prescribing matters relating to the appointment of inspectors and authorised persons who are external to the public service, ensuring (appropriately trained) officers can exercise compliance and enforcement functions under the Biosecurity Act.
- Part 4 prescribes details required for applications for biosecurity compliance agreements, supporting mechanisms that allow regulated entities and the regulator to formalise arrangements to manage and mitigate biosecurity risks.

Nature and scope of the problem

Prohibited feed for pigs and poultry

By defining exemptions and technical details, Chapter 8 supports the broader objective of Queensland's biosecurity framework to minimise the risk of introducing or spreading serious animal diseases through feed practices. The chapter therefore plays an important regulatory role by providing certainty to industry while maintaining

safeguards designed to protect livestock industries, public confidence, and market access.

*Inspector and authorised officer appointments*In addition, Chapter 8 provides clarity for the appointment of external classes of persons as inspectors and authorised persons under the Biosecurity Act, and the administrative details required in compliance agreement applications. These measures help ensure that biosecurity risks are appropriately managed while providing clarity and certainty for industry and regulators.

The external appointee provisions were originally utilised to support surveillance, compliance and enforcement capacity in highly regulated industries such as bananas, and sugar cane which both carry significant biosecurity risks.

The sunset review has identified amendments to the appointment of external classes of persons to ensure that only appointments that have been utilised over the past 10 years should be remade. The Biosecurity Regulation currently names nine classes of persons who may be appointed as inspectors or authorised persons:

- ABGC (removal as inspectors, maintenance as authorised persons)
- Burdekin Productivity Services Ltd.
- Herbert Cane Productivity Services Ltd.
- Horticulture Innovation Australia Ltd.
- Mackay Area Productivity Services Ltd.
- MSF Sugar Ltd.
- Plane Creek Productivity Services Ltd.
- Tully Cane Productivity Services Ltd, and
- persons authorised to sell S7 substances under an S7 retail licence under the *Medicines and Poisons Act 2019*.

To date, only one external class of persons has utilised this provision by working with DPI to appoint authorised persons, and one (now retired) has been appointed as an inspector.
It is proposed to remove the list of inspector appointments completely and only remake the authorised person provision for ABGC. The possibility of adding appointment types into the Biosecurity Regulation in the future remains available as the Biosecurity Act (sections 242 and 246) will continue to allow for it.

The provision authorising police members of Rural and Stock Crime Squad (**RSCS**) to be inspectors without further appointment is critical to animal biosecurity and is proposed to be remade.

Obligations – national, market access, deed or other

Prohibited feed for pigs and poultry

Agricultural Ministers agreed to introduce a nationally consistent feed ban (prohibited pig feed, swill) legislation for pigs in 2014. The feed bans were developed by the AHC

and AHA in consultation with the Commonwealth, all statesand territories, and peak industry bodies. Queensland extends the prohibited feed restrictions to poultry.

Inspector and authorised officer appointments

There is commitment from DPI to support the ABGC in delivery of the Panama TR4 Surveillance programs for disease detection[182] and compliance programs[183] by appointing staff as authorised persons. Arrangements for the appointment of ABGC staff as Authorised Persons are outlined in a Service Level Deed executed between the ABGC and the State.

The remainder of the inspector and authorised person appointment provisions have never been activated in the life of this Regulation. It is proposed to remove all parties besides ABGC from the list of appointable people who are not public servants.

Size of problem and who is affected by it

Prohibited feed for pigs and poultry

Queensland's commercial pig and poultry production industries include approximately 539 businesses valued at $1.1 billion, which form part of Australia's multi-billion-dollar agricultural sector. Feeding practices that involve animal-derived materials can present a pathway for the introduction or spread of serious animal diseases if not appropriately regulated. International experience has demonstrated that diseases such as FMD and African swine fever can be transmitted through contaminated feed or food waste, with potentially severe economic and trade consequences.

Inspector and authorised officer appointments

In relation to the external appointment of inspectors and authorised persons, uptake across the state has been limited. To date, only one external class of persons has been authorised under the Biosecurity Act.

Compliance agreements

While under-utilised, this rule provides an important opportunity for innovation in Queensland. The standardisation of basic contact details provides security in maintaining contact with agreement holders.

Objectives of government action

Prohibited feed for pigs and poultry

Although the likelihood of disease introduction through feed practices may be relatively low under existing controls, the potential consequences are significant, including impacts on livestock health, agricultural productivity, export market access, and broader economic activity. As a result, clear regulatory provisions are required to minimise this pathway of risk and provide certainty to industry about permissible feeding practices.

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[182] www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/farms-fishing-forestry/agriculture/crops/fruit-veg/bananas/panama-disease-tr4/surveillance-detection

[183] www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/farms-fishing-forestry/agriculture/crops/fruit-veg/bananas/panama-disease-tr4/surveillance-compliance

Inspector and authorised officer appointments

ABGC currently has staff appointed as authorised persons with limited powers to undertake surveillance for Panama TR4 under a chief executive biosecurity program supported by DPI.

RSCS arrangements can only be maintained through the current provision in the Biosecurity Regulation.

Compliance agreements

Consistency in compliance agreement application details maintains appropriate contact with agreement holders.

Current regulation effectiveness and efficiency

Prohibited feed for pigs and poultry

The provisions relating to permitted feed materials provide clarity to industry about substances that may be used in feed for pigs and poultry while maintaining safeguards to minimise the risk of disease transmission. Clearly prescribing both pig and poultry safe materials, consistent with the endorsed national definitions, ensures the transmission of diseases like infectious bursal disease and Newcastle Disease are in place and effective in mitigating risk.

Inspector and authorised officer appointments

The appointment of industry inspectors was originally used to support the monitoring of leaf spot and enable industry management once the disease was declared endemic. This function is no longer required. The sugar industry also chose not to pursue appointments under section 123, instead preferring to operate as accredited certifiers. More broadly, uptake by other industry bodies for appointment as inspectors or authorised officers under the Biosecurity Act has been limited.

The ABGC previously utilised the appointment of a leaf spot inspector for a period. DPI continues to support ABGC in delivering the Panama TR4 surveillance program and intends to appoint relevant staff as authorised persons with limited powers for surveillance activities.

It is proposed to remove section 123 and amend section 124 to limit appointments to employees of the ABGC as authorised persons only. Provisions enabling the appointment of employees from Horticulture Innovation Australia Ltd and state Sugar Productivity Services Companies will be removed.

Section 125 enables livestock regulators outside of DPI to enforce specific requirements under the Biosecurity Act. This supports compliance with biosecurity regulations and strengthens livestock traceability for market access and emergency disease response. As this provision directly supports a function established under the Biosecurity Act and applies specifically to stock inspectors, it is proposed that this section be remade without amendment.

Compliance agreements

Although compliance agreements are not commonly used, they remain available under the Biosecurity Act and therefore contact details must continue to be prescribed in the Biosecurity Regulation.

Jurisdictional comparison

In alignment with the national agreement, all other jurisdictions ban the feeding of prohibited pig feed (swill) to pigs, but Queensland is the only jurisdiction that extends this to poultry.

Other jurisdictions support the appointment of nominated external classes of persons as inspectors/authorised persons, with the exception of South Australia.

All jurisdictions allow for compliance agreements under their legislation, with specific application details.

Please refer to Attachment 4 for a summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions.

Options considered and impacts

Table 32 provides an analysis of three potential options for the future Biosecurity Regulation: expiry, remake without amendment, and remake with amendments. This analysis clearly demonstrates the rationale for the recommended option.

Table 32 Analysis of options and impacts for remaking provisions relating to materials not considered RAM and materials considered appropriate feed, matters relating to inspectors and authorised persons, and compliance agreements for managing biosecurity matter

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
Option 1 – expiry of Chapter 8 miscellaneous provisions	There are limited benefits to the expire of these provisions as they generally provide opportunity, flexibility, and certainty to regulated stakeholders.	If emergency animal diseases , such as FMD and African Swine Fever became established in Queensland as a result of inadequate pig or poultry feed safeguards, there would be significant costs associated with loss of market access,containment and eradication. Removal of opportunity for co-management of biosecurity programs and for compliance support from the RSCS, weakening the biosecurity system.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
		Incomplete compliance agreement application details resulting in decision delays.
Option 2 – remake of Chapter 8 miscellaneous provisions	Provides certainty and flexibility in pig and poultry feed options through identifying materials that are not considered prohibited feed, while maintaining safeguards designed to protect livestock industries. External industry members from specified groups have the opportunity to support Queensland's biosecurity system on the front line. Retention of flexibility for future appointments without a regulatory amendment. Avoids industry concern about reduced government support. Provides clarity of the administrative details required to support regulatory oversight and compliance arrangements.	Appointment of industry personnel under the Biosecurity Act can impose costs on industry to fund appointments (by mutual agreement or choice). Government is required to resource training materials and oversight of appointments that are not being used.
Option 3 (recommended)– remake Chapter 8 miscellaneous provisions with amendments: remove appointments of inspectors or authorised persons external to the public service, except for appointment of ABGC members as authorised persons.	Minimises the risk of introducing or spreading serious animal diseases through feed practices. This provides certainty to industry while maintaining safeguards designed to protect livestock industries. This protects the pig and poultry industries in Queensland, which had a value of production of $1.1 billion in 2022–23. External industry members from specified groups would have the opportunity to support Queensland's biosecurity system on the front line in a collaborative arrangement through retention of flexibility for potential future appointments. Removal of latent appointment opportunities to reflect the current	Appointment of industry personnel under the Biosecurity Act can impose costs on industry to fund appointments (by choice). Continued need to resource training materials and oversight of appointments. The overall compliance cost for regulated parties is estimated to be $20,402 in the first year, and $42,556 for the next 10 years.

OPTIONS	Benefits	Cost
	biosecurity system, supporting modern drafting practices.	

Consultation and outcomes

There has been preliminary consultation with peak industry bodies and individuals regarding specific feed types for poultry in relation to the current rules. The existing regulatory framework allows for new types of products to be considered should scientific evidence support it.

Recommended option

Option 3 is the recommended approach.

This involves remaking Chapter 8 miscellaneous provisions which clarifies Biosecurity Act provisions, defines feed materials, appoints officers, and outlines compliance agreements, with one proposed amendment to remove remove appointments of inspectors or authorised persons external to the public service, except for appointment of ABGC members as authorised persons.

If these parts of the Biosecurity Regulation are allowed to lapse, this could increase the risk of serious animal diseases, such as FMD and African Swine Fever, entering Queensland through unregulated feed practices, resulting in significant economic losses, reduced market access, and threats to livestock industries. Additionally, the lack of clear provisions for appointing authorised officers and authorising RSCS would weaken compliance and enforcement efforts, compromising Queensland's biosecurity framework.

Survey questions – See the *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey
Survey questions 169–174 The recommended option (option 3) is to remake the chapter which clarifies Biosecurity Act provisions, defines feed materials, appoints external officers, and outlines compliance agreements, with one amendment. This is to remove external inspector and authorised person appointments not being utilised. Question 169: Do you support the recommended option? Question 170: Would the recommended option result in an unacceptable impact on you or your business? Question 171: If so, please provide an explanation including details of the nature of the impact, its size, and the consequences for you.

Survey questions – See the *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey
Question 172: Is there a more efficient way to achieve the objectives of this part of the Biosecurity Regulation? Question 173: If so, please explain. Question 174: Are there any other factors you would like to highlight for government consideration?

5.9 Chapter 9 – Fees

Policy rationale

Chapter 9 of the Biosecurity Regulation contains two sections. Section 127 provides that the fees payable for applications, permits, and other biosecurity-related services under the Biosecurity Regulation are in Schedule 10 of the Biosecurity Regulation. Section 128 provides for the waiver of fees, including the circumstances under which the chief executive or an authorised officer may waive particular fees. The fee section of the current Biosecurity Regulation is considered necessary and appropriate for continued delivery of these services.

Regulated biosecurity fees and policy objectives

DPI offers a number of regulatory and non-regulatory fees to assist Queensland businesses to comply with their legal requirements to minimise biosecurity risks. Many of the services are for private benefit, as they effectively facilitate commercial activities, decision making, and access to markets.

In 2016, when the Biosecurity Regulation was made, the fee structures of the predecessor legislation were redesigned through consolidation and removal of unnecessary fees, reducing the number of fees from 87 to the current 23. Chapter 9 and the associated Schedule 10 of the current Regulation sets out a schedule of regulatory fees provided for under the Biosecurity Act.

There are 23 fees relating to:

- application for, and renewal of, a registrable biosecurity entity for designated animals and bees
- application to end declarations for restricted places, restricted animals or restricted biosecurity matter
- application for a copy of information held in the biosecurity register (e.g. restricted places, restricted animals, restricted biosecurity matter, RBEs)
- application for, transfer of, and renewal of, prohibited and restricted matter permits
- giving a copy of information held in the register of prohibited and restricted matter permits
- inspection of a register of biosecurity orders held by local government
- giving a copy of information held in a register of biosecurity orders
- application to enter into a compliance agreement

- giving a biosecurity certificate by an authorised officer who is also an accredited certifier
- application for, and renewal of, approval as an auditor
- application to amend conditions of a relevant authority (e.g. prohibited or restricted matter permits, accreditation, auditor's approval).

Historical cost recovery model for regulated fees

The fee schedule, including their structure and the amount payable, was set when the Biosecurity Regulation was made in 2016. The 2016 *Queensland Biosecurity Regulation Decision Regulation Impact Statement* supported a full-cost recovery model for all fees, except for biosecurity entity registration in line with the *Queensland Government Principles for Fees and Charges*. This is because most of the services provided by DPI provide private financial benefit, as they effectively facilitate commercial activities and access to markets. For example, land can be listed as a restricted place on the biosecurity register due to a localised biosecurity risk. Conditions on the use of the land can be attributed to the place, and these may involve a cost to comply with the conditions or limit trade. Also, the restricted place declaration may influence property sale price if it is still in place at the time. There is a private financial advantage in applying to have the restricted place declaration ended once the biosecurity risk has been resolved (fee 3b, Table 33).

Table 33 Current regulated fees and cost recovery model intent

Fee	Fee amount and frequency*[184]	Cost recovery model intent – based on 2016 fees	Likely clients
1. Application for the registration of a registerable biosecurity entity (Act, s 148(1)(e))-			
(a) in relation to the keeping of designated animals other than bees, for each year applied for	48.30 fee units per year for 3 years	Partial cost recovery Commercial entities receive a 66 per cent subsidy. Non-commercial entities have the fee waived.	Primary producers (livestock) with the threshold number of designated animals.
(b) in relation to the keeping of bees, for each year applied for	32.60 fee units per year for 3 years	Partial cost recovery Commercial entities receive a 66 per cent subsidy. Non-commercial entities have the fee waived.	Primary producers (bees) with the threshold number of bee hives.
2. Renewal of registration of a registered biosecurity entity (Act, s 156(2)(a))—			
(a) in relation to the keeping of designated animals other than bees, for each year of registration	48.30 fee units per year for 3 years	Partial cost recovery Commercial entities receive a 66 per cent subsidy. Non-commercial entities have the fee waived.	Primary producers (livestock) with the threshold number of designated animals.
(b) in relation to the keeping of bees, for each year of registration	32.60 fee units per year for 3 years Per year for 3 years	Partial cost recovery	Primary producers (bees) with the threshold number of bee hives.

[184] *The current value of 1 fee unit in 2025/26 is $1.096*

Fee	Fee amount and frequency*[184]	Cost recovery model intent – based on 2016 fees	Likely clients
		Commercial entities receive a 66 per cent subsidy. Non-commercial entities have the fee waived.	
3.Application to end the following declarations (Act, s 164C(b))—			
(a) the declaration of a place as a restricted place;	79.95 fee units per application	Full cost recovery	Landowners whose property has a restricted place declaration
(b) the declaration of a designated animal as a restricted animal;	79.95 fee units per application	Full cost recovery	Owners whose designated animal(s) has/have a restricted animal declaration
(c) the declaration of designated biosecurity matter as restricted biosecurity matter	79.95 fee units per application	Full cost recovery	Owners of designated biosecurity matter declared to be restricted biosecurity matter
4. Giving a copy of information held in the biosecurity register (Act, s 173(1))	51.40 fee units per request	Full cost recovery	RBEs, and if publicly available, any member of the public seeking details about restricted places, animals and biosecurity matter under their control.
5. Application for a prohibited matter permit or restricted matter permit (Act, s 214(2)(b)(ii))	443.65 fee units per application	Full cost recovery	Researchers, educational businesses, exhibitors, land care and conservation groups, citizens, commercial entities.

Fee	Fee amount and frequency*[184]	Cost recovery model intent – based on 2016 fees	Likely clients
6. Application for renewal of a prohibited matter permit or restricted matter permit (Act, s 225(2)(c))	443.65 fee units per application	Full cost recovery	Researchers, educational businesses, exhibitors, land care and conservation groups, citizens, commercial entities.
7. Application for the transfer of a prohibited matter permit or restricted matter permit (Act, s 230(1))	79.95 fee units per application	Full cost recovery	Researchers, educational businesses, exhibitors, land care and conservation groups, citizens, commercial entities.
8. Copy of all or part of the information held in the register of prohibited matter and restricted matter permits (Act, s 231(4))	51.40 fee units per application	Full cost recovery	Researchers, educational businesses, exhibitors, land care and conservation groups, citizens, commercial entities.
9. Inspection of a register of biosecurity orders kept by a chief executive officer of a local government, for each hour (Act, s 379(5))	17.10 fee units per hour	Full cost recovery	Residents, primary producers, businesses.
10. Copy of all or part of the information held in a register of biosecurity orders (Act, s 379(6))	51.40 fee units per request	Full cost recovery	Residents, primary producers, businesses.
11. Application to enter into a compliance agreement with the State, for each year of the term of the agreement applied for (Act, s 396(3))	146.75 fee units per year of agreement	Full cost recovery	Any person, typically commercial entities.
12. Giving of a biosecurity certificate by an authorised officer who is also an accredited certifier (Act, s 419) if— (a) the authorised officer does not visit a place for the purpose of giving the certificate; and (b) preparing the certificate takes no more than 15 minutes	54.70 fee units per decision	Full cost recovery	Primary producers seeking certification of product.

Fee	Fee amount and frequency*[184]	Cost recovery model intent – based on 2016 fees	Likely clients
13. Application for the grant of an accreditation, for each year of the term of the accreditation applied for (Act, s 420(2)(b))	335.30 fee units per year	Full cost recovery	People seeking to offer accreditation services
14. Application for the renewal of an accreditation, for each year of the term of the accreditation applied for (Act, s 432(2)(c))	335.30 fee units per year	Full cost recovery	People seeking to offer accreditation services
15. Application for an approval as an auditor (Act, s 460(2)(b)), the total of the following fees—		Full cost recovery	People seeking to offer auditing services
(a) the application fee	165.95 fee units per application		
(b) the additional fee, for each year of the term of the approval applied for	428.35 fee units per year of approval		
16. Application for the renewal of an approval as an auditor (Act, s 460(2)(b)), the total of the following fees—		Full cost recovery	People seeking to offer auditing services
(a) the application fee	165.95 fee units per application		
(b) the additional fee, for each year of the term of the approval applied for	428.35 fee units per year of approval		
17. Application for the amendment of the conditions of a relevant authority (Act, s 479(2)(b))	82.30 fee units per application	Full cost recovery	Authority holders

The *Queensland Government Principles for Fees and Charges* requires that in deciding charges for goods and services, departments must have regard to the full cost of providing the goods and services, and unless government has made a deliberate decision otherwise, fees or charges should reflect full cost recovery. Furthermore, those who use and benefit from the services should pay for them.

To calculate the fees in the 2016 consultation document, the regulatory services set out in the Biosecurity Regulation were calculated by DPI using the following costing methodology developed by the Queensland Government. The methodology involved consideration of labour costs, operating costs, and indirect costs, and represented the minimum costs necessary to deliver the activity – that is, the efficient costs.

- Labour costs (salary only) were calculated by multiplying each person's time directly spent on the service in question by the hourly rate (or part thereof) for each person. For example, it may involve time spent processing and assessing an application or updating a database.
- Operating costs were the materials consumed through providing the service, for example, postage and printing of permits.
- Indirect costs included employment overheads such as annual leave, superannuation, and sick leave. They also included the costs of the management, legal, and administrative services, and infrastructure such as building lease costs, computers, and vehicles required to facilitate the provision of a particular service. DPI established a model to ensure consistency when determining fees or charges. The model was based on calculating total departmental overheads (indirect costs) and applying them to each service based on time spent on those services. When setting the original fees, the modelling resulted in a multiplier of 2.85.[185]

Fee structure

Subsidies

RBE

Biosecurity entity registration is a critical element in livestock and bee biosecurity outcomes. Biosecurity entity registration allows DPI to better:

- prepare for biosecurity emergencies
- respond to biosecurity risks, and
- trace the origin and spread of a pest or disease.

The biosecurity entity registration system also provides benefits to commercial primary producers, including:

- access to industry quality assurance programs

[185] www.treasury.qld.gov.au/files/Biosecurity-Regulations-Decision-RIS.pdf

- improved market access, and
- lower biosecurity risk as registration enables better management of biosecurity risks.

Registration and renewal fees help deliver these benefits by contributing to the cost of:

- maintaining and administering Queensland's database of registered entities. which integrates with the NLIS https://www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/farms-fishing-forestry/agriculture/animal/move/laws/nlis and Livestock Production Assurance (LPA), to ensure traceability of livestock
- maintaining an online portal for customers to access and manage their registration and renewal details.

The Biosecurity Regulation 2016 regulatory impact statement recognised that some non-commercial owners may gain minimal measurable benefits from registration, and imposing a fee could deter them from registering their animals, potentially undermining the system's integrity. To address this, a minimum threshold was set which determined when a fee waiver could be applied. Individuals meeting the Australian Tax Office's definition of conducting a primary production business are required to pay the fee.[186] All other entities must still register to uphold the system's integrity but have their fees fully subsidised by the government.

While the broader public benefits from the flow-on effects of Queensland's strong biosecurity status, the primary beneficiaries are producers and those directly involved with designated animals. This includes individuals engaged in related activities and those who profit directly from the trade of healthy, pest-free animals. However, it is challenging to precisely determine the proportion of benefits received by producers and property owners, as well as the indirect advantages for other industries, such as animal transport companies, and the resulting flow-on effects to local communities.

As the system delivers public benefits and flow-on benefits to other industries, the Queensland Government currently subsidises 66% of the registration and renewal fees for those who pay.

Subsidisation of non-commercial entities distributed the cost for managing biosecurity between the risk-creators and the government, delivered the best and most equitable outcome.

Fee waivers

The Biosecurity Regulation provides that DPI may waive a fee relating to RBEs if it is not being made for the purpose of carrying on a business of primary production. DPI provides guidance about who meets this criteria using the Australian Tax Office ruling

[186] www.ato.gov.au/businesses-and-organisations/income-deductions-and-concessions/primary-producers/primary-production-activities#ato-Operatingabusiness

of carrying out the business of primary production. The fee is not payable if primary producer status is not claimed on their tax return as a result of owning the animals.

Similarly, an authorised officer who is also an accredited certifier may waive a fee or for giving a biosecurity certificate, if they are satisfied the recipient will gain no commercial benefit as a result of receiving the certificate. The vast majority of biosecurity certificates are given for commercial purposes.

Table 34 sets out the current number and proportion of commercial and non-commercial RBEs (as at 25 February 2026). RBEs represents the largest uptake of fee related services.

Table 34 Current number of commercial and non-commercial RBEs as at 35 February 2026

RBE designated animal	Commercial RBEs		Non-commercial RBES	
	Number	Percentage (%)	Number	Percentage (%)
Bees	676	6	9,955	94
Cattle	38,856	68	18,675	32
Buffalo and bison	103	72	41	28
Sheep	5,821	52	5,433	48
Goats	3,494	44	4,378	56
Pigs	2,200	52	2,017	48
Poultry	3,640	51	3,515	49
Other designated birds	94	35	177	65
Equine	19,575	57	14,518	43
Deer	97	63	57	37
Camels	260	69	118	31
Alpacas and llamas	358	34	689	66

Benchmarking current fees

As part of the review, Queensland's current regulated fees were compared to other Australian jurisdictions. Fee levels vary between jurisdictions, noting not all fees are directly comparable and a number have no equivalent legislative concept. Generally, Queensland's biosecurity related fees are within the range of other states and territories. For example, registration of a registrable biosecurity entity for bees ranges from $17 to $52.50 per year. Queensland's fee of $35.73 sits just above the average cost of $33.09. Refer to Attachment 7 for a detailed comparison.

Uptake of services

Table 35 sets out the number of applications received per financial year for each fee related service over the last five years.

There is marked year-to-year variability in some fee types:

- fees 2(a) and 2(b) – renewal of RBE registrations
  Reflects the three-yearly RBE renewal cycle and uptake of registrations following bee disease incursion.
- fee 12 – giving of a biosecurity certificate
  Application numbers are a product of biosecurity regulatory requirements given they are used to certify that specific biosecurity requirements have been met. The spike in biosecurity certificates issued in 2024/25 is likely the result of expanding the RIFA biosecurity zone. The number of biosecurity certificates issued is increasing year on year.

There were no applications received over the last five years relating to the following fee types:

- fee 3(c) application to end declaration of Restricted Biosecurity Matter
  An RBE for the place, or an owner or occupier of a designated place, is required to inform the chief executive if designated biosecurity matter at the place poses, or may pose, a biosecurity risk. A restricted biosecurity matter declaration can be made when the chief executive has decided that designated biosecurity matter at a place should be declared as restricted biosecurity matter. Designated biosecurity matter is prescribed under a regulation, however currently there is none.
- fee 7 application for Transfer of Prohibited Matter Permit or Restricted Matter Permit

  Transfer of permits are considered a rare occurrence as they are specifically tied to a permit holder's own permit plan. Transfer of permits requires both the original and proposed new permittee to agree to the transfer. This means that the new permittee would have to comply with the permit plan and conditions on the transferring permit. As this may not be suitable, it's possible that applicants are applying for a new permit rather than applying for a transfer.
- fee 8 copy of Information held in register of Prohibited Matter and Restricted Matter Permits

  The Register of prohibited matter and restricted matter permits is available to the public on DPI's website at no cost.[187] This removes the need to apply to purchase a copy of the register information for most people with access to the internet.
- fee 11 application to enter a Compliance Agreement with the State, for each year
  Under the Biosecurity Act people can enter into a compliance agreement with the Chief Executive. Compliance agreements enable people to manage biosecurity risks in the absence of, or instead of, regulatory provisions. Anyone who applies for, or has entered into, a compliance agreement will be subject to auditing to assess compliance with the requirements of the agreement. It is possible that prohibited or restricted matter permits, or other permits such as biosecurity

[187] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/about/rti/publication-scheme/lists/prohibited-permits

instrument permits (for biosecurity zones) are addressing all needs for managing risks outside of regulatory provisions.

- fee 15(a) application for approval as an Auditor, application fee and Fee 15(b) Application for approval as an Auditor, for each year

  and

  fee 16(a) application for renewal of approval as an Auditor, application fee and fee 16(b) application for renewal of Accreditation as an Auditor, for each year

  An auditor's function is to conduct audits of businesses and other parties to compliance agreements, of accredited certifier applicant's quality control systems, of applicants' biosecurity accreditation systems, and operation of accreditation schemes. There are currently no active compliance agreements in Queensland, meaning there is no demand for auditor services.

Table 35 Number of service of applications over the past five years

Service or application type	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	*5-year average*
Fee 1(a) Application for Registration of Registerable Biosecurity Entity (other than bees)	4,033	4,300	4,482	3,584	3,730	*4,026*
Fee 1(b) Application for Registration of Registerable Biosecurity Entity (keeping of bees)	1,605	1,690	1,458	1,409	1,219	*1,476*
Fee 2(a) Renewal of Registration of Registerable Biosecurity Entity (other than bees)	19,302	36,032	30,119	14,285	20,126	*23,973*
Fee 2(b) Renewal of Registration of Registerable Biosecurity Entity (keeping of bees)	4,986	3,654	3,589	4,329	3,740	*4,060*
Fee 3(a) Application to end declaration of Restricted Place	37	23	41	15	29	*29*
Fee 3(b) Application to end declaration of Restricted Animal	512	75	33	107	14	*148*
Fee 3(c) Application to end declaration of Restricted Matter	0	0	0	0	0	*0*
Fee 4 Giving a copy of information held in Biosecurity Register	931	812	630	616	623	*722*
Fee 5 Application for Prohibited Matter Permit or Restricted Matter	20	14	8	16	18	*15*
Fee 6 Renewal of Prohibited Matter Permit or Restricted Matter Permit	19	23	34	15	13	*21*
Fee 7 Application for Transfer of Prohibited Matter Permit or Restricted Matter Permit	0	0	0	0	0	*0*
Fee 8 Copy of Information held in register of Prohibited Matter and Restricted Matter Permits	0	0	0	0	0	*0*
Fee 9 Inspection of a register of Biosecurity Orders by Chief Executive of a Local Government	Not available					
Fee 10 Copy of Information held in a register of Biosecurity Orders	10	8	5	12	7	*8*
Fee 11 Application to enter a Compliance Agreement with the State, for each year	0	0	0	0	0	*0*
Fee 12 Giving of a Biosecurity Certificate by an Authorised Officer	265	361	446	818	2,280	*834*
Fee 13 Application for the grant of Accreditation, for each year	53	33	79	46	51	*52*
Fee 14 Application for renewal of Accreditation, for each year	86	184	231	196	216	*183*
Fee 15(a) Application for approval as an Auditor, application fee	0	0	0	0	0	*0*
Fee 15(b) Application for approval as an Auditor, for each year	0	0	0	0	0	*0*
Fee 16(a) Application for renewal of approval as an Auditor, application fee	0	0	0	0	0	*0*
Fee 16(b) Application for renewal of approval as an Auditor, for each year	0	0	0	0	0	*0*
Fee 17 Application for amendment of conditions of a relevant authority	22	16	19	20	18	*19*

Feedback on the current fee schedule

The Biosecurity Act provides the regulation-making power for fees payable.

DPI will be considering the appropriate fee structure and amounts payable, including the level of cost recovery, during the next phase of the sunset review. To inform that process, general feedback on the fees is sought.

Survey questions – See *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey
Survey questions 175–179 Question 175: Full cost-recovery was the basis for all current fees when implemented in 2016, except those related to registrable biosecurity entities. Is this model of cost-recovery still appropriate? If not, please provide an explanation. Question 176: Fees relating to registered biosecurity entities were set including a subsidisation of 2/3 of the full cost recovery to reflect the shared public and private benefits. Is the cost recovery approach, including the current fee rate, this still appropriate? Question 177: DPI waives fees for applications relating to registrable biosecurity entities where it is for a non-commercial purpose (for livestock and bees). Is this still appropriate? Question 178: Are there any other factors that should be considered when setting fees? If yes, please identify which fees and the reasons. Question 179: How do the current fee levels impact your business operations or profitability?

5.10 Chapter 10 – Repeals and revocations

Chapter 10 contains the repeal of regulation sections and the revocation of movement control orders issued under the Biosecurity Act. This chapter is administrative only. No further analysis or consultation is required.

Miscellaneous administrative amendments

The sunset review has identified the need for administrative amendments that would have no regulatory impact on community or industry. This includes correction or clarification to the head of power in the Biosecurity Act, revocation of emergency response instruments that have already expired, removal of facsimile number from required applicant information as this option is no longer commonly available, removal of transitional provisions, and updates to scientific or common names of species due to changes in taxonomic classifications.

As these proposals are wholly administrative and do not have a regulatory impact, no further policy analysis has been undertaken.

6. Additional feedback

6.1 Suggested future inclusions

The analyses in this document have been focused on the existing Biosecurity Regulation. DPI invites you to raise any biosecurity (including contaminant) risks that you believe may benefit from management in a future Biosecurity Regulation.

Survey questions – See *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey
Survey questions 180–181 Question 180: Are there any additional biosecurity risks that you believe should be addressed through the current Biosecurity Regulation, which should be included to improve biosecurity outcomes for Queensland? Question 181: If so, please provide an explanation including evidence of the biosecurity risk, the risk pathways (how it might spread), the species or matter of concern, and any known impacts on Queensland's biosecurity outcomes including market access or the environment.

6.2 Direct compliance costs

DPI would like to better understand the direct compliance costs for each part of the current Regulation, to confirm the understanding of the impacts. Direct compliance costs are those costs that a person or business bears in performing actions the Biosecurity Regulation requires. It does not include indirect or consequential business costs, or costs that are a business decision. DPI invites you to share your experience through the survey below.

Survey questions – See *Mixed sectors and miscellaneous* survey
Survey questions 182–184 Question 182: Which parts of the Biosecurity Regulation require action from you? Question 183: For each of these, how much does it cost you over a year, to perform the *required* actions that the Biosecurity Regulation prescribes? Note this is the direct compliance costs rather than indirect business costs or those resulting from individual business decisions. Question 184: For each of these, please provide information on staff pay rates, hours required for education, actions, purchases (e.g. insecticides)

Section D
Conclusion

Prawn trawler off Queensland coastline © The State of Queensland 2022

7. Recommended option

The recommended option is to remake the Biosecurity Regulation, incorporating the proposed amendments where identified. This option is expected to deliver a net benefit to the Queensland community by supporting the continued effective operation of the Biosecurity Act and maintaining appropriate protections for the economy, human health, social amenity, and the environment.

All provisions within the Biosecurity Regulation are supported by a clear head of power under the Biosecurity Act and remain necessary to manage biosecurity risks. The proposed amendments are not expected to result in material increases in regulatory burden or compliance costs for business, government, or the community compared to the existing regulation. Requirements will largely be maintained, with changes limited to targeted deregulation, technical amendments, and the introduction of minor, low-cost regulatory measures. These changes are considered proportionate to the risks being managed.

Allowing the Biosecurity Regulation to expire would result in a significant regulatory gap, substantially reducing the effectiveness of the biosecurity framework. This would increase the likelihood and consequence of biosecurity risks, including the entry, establishment and spread of pests and diseases within Queensland. The associated impacts would impose significant economic, environmental, and social costs, particularly on primary industries, and would outweigh any short-term reduction in compliance costs.

Given the often irreversible nature of biosecurity incursions and the potential for widespread impacts, a regulatory approach remains necessary to ensure consistent, enforceable, and risk-based management of biosecurity threats. Accordingly, remaking the Biosecurity Regulation with the proposed amendments is the preferred option as it achieves the greatest net benefit while maintaining an appropriate balance between risk management and regulatory burden.

7.1 Net benefit to the community

The remake of the Biosecurity Regulation with amendments will effectively maintain existing regulatory requirements and associated compliance costs for businesses, government, and the community, with several opportunities for deregulation identified. While these costs are ongoing, they are necessary to manage biosecurity risks and are substantially outweighed by the benefits delivered to Queensland's economy, environment, and community.

The Biosecurity Regulation supports the effective implementation of the Biosecurity Act by providing specific, enforceable measures to prevent, minimise, and manage biosecurity risks. Government administration of the Biosecurity Regulation, including compliance, enforcement, and service delivery, is targeted and risk-based, ensuring that regulatory costs are proportionate to the level of risk and are justified by the resulting benefits.

Economic benefits, jobs and food security

Queensland's primary industries make a significant contribution to the national economy and food supply chains. According to the DPI Annual Report 2024–25, there were approximately 67,100 businesses operating across the supply chain in 2023–24, contributing an estimated $34.7 billion to the economy in 2024–25 and employing around 382,000 people (approximately 13% of the Queensland workforce). Of these, around 65,300 are directly employed in the agriculture, fisheries, and forestry sectors.[188]

The Biosecurity Regulation, as part of the broader legislative framework, plays a critical role in protecting these industries from the impacts of pests and diseases, which can lead to production losses, increased operating costs, market access restrictions, and long-term industry decline.

Key sectors supported by the Biosecurity Regulation include:

- livestock: In 2024-25, Queensland's livestock industry was valued at approximately $10.1 billion, with beef production representing the State's most valuable agricultural commodity. Queensland accounts for approximately 49% of the national cattle herd. Cattle tick biosecurity zone provisions play a critical role in reducing the risk of spread and minimising associated production losses from tick fever.
- Sugar cane: Queensland produces more than 95% of Australia's sugar cane. Biosecurity zone provisions reduce the risk of pest and disease incursions in an industry valued at approximately $1.5 billion in 2022-23.
- horticulture: Queensland is a major producer of mangoes, citrus, and bananas. Entry restrictions and biosecurity zones protect these industries from serious pests such as mango malformation disease and Mediterranean fruit fly, and from the spread of banana pests and diseases. Queensland's banana industry alone produces over 90% of Australia's bananas, valued at approximately $563 million.

By reducing the likelihood of pests and diseases entering, establishing, or spreading, the Biosecurity Regulation supports productivity, protects market access, and underpins employment across regional and rural Queensland. Without these protections, industries would face significantly higher costs associated with pest management, reduced yields, and potential loss of domestic and international markets.

Human health and community benefits

Queensland's biosecurity regulatory framework protects human health and community wellbeing by managing contaminants and zoonotic diseases (those transmissible from animals to humans). Through controls on high-risk biosecurity matter and carriers, delivering the following benefits:

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[188] www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/6dd176e9-c8ae-4a67-9104-e0fea137f331/department-of-primary-industries-annual-report-2024-2025.pdf?ETag=affbeaed7dc1a636452a670cf4784373

- public safety: Reduces the risk of exposure to harmful contaminants and infectious diseases, avoiding significant impacts on individuals and reducing pressure on the health system.
- Community wellbeing: Supports Queensland's outdoor lifestyle by limiting the establishment and spread of invasive pests, such as RIFA, which can affect the safe use of parks, gardens, and residential areas.
- Food security: Maintains the integrity and reliability of food supply chains by minimising the risk of chemical and biological contamination from production through to consumption.

Environmental and social benefits

The Biosecurity Regulation includes measures to manage environmental pests and diseases that threaten biodiversity and ecosystem health. These measures also support social amenity by protecting public spaces such as parks, beaches, waterways, and recreational areas.

For example, biosecurity zone provisions targeting high-risk pests—such as invasive ants and plant pests—reduce the likelihood of establishment and spread. Experiences in other jurisdictions demonstrate that failure to manage these risks can result in significant environmental degradation, loss of urban canopy, and reduced community amenity, as well as substantial long-term control costs.

By preventing or limiting the establishment of invasive species, the Biosecurity Regulation protects native ecosystems, agricultural landscapes, and the broader environment, delivering long-term benefits to the community.

Legislative and administrative benefits

The Biosecurity Regulation provides the detailed mechanisms necessary to operationalise the Biosecurity Act, including the prescription of fees for services such as permits, registrations, and compliance agreements. This supports consistent, transparent, and efficient cost recovery for services that deliver a private benefit, in line with government policy.

In addition, the Biosecurity Regulation enables a flexible and responsive approach to biosecurity risk management, allowing controls to be updated as new threats emerge or risk profiles change. This adaptability is critical in a dynamic biosecurity environment.

Consistency with national biosecurity management

The Biosecurity Regulation supports Queensland's obligations under national biosecurity agreements and frameworks. This includes provisions relating to the operation of the NLIS, CoPs for the labelling of fertilisers and stock feed, and the management of nationally significant pests such as cattle tick.

The Biosecurity Regulation has been assessed against biosecurity legislation in other Australian jurisdictions to identify opportunities for harmonisation and improved consistency for stakeholders operating across borders. While alignment exists in key areas, no additional opportunities for harmonisation were identified that would be appropriate for Queensland's specific biosecurity risk profile and regulatory context. A summary of Queensland's alignment with other jurisdictions is provided in Attachment 4.

Overall, the Biosecurity Regulation is consistent with national biosecurity frameworks and does not create unnecessary duplication or inconsistency with other jurisdictions. Any jurisdictional differences are appropriate and reflect Queensland's unique risk profile, industry composition, and environmental conditions. Accordingly, the Biosecurity Regulation supports a coordinated national approach while maintaining the flexibility required to effectively manage biosecurity risks within Queensland.

7.2 Consistency with competition principles

The Queensland Government is a signatory to the Intergovernmental Agreement on National Competition Policy, which commits jurisdictions to promoting a single national market. Under Principle 5, parties agree not to create or entrench unnecessary barriers to the movement of goods and services, or to the operation of businesses across state, territory, and international borders, where appropriate.

The Biosecurity Regulation has been assessed against this principle. Most provisions are consistent with Principle 5, as they do not impose unnecessary restrictions on market participation or interstate trade. However, certain measures—such as statewide entry restrictions on biosecurity carriers associated with high-risk pests and diseases—may limit the free movement of goods.

These restrictions are considered necessary and proportionate to manage significant biosecurity risks. They are targeted, risk-based controls designed to prevent the introduction and spread of pests and diseases that could have substantial economic, environmental, and social impacts. Without such measures, Queensland industries would face increased risk of incursion, potentially resulting in far greater market disruption, including the loss of interstate and international market access.

Accordingly, any limitation on competition is justified, as the Biosecurity Regulation supports the efficient functioning of markets over the longer term by maintaining Queensland's biosecurity status and protecting industry productivity and trade.

7.3 Consistency with the Mutual Recognition Act

The *Mutual Recognition Act 1992* (Cth) facilitates the recognition of regulatory standards and occupational qualifications across Australian jurisdictions, supporting the free movement of goods and services.

The Biosecurity Regulation, including the proposed amendments, is consistent with the Mutual Recognition Act. The Biosecurity Regulation does not impose requirements that conflict with mutual recognition principles. Any provisions relating to the recognition of interstate qualifications are addressed within the Biosecurity Act.

7.4 Summary

Overall, remaking the Biosecurity Regulation with targeted amendments is necessary to maintain an effective and enforceable biosecurity framework and delivers a substantial net benefit to Queensland. The Biosecurity Regulation provides proportionate, risk-based controls that protect the State's economy, human health, environment, and community, while supporting national consistency and market access. Any regulatory burden is justified and outweighed by the significant costs avoided through preventing and managing biosecurity risks.

8. Implementation, compliance support and evaluation strategy

8.1 Implementation strategy

Feedback on this C-IAS will be considered by Government in preparing a decision on the future of the expiring Biosecurity Regulation. Subject to Government approval, development of a replacement Regulation is expected to commence prior to the current Regulation's expiry.

The recommended option is to remake the Biosecurity Regulation with amendments. This is not expected to result in significant changes to requirements for regulated parties. Implementation will be supported through:

- updates to DPI guidance materials and public information
- targeted communication and engagement, including media and digital channels
- notification of the remade Regulation through established biosecurity networks and stakeholder groups.

If the Biosecurity Regulation is not remade by its scheduled expiry on 1 September 2026, provisions under the SI Act may allow for its exemption from expiry. Any extension would only be applied if necessary and in accordance with statutory requirements, to ensure continuity of the regulatory framework.

8.2 Evaluation strategy

The proposed replacement Biosecurity Regulation will be subject to review within ten years of commencement to assess its ongoing effectiveness, efficiency, and appropriateness.

Performance will be monitored on an ongoing basis, with relevant outcomes reported through annual whole-of-government Regulator Performance Framework reporting, as appropriate.

DPI will continue to update the Biosecurity Regulation in response to changing biosecurity risk profiles, with any amendments undertaken in accordance with consultation and regulatory impact assessment requirements set by the Office of Best Practice Regulation.

8.3 Compliance strategy

DPI undertakes compliance and enforcement activities in a manner consistent with a best-practice, risk-based approach. This approach will ensure that regulatory effort is proportionate, targeted, and aligned with community expectations.

Compliance activities will be informed by data, intelligence, and evidence-based decision-making to focus resources on areas of highest risk and greatest impact. DPI will also promote consistency, transparency, and efficiency in the application of compliance and enforcement actions.

This approach is expected to support improved compliance outcomes by providing clear guidance to frontline officers on priorities and appropriate enforcement responses. It will also ensure that the level of intervention is proportionate to the risks being managed, supporting effective implementation of the Biosecurity Regulation.

9. Impact assessment

The recommended option is to remake the Biosecurity Regulation with proposed amendments. In accordance with Best Practice Regulation requirements, an estimate of the direct compliance costs borne by regulated parties and government has been undertaken.

Direct compliance costs relate to activities required to comply with regulatory obligations and exclude indirect impacts such as market access benefits, business decisions, and broader government compliance and enforcement costs.

Direct compliance costs were calculated using the Best Practice Regulation methodology and calculator. DPI applied legislated award rates (sourced from the Fair Work Ombudsman), available data, and expert estimates to determine the number of affected businesses, the activities required under the Biosecurity Regulation, the staff involved and the frequency of these activities.

Cost components considered include:

- notification
- education and training
- permissions and approvals
- purchasing products and services
- record keeping
- publication, documentation and procedural requirements
- labour.

Estimated direct compliance costs are approximately $2.4 million per year across the Queensland community (Table 36). These costs are outweighed by the economic benefits of the Biosecurity Regulation, including protecting an estimated $26.8 billion in

primary industry production in 2024–25[189], in addition to broader food security and community benefits.

Table 36 Direct compliance costs and Government costs over the first full year of a remade Biosecurity Regulation and over a 10-year period

	First full year	First 10 years**
Direct costs – *Compliance costs*	$3.9 million*	$24 million **
Direct costs – *Government costs*	**0*** **	$84,364 ***

* Start-up costs are minimal, reflecting the continuation of established regulatory requirements. Limited start-up costs have been assumed for sectors with new entrants.

** Certain compliance costs could not be reliably quantified:

- **Cattle tick zone requirements**: Costs vary depending on production systems and cattle movements. Indicative modelling suggests costs of $8.50 to $52 per head. With approximately 3.4 million head processed in 2024–25[190], this equates to a potential range of $29.1 million to $177.8 million. Compared to a gross cattle value of $11.7 billion, this indicates a clear net benefit. Forecasting over a 10-year period is not reliable due to variability in production and market conditions.
- **Fertiliser and feed requirements**: Costs associated with labelling and contaminant controls could not be quantified due to limited data on affected stakeholders and activity frequency. Collecting this data would impose an unreasonable burden and would likely require a coordinated national approach.

***Direct Government costs stemming from the Biosecurity Regulation are a result of two restricted matter permit types introduced by the Biosecurity Regulation. The remaining direct Government costs are attributable to the Biosecurity Act (the primary legislation).

The first full year would not result in any additional startup costs as the legislation is already currently in place. Calculations used the current fee schedule and fee unit value set out in legislation.[191,192]

[189] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm
[190] www.dpi.qld.gov.au/news-media/campaigns/data-farm/livestock
[191]www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/sl-2022-0039
[192] www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/current/sl-2016-0075

Attachment 1 – List of stakeholders invited to comment on current Regulation effectiveness and efficiency – pre-consultation (noting sunset exemptions)

Stakeholder group name	Relevant parts of Regulation
Stage 1 (September 2025)	
AgForce	All
Animal Health Australia	Animal biosecurity rules
Plant Health Australia	Plant biosecurity rules
Queensland Farmers' Federation	All
Stage2 (November 2025)	
Apple and Pear Australia Limited	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Animal Biosecurity Market Access Liasion Group (ABMALG)	Notifiable incidents (section 19)
Australian Banana Growers' Council	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Banana pest biosecurity zone (sections 78-80), Pyriform Scale carrier list (Schedule 7), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8)
Australian Forest Products Association	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone (sections 94EF - 94 EI)
Australian Ginger Industry Association	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Australian Grape and Wine	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Australian Honey Bee Industry Council	Notifiable incidents (section 19), Diagnostic testing (Sections 23-29), Bees and apiaries (sections 30-32), Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Marking and maintenance of marked or branded HIN (section 95)
Australian Lot Feeders Association	Biosecurity management plans (section 94F - 94H), Special designated animal identification and tracing system (sections 96-114)
Australian Livestock and Property Agent Association	Special designated animal identification and tracing system (sections 96-114)
Australian Lychee Growers Association	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)

Stakeholder group name	Relevant parts of Regulation
Australian Macadamia Society	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone (sections 94EF - 94 EI),
Australian Mango Industry Association	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B),Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone (sections 94EF - 94 EI), Pyriform Scale carrier list (Schedule 7)
	Far northern pests list (Schedule 8)
Australian Meat Industry Council	Special designated animal identification and tracing system (sections 96-114)
Australian Melon Industry	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Australian Olive Association	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone (sections 94EF - 94 EI)
Australian Papaya	Papaya ringspot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (sections 90-92)
Australian Pork Limited	Biosecurity management plans (section 94F - 94H)
Australian Prawn Farmers Association	White spot biosecurity zone (section 94A-94E)
Australian Queen Bee Breeders' Association	Notifiable incidents (section 19), Marking and maintenance of marked or branded HIN (section 95)
Australian Sugar Manufacturers	Sugar cane pest biosecurity zone (sections 93-94)
Australian Sweet Potato Growers	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Australian Table Grape Industry	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone (sections 88-89), Grape phylloxera carriers (schedule 9)
Australian Tea Tree Industry Association	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Ausveg	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone (sections 88-89), Papaya ringspot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (sections 90-92), Pyriform Scale carrier list (Schedule 7), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8), Grape phylloxera carriers (schedule 9)
Avocados Australia	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Pyriform Scale carrier list (Schedule 7)
Berries Australia	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Brisbane City Council	Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biosecurity control agents (Schedule 4)
Australian Cane Farmers Association	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Sugar cane pest biosecurity zone (sections 93-94), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8)
Cane Growers	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77),Sugar cane pest biosecurity zone (sections 93-94), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8)

Stakeholder group name	Relevant parts of Regulation
Cairns Regional Council	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Cassowary Coast Regional Council	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Cattle Australia	Statewide pest management requirements (cattle tick) (section 61), Cattle tick biosecurity zone (sections 81-87)
Cherry Growers Australia	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Citrus Australia	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Pyriform Scale carrier list (Schedule 7), Citrus canker carriers (Schedule 7A)
City of Moreton Bay Council	Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biosecurity control agents (Schedule 4)
City of the Gold Coast Council	Invasive animal boards (section 43)
Cotton Australia	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
CS Energy	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
DAFF	Maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers (sections 20-22), Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65)Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals (Schedule 3), Mediterranean fruit fly carriers (Schedule 6), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8)
Darling Downs Moreton Rabbit Board	Invasive animal boards (section 43)
Douglas Shire Council	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
EcoInsects	Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biosecurity control agents (Schedule 4)
Energy Queensland	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Far North Queensland Growers	Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8),
Far North Queensland Regional Organisation of Council	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Fertilizer Australia	Code of Practice for the Labelling of Fertilisers and Contaminants in Fertilisers (Schedule 2)
Food Standards Australia and New Zealand (FSANZ)	Maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers (sections 20-22), Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals (Schedule 3)
Fraser Coast Regional Council	Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biosecurity control agents (Schedule 4)
GENICS	Diagnostic testing (Sections 23-29)
Goat Industry Council of Australia (GICA)	Notifiable incidents (section 19), Special designated animal identification and tracing system (sections 96-114)
Goondiwindi Regional Council	Barrier fence (section 44)
Grain Producers Australia	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)

Stakeholder group name	Relevant parts of Regulation
Greenlife Industry Australia	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77), Banana pest biosecurity zone (sections 78-80), Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone (sections 88-89), Papaya ringspot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (sections 90-92), Polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone (sections 94EF - 94 EI), Pyriform Scale carrier list (Schedule 7), Citrus canker carriers (Schedule 7A), Grape phylloxera carriers (schedule 9)
Horse Biosecurity Market Access Liaison Group (HBMALG)	Notifiable incidents (section 19)
Hort Innovations members	Papaya ringspot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (sections 90-92)
IDEXX	Diagnostic testing (Sections 23-29)
Invasive Species Council	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Ipswich City Council	Invasive animal boards (section 43)
JCU	Notifiable incidents (section 19), Diagnostic testing (Sections 23-29)
Kuranda Enviro Care	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ)	Matters relating to local governments (section 42), Invasive animal boards (section 43), Barrier fence (section 44), Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biological control agent (Schedule 4), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8)
Lockyer Valley Regional Council	Invasive animal boards (section 43)
Logan City Council	Invasive animal boards (section 43)
Mareeba Shire Council	Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8)
Mulgrave Mill	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
NBN Co	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Nursery & Garden Industry Queensland	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77), Banana pest biosecurity zone (sections 78-80), Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone (sections 88-89), Papaya ringspot biosecurity zone (sections 90-92), Polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone (sections 94EF - 94 EI), Pyriform Scale carrier list (Schedule 7), Citrus canker carriers (Schedule 7A), Grape phylloxera carriers (schedule 9)
Oxley Creek Catchment Association	Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biosecurity control agents (Schedule 4),
Paroo Shire Council	Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biosecurity control agents (Schedule 4),
Passionfruit Australia	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Pine Rivers Catchment Association	Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biosecurity control agents (Schedule 4),

Stakeholder group name	Relevant parts of Regulation
Ports North	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Poultry Health Liaison Group (PHLG)	Notifiable incidents (section 19), Biosecurity management plans (section 94F - 94H)
Queensland Health	Maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers (sections 20-22), Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals (Schedule 3)
Queensland Beekeepers Association	Notifiable incidents (section 19),Bees and apiaries (sections 30-32), Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Marking and maintenance of marked or branded HIN (section 95), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8)
Powerlink Queensland	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Queensland Fruit and Vegetable Growers Assoc.	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B), Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone (sections 88-89),Papaya ringspot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (sections 90-92), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8), Grape phylloxera carriers (schedule 9)
Queensland Goat Producers Inc.(QGoat)	Notifiable incidents (section 19), Special designated animal identification and tracing system (sections 96-114)
Queensland Seafood Industry Association (QSIA)	White spot biosecurity zone (section 94A-94E)
Queensland Strawberry Growers Association	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Queensland Investment Corporation	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Real Estate Institute of Queensland	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Rockhampton Regional Council	Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biosecurity control agents (Schedule 4)
Safe Food Production Queensland (SFPQ)	Maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers (sections 20-22), Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals (Schedule 3)
SAFEMEAT Partners	Maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers (sections 20-22), Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals (Schedule 3), Restricted Animal Matter statements (sections 35-41)
Saleyards Australia	Special designated animal identification and tracing system (sections 96-114)
Scenic Rim Regional Council	Invasive animal boards (section 43)
Seqwater	Category 3 restricted matter - recognised biological control agent (Schedule 4)
Sunwater	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Southern Downs Regional Council	Invasive animal boards (section 43) Barrier fence (section 44)
Stock Feed Manufacturers Council of Australia	Maximum acceptable level of contaminants in carriers (sections 20-22), Restricted Animal Matter statements (sections 35-41), Code of Practice for Feed for Food Producing Animals (Schedule 3)
Australian Sugar Manufacturers	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)

Stakeholder group name	Relevant parts of Regulation
Sugar Research Australia	Sugar cane pest biosecurity zone (sections 93-94)
Summerfruit Australia	Statewide entry restrictions (sections 48-57B)
Tablelands Regional Council	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
The Livestock and Rural Transporters Association of Queensland	Special designated animal identification and tracing system (sections 96-114)
Toowoomba Regional Council	Invasive animal boards (section 43) Barrier fence (section 44)
Torres Cape Indigenous Council Alliance	Far Northern Pest biosecurity zone (sections 62-65), Far northern pests list (Schedule 8)
UQ	Diagnostic testing (Sections 23-29)
VetNostics	Diagnostic testing (Sections 23-29)
Vinehealth Australia	Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone (sections 88-89)
Waste Management and Resource Recovery Association Australia	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Wet Tropics Management Authority	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)
Western Downs Regional Council	Invasive animal boards (section 43) Barrier fence (section 44)
Wine Australia	Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone (sections 88-89), Grape phylloxera carriers (schedule 9)
Yarrabah Aboriginal Shire Council	Electric ant biosecurity zone (sections 74-77)

Attachment 2 – Participation, compliance costs and impact case studies for current Biosecurity Regulation

*NR – Not Reported - Not calculable as not reportable to DPI. These provisions are self-managed opportunities tied to individual choice. Individuals are not required to report the use of these provisions to DPI. These opportunities do not represent obligations and so have no direct compliance costs.

*NC – Not Calculable – The information required to calculate this is unavailable or cannot be determined due to the lack of sufficient data.

*N/A - Not applicable

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
2, part 1	Administrative referencing to schedules of prohibited matter and restricted matter.	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC
2	Prescribes a compulsory code of practice about the labelling of fertilisers, the levels of contaminants in fertilisers and required warning statements on fertilisers (s6-7 + Schedule 2)	344 businesses	$2.53 billion (Australia)	Cost calc Australia Fertilizer Market Size, Report & Trends | 2035	$17,828,293	$52,520,864	There have been cases where the quality of imported fertiliser has not matched the certificate of analysis provided by the supplier. In one case, cadmium levels far exceeded the maximum permissible concentration. In another, the 'fertiliser' appeared to be simply soil. Fertilizer Australia launches labelling awareness campaign | Apple and Pear Australia Limited (APAL)

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
2	Prescribes a compulsory code of practice for labelling of feed for food producing animals (s8-9 + Schedule 3)	432 businesses, 290 people	4.6 billion (Australia)	Cost calc; INDUSTRY | ALFA	$16,618,577	$45,250,641	Correct labelling of animal feed reduces the chances that livestock will accidentally be given unsuitable feed. If unsuitable feed is given to an animal, it can potentially lead to (1) the introduction or spread of serious diseases, such as mad cow disease in cattle and scrapie in sheep (transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, TSEs) and/or (2) chemical residues in meat, milk or eggs produced from animals. Stockfeed labelling in Western Australia
2	Prescribes a code of practice for managing Panama disease tropical race 4 (s9A-9B)	7 businesses	$563 million (Queensland)	Cost calc; 2022-23 GVAP	$786,492	$1,185,495	In a 2016 study, it was predicted that Panama disease race 4, a banana pest, was to spread over time in the Australian banana industry, it would cause industry losses exceeding $138 million per year. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF03356557
2	Approved ways of disposing of and distributing, and purposes of disposing restricted matter category 3	NR					

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
	(otherwise must not distribute or dispose of) (s10-11E)						
2	Approved purposes for distributing category 3 restricted matter (s12-16A + Schedule 4)	NR					
2	Approved ways of distributing category 3 restricted matter infested grain (s17)	NR					
2	Approved ways of disposing of category 7 (some types of fish) (s18)	NR					
2	Establishes notification requirement (phone call/web form) when a honey bee colony is showing prescribed symptoms (s19(1)-(2))	5022 people, 271 businesses	$184.3 million (Australia)	Cost calc; Honey Bee & Pollination	$3,001,425	$22,556,406	For example, Australia-wide establishment of varroa mite could result in estimated losses of over $70 million per year. https://www.agriculture.gov.au/about/news/stay-informed/communiques/varroa-destructor-27-june-2023
2	Establishes notification requirement where presence of tick fever in a cattle tick carrier within the cattle tick free zone is found (s19(3)-(4))	9098 cattle businesses within zone, 12,338 in all of QLD. There have been 549 notifications	$6.5 billion (Queensland)	2021 census; 2022-23 GVAP	Negligible – making a phone call		A 2022 report entitled "Cost of Endemic Diseases Update 2022" stated that the annual cost of cattle tick in northern Australia is estimated to be $128.2 million, including treatment costs, prevention costs and production

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
		in the cattle tick free zone since the Biosecurity Act 2014 came into effect, though only 212 properties remain regulated.					losses, and NSW's Department of Primary Industries states that a cattle tick outbreak could cost the NSW cattle industry up to $30 million annually. https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1640120/Cattle-Tick-Owner-Treatment-Scheme-Manual.pdf
2	Details the permissible levels of contaminants in carriers named in specific parts of the national Food Standards Code Australia and NZ (s20-22)	67,100 businesses	$17.6 billion (Queensland agriculture)	Cost calc; 2022-23 GVAP	NC		Contaminants in feed for livestock need to be managed to protect livestock health, and to minimise residues in livestock products that might affect the health of human consumers or impair marketing and international trade A review of potential contaminants in Australian livestock feeds and proposed guidance levels for feed
2	Requires CE approval of exotic disease diagnostic test kits or methods and their use (s23-29)	3 laboratories	NC	Cost calc	$16,250	$48,826	For example, a false positive for Panama disease tropical race 4 resulted in the unnecessary quarantine of a banana farm in 2015. Now to save banana grower's skin | news.com.au — Australia's

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
							leading news site for latest headlines
2	Regulates distances between apiaries to prevent the spread of biosecurity risks (s30-31)	550 RBEs	$184.3 million (Australia)	RBE; Honey Bee & Pollination	Proposed expiry of this rule		
2	Prohibits keeping or moving live Asian honey bees (Apis cerana) without a biosecurity authorisation, to prevent the spread of this invasive species and associated biosecurity risks (s32)	2 businesses	$184.3 million (Australia)	Cost calc; Honey Bee & Pollination	$2,208	$8,202	"Asian honey bees are likely to impact on commercial beekeepers and farmers who rely on the pollination services of managed honey bees. By competing for f loral resources, robbing managed hives and transmitting disease, Asian honey bees could have detrimental impacts on European honey bees, which themselves are an invasive species that harm the natural environment." Case-Study-Asian-honey-Bee.pdf
2	Prescribes the minimum labelling standards for animal feed regarding restricted animal material contents (s35-41)	Obligations are negligible (i.e. adding a line to a preexisting label)					
3	Sets a formula for the maximum amount a local government may be required to pay for Departmental management of invasive	No cost – administrative provision					

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
	animals and invasive plants in the LGs area (s42)						
4	Prescribes the number of directors, species, responsibilities and operational area of the Darling Downs–Moreton Rabbit Board (s43)	No cost – administrative provision					
4	Prescribes local government building authority responsibility for parts of the wild dog check fence (s44)	No cost – administrative provision					
5	Ensures biosecurity matter or a carrier is dealt with in accordance with risk minimisation requirement, and makes reference to the Biosecurity Manual (s46)	No cost – administrative provision					
5	Sets conditions on moving samples of carriers for testing including packaging requirements (s46A-47)	12 businesses	NC	Cost calc	$23,309	$23,309	Clear and specific rules for securely packaging biosecurity risk material are crucial to ensure consistent handling, prevent contamination or leakage, and minimise the risk of spreading pests or diseases. ADG Code 7.7_0_0.pdf
5	Statewide entry restrictions for banana pest carriers (s48)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
5	Statewide entry restrictions for branched broomrape carriers (s50)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					
5	Statewide entry restrictions for cucurbit virus carriers (s51)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					
5	Statewide entry restrictions for European house borer carriers (s52)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					
5	Statewide entry restrictions for giant pine scale carriers (s53)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					
5	Statewide entry restrictions for mango malformation disease carrier (s54)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					
5	Statewide entry restrictions for mediterranean fruit fly carrier (s55+ Schedule 6)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					
5	Statewide entry restrictions for Pyriform scale carrier (s56 + Schedule 7)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					
5	Statewide entry restrictions for potato pest carriers (s57)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					
5	Statewide entry restrictions for tomato/potato psyllid carrier (s57A)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					
5	Statewide entry restrictions for citrus canker carrier (s57B + Schedule 7A)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
5	Statewide pest management requirements for eradicating cattle tick from infested land (s61)	9098 cattle businesses within zone, 12,338 in all of QLD, 79,166 RBEs in all of QLD	$6.5 billion (Queensland)	2021 census; 2022-23 GVAP	$133.04-$167.78 per head to eradicate	NR	A 2022 report entitled "Cost of Endemic Diseases Update 2022" stated that the annual cost of cattle tick in northern Australia is estimated to be $128.2 million, including treatment costs, prevention costs and production losses, and NSW's Department of Primary Industries states that a cattle tick outbreak could cost the NSW cattle industry up to $30 million annually. https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1640120/Cattle-Tick-Owner-Treatment-Scheme-Manual.pdf A 2015 MLA research paper estimates the annual on-farm costs of cattle tick (production losses and control costs) costs the Australian cattle industry approximately $146m. Ticks | Meat & Livestock Australia
5	Far northern pest biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s62-65 + Schedule 8)	11 businesses in zones, (10 fruit and nut, 1 sugarcane)	$2.4 billion (Queensland sugarc	2021 census; 2022-23 GVAP	NC (unknown frequency)		For example, Australia-wide establishment of varroa mite, a far northern pest, could result in estimated losses of over $70 million per year.

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
			ane, banana, citrus, melon and mango)				https://www.agriculture.gov.au/about/news/stay-informed/communiques/varroa-destructor-27-june-2023 For example, Australia-wide establishment of Black Sigatoka, a far northern pest, could result in estimated losses of $60 million annually. The eradication of Black Sigatoka from the Tully area in 2001-2005 cost $17 million. Black Sigatoka | Business Queensland
5	Fire ant biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s66-73)	NC	$17.6 billion (Queensland agriculture)	2022-23 GVAP	$1,595,685	$11,991,813	Australia Institute research shows that that fire ants will cost Australia more than $22 billion by the 2040s if allowed to spread. https://australiainstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/The-Australia-Institute-Fire-Ants-Report.pdf
5	Electric ant biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s74-77)	18 businesses impacted by zone	$17.6 billion (Queensland	Cost calc; 2022-23 GVAP	$10,962	$82,382	"The cost of not eradicating an electric ant infestation was valued by Queensland's Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries (Antony 2006), now the

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
			agriculture)				Department of Primary Industries, in the early stages of the NEAEP. It is estimated that after 30 years of infestation, 350 000 houses will be infested and the annual cost to residents of treating their properties would amount to almost $14 million." https://www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/6527e31b-3a1c-4085-ac3a-dde234392ead/prevention-control-program-electric-ants-2025.pdf?ETag=0a2ea73204443274753a4d8339113b78
5	Banana pest biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s78-80)	4 businesses currently impacted	$624 million (Queensland)	Cost calc; 2024-25 GVAP	$246	$1,849	A 2013 study indicated that the annual losses to the Australian banana industry if Black Sigatoka, a banana pest, were to spread and become established would be $60 million annually under a quarantine situation. Without quarantine, this could escalate to over $180 million annually.

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
							https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261219413000987
5	Cattle tick biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s81-87)	9098 cattle businesses within zone, 12,338 in all of QLD, 79,166 RBEs in all of QLD	$6.5 billion (Queensland)	2021 census and RBE data; 2022-23 GVAP	$8.50-$52/head for direct compliance costs, notifications up to $1776.50 total for state if all infested properties detect cattle tick		A 2022 report entitled "Cost of Endemic Diseases Update 2022" stated that the annual cost of cattle tick in northern Australia is estimated to be $128.2 million, including treatment costs, prevention costs and production losses, and NSW's Department of Primary Industries states that a cattle tick outbreak could cost the NSW cattle industry up to $30 million annually. https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1640120/Cattle-Tick-Owner-Treatment-Scheme-Manual.pdf
5	Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s88-89 + Schedule 9)	392 businesses	$39 million (Quee	Cost calc; 2022-23 GVAP	$13,503	$101,480	A report on the potential impact of grape phylloxera upon the Western Australian wine sector stated that "if strict quarantine

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
			nsland)				measures to limit spread are not implemented, a phylloxera incursion could affect 60%–70% of vines and cause cumulative losses of AUD150–290 million over a 50-year period. This is equivalent to a 3%–6% annual contraction of winegrape production." https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1155/ajgw/4815715?msockid=3f03027a11926047379d148010916184
5	Papaya ringspot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s90-92)	496 businesses	$1.9 billion (Queensland, fruit and nut)	Cost calc; 2022-23 GVAP	$14,013	$105,312	In 1992, papaya ringspot virus was detected in Hawaii. By 1998, Hawaii's papaya harvest had reduced by 50% and yeilds per acre reduced by 35%. https://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2004/Oct/17/op/op08p.html
5	Sugar cane pest biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s93-94)	3678 businesses	$1.5 billion (Queensland)	Cost calc; 2022-23 GVAP	$104,735	$787,106	In the 1970s, fiji leaf gall virus was present in Queensland, resulting in 5-7% yield losses which equated to over 11,000 tonnes of lost crop in 1979. In addition, striate mosaic disease can result in a 75% reduction in yield, and mosaic

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
							disease has been estimated to reduce yield by 25-51%. https://elibrary.sugarresearch.com.au/server/api/core/bitstreams/6a2199b1-7f30-4dab-a24f-1c4e7eee4f55/content
5	White spot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s94A-94E)	5 businesses	$218.32million (Queensland)	Cost calc; 2024-25 GVAP	$17,982	$76,562	The 2016-17 outbreak of white spot disease in prawn farms in the Logan River, Queensland was estimated to have led to production losses of $43 million. The Australian Government provided funding of up to $21.9 million for control measures in the two years following the outbreak, while the Queensland Government provided $17 million for control measures in 2016-17 and committed up to $9 million over the following two years. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/9058462/upload_binary/9058462.pdf
5	Polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s94EF-94EI)	Obligations are on businesses from other jurisdictions					

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
5	Biosecurity management plan regulatory provisions (s94F-94H)	90,474 RBEs	$10.28 billion (Queensland, livestock)	RBE stats; 2024-25 GVAP	Opportunity not cost		Persons entering an RBE must comply with the measures stated in the plan, working against activist invasions like that seen in 2018 when over 100 activists entered a pig farm. Pig Farm Siege "Bordered on Terrorism" | by ANIMAL ACTIVIST WATCH | Medium
6	Hive branding/labelling requirements (s95)	680 businesses, 10796 people	$184.3 million (Australia)	Cost calc; Honey Bee & Pollination	$409,234	$3,075,489	"Clearly identifiable hives enable beekeepers to be contacted, and hives traced, if varroa mite or other exotic bee pests or diseases are detected" FAQs - Beehive marking in Western Australia | Beehive marking in Western Australia | Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development
6	Approved devices and movement records (s96-97)	90,474 RBEs	$10.28 billion (Queensland livestock	RBE stats; 2024-25	No additional cost from Regulation - National requirement under NLIS		N/A - National traceability
6	National Livestock Identification System including movement record	90,474 RBEs	$10.28 billion (Quee	RBE stats, 2024-25 GVAP	No additional cost from Regulation - National requirement under NLIS		"Traceability of animals is necessary to establish these disease-free zones and facilitate

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
	requirements, slaughter date, yard PICs, microchip details etc (s98-114)		nsland, livestock)				reestablishment of foreign and domestic market access with minimum delay in the wake of an animal disease event" APHIS Bolsters Animal Disease Traceability in the US | APHIS
7	Prohibited and restricted matter permit types, plan requirements, and conditions (s115-120)	Approx 385 permits applied for in the last decade	NC	Cost calc	$36,825	$276,752	Administrative
8	Prescribes exceptions to material considered to be prohibited feed for pigs and poultry (s121)	539 businesses	$1.1 billion (Queensland pigs and poultry)	2021 census; 2022-23 GVAP	Opportunity not cost		N/A (opportunity not risk management)
8	Prescribes exceptions to material considered to be restricted animal material (s122)	432 businesses, 290 people	4.6 billion (Australia)	INDUSTRY | ALFA	Opportunity not cost		N/A (opportunity not risk management)
8	Allows for the appointment of nominated external classes of persons as inspectors/authorised persons under the Biosecurity Act (s123-125)	1 business	Administrative	Cost calc	$20,402	$42,556	Administrative

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Number of Businesses/ People in QLD	Value of sector	Citation	Direct compliance cost (1st year)	Direct compliance cost (next 10 years)	Importance/case study
8	Prescribes required details of compliance agreement applications (s126)	No cost – administrative provision					
9	Sets up the schedule for regulated biosecurity fees and allowable fee waivers (s127-128 + Schedule 10)	No cost – administrative provision					
10	Repeal of transitional provisions for Plant Protection Act 1989 and pest quarantine areas and controlled matter under the Stock Act 1915 (s130)	No cost – administrative provision					
10	Polyphagous shot hole borer Movement Control Order (MCO) revocation (s131)	No cost – administrative provision					

Attachment 3: Amendments to the Biosecurity Regulation since introduction

Name	Publication date	Topics amended	Link to leg. history – explanatory notes and human rights
		•	
Biosecurity (Prohibited and Restricted Matter) Amendment Regulation 2026	17 April 2026	• Gives effect to the *Agriculture and Fisheries and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024* (AFOLA Act) by moving the prohibited and restricted matter lists to the Biosecurity Regulation.	Biosecurity (Prohibited and Restricted Matter) Amendment Regulation 2026 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government
Biosecurity (Tomato/Potato Psyllid Carrier) Amendment Regulation 2026	3 April 2026	• aligns Queensland's biosecurity regulations relating to tomato/potato psyllid carriers with nationally agreed standards	Biosecurity (Tomato/Potato Psyllid Carrier) Amendment Regulation 2026 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government
Biosecurity (Varroa Mite) Amendment Regulation (No. 2) 2025	5 December 2025	• *Varroa destructor* reclassified as restricted matter category 2, requiring notification and control measures • Varroa mite biosecurity zone provisions removed to reduce regulatory burdens • Shift from eradication to management approach in alignment with national strategies	Biosecurity (Varroa Mite) Amendment Regulation (No. 2) 2025 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government
Biosecurity (Varroa Mite) Amendment Regulation 2025	27 June 2025	• Replacement of emergency prohibited matter declaration - formally declaring that *Varroa destructor* is no longer prohibited matter for the purpose of the Act	Biosecurity (Varroa Mite) Amendment Regulation 2025 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government
Biosecurity (Updating of Code of Practice and	30 September 2024	• Electric ant biosecurity zone extension.	Biosecurity (Updating of Code of Practice and Biosecurity Zone Map) Amendment Regulation 2024 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government

Name	Publication date	Topics amended	Link to leg. history – explanatory notes and human rights
Biosecurity Zone Map) Amendment Regulation 2024		• Updating the CoP for Panama TR4 on infested property to reduce destruction zone	
Biosecurity (Polyphagous Shot-hole Borer) Amendment Regulation 2023 (HRC included)	25 August 2023	• Establish a biosecurity zone to deal with risks posed by polyphagous shot-hole borer (*Euwallacea fornicatus* or PSHB) • Ensure the biosecurity zone deals with matters in a way that minimises the risk of incursion from PSHB, by preserving risk prevention and management procedures in the current movement control order (MCO).	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2023-0118/lh#creationhistory
Biosecurity (Panama Disease Tropical Race 4) Amendment Regulation 2023	23 June 2023	• Removing notice provisions in Reg for Panama TR4 • Adding Code of Practice to replace the need for individual property notices	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2023-0066/lh#creationhistory
Biosecurity (Varroa Mite and Other Matters) Amendment Regulation 2023	3 February 2023	• Intro of permanent zone for *V. destructor* • Bee louse (Braula fly) entry into Qld - deregulation	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2023-0003/lh#creationhistory
Rural and Regional Adjustment and Other Legislation (Brisbane River Tourism Berthing Assistance Scheme and Other Matters) Amendment Regulation 2022	7 October 2022	• Update - replace reference to the 'Major and Organised Crime Squad (Rural)' with the 'Rural and Stock Crime Squad'.	Rural and Regional Adjustment and Other Legislation (Brisbane River Tourism Berthing Assistance Scheme and Other Matters) Amendment Regulation 2022 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government
Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fee Unit Conversion) Amendment Regulation 2022	6 May 2022	• convert the expression of regulatory fees and charges from a dollar amount to a fee unit amount.	Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fee Unit Conversion) Amendment Regulation 2022 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government

Name	Publication date	Topics amended	Link to leg. history – explanatory notes and human rights
Biosecurity and Other Legislation Amendment Regulation 2021	3 December 2021	• prohibited feed for pigs and poultry • allowing for heat treated product • introduction of Penalty Infringement Notices (on the spot fines)	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2021-0174/lh#creationhistory
Medicines and Poisons (Poisons and Prohibited Substances) Regulation 2021	17 September 2021	• Replacement of legislation allowing appropriately trained biosecurity officers to possess and use particular baits and restricted S7 substances.	
Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fees) Amendment Regulation 2021	30 June 2021	• Annual indexation of fees and charges	Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fees) Amendment Regulation 2021 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government
Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fees) Amendment Regulation 2020	14 August 2020	• Annual indexation of fees and charges	Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fees) Amendment Regulation 2020 - Queensland Legislation - Queensland Government
Biosecurity (Siam Weed and Other Matters) Amendment Regulation 2020 (HRC included)	19 June 2020	• update the technical reference in the definition of 'Maximum Residue Limits standard' to refer to the current Federal instrument; and • enable the distribution of Chromolaena Gall fly (Gall fly) as a biological control for Siam weed (*Chromolaena odorata*), including the distribution of Gall fly infected Siam weed, without the need for a Restricted Matter Permit.	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2020-0095/lh#creationhistory
Biosecurity (Fire Ant Controls) Amendment Regulation 2020	1 May 2020	• Allow for risk mitigation measures previously allowed for in BIPs, to reduce reg burden • Renumbering zones for clarity • Redefining carriers	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2020-0060/lh#creationhistory
Agriculture and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2020	22 August 2019	• Update to ways of disposing of category 3 restricted matter	

Name	Publication date	Topics amended	Link to leg. history – explanatory notes and human rights
		• Introduce requirement to comply with a biosecurity management plan and increase in penalty • allow chief executive to approve amendment of a biosecurity zone map in order to be more responsive to changes in biosecurity risk	
Biosecurity and Other Legislation Amendment Regulation 2019	26 April 2019	• address the *biosecurity risks* associated with unauthorised entry into places where animals are kept, including by animal activists. • provide for enforcement action to be taken in swift response to these risks. • biosecurity management plans	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2019-0056/lh#creationhistory
Biosecurity (Fees for Registered Biosecurity Entities) Amendment Regulation 2019	29 March 2019	• provide financial relief to currently registered biosecurity entities in the identified local government areas by exempting them from paying the next registered biosecurity entity renewal fee.	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2019-0037/lh#creationhistory
Biosecurity (Citrus Canker) Amendment Regulation 2019	15 March 2019	• Prohibition on the entry of citrus canker carriers into Qld (prohib matter)	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2019-0025/lh#creationhistory
Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fees) Amendment Regulation 2018	29 June 2018	• Annual indexation of fees and charges	Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fees) Amendment Regulation 2018
Biosecurity and Other Legislation Amendment Regulation 2018	15 June 2018	• Electric ant zone: Establishing lesser restriction areas within broader electric ant zone map. • Zone map versioning: Adding version info to maps (name and date of publication)	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2018-0077/lh#creationhistory

Name	Publication date	Topics amended	Link to leg. history – explanatory notes and human rights
		• Restricted matter permits: noxious fish recreational use permit 'grandfathered permits for old GFPs (alligator gar) • White spot fishing restrictions: relaxation of fishing restrictions in the areas surrounding prawn farms Prohibitions on line fishing will continue.	
Biosecurity (Tomato/Potato Psyllid) Amendment Regulation 2018	2 February 2018	• Prohibit TPP carriers from entering the State from a state where TPP has been found, unless certain conditions are met.	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2018-0004/lh#creationhistory
Biosecurity (Melon Necrotic Spot Virus and Other Matters) Amendment Regulation 2017	27 October 2017	• Bee feed: removing the requirement that the feed intended to be fed to bees must have restricted animal material labelling. • allow the movement of diagnostic samples of some pest carriers into or out of the State, or into or from a biosecurity zone without a biosecurity certificate on the conditions that the samples are sent to an approved facility or an interstate laboratory and they are quarantine secured. • Branched broomrape: allow low risk movements of potatoes into Queensland from an infested state. • MNSV: Add to prohib matter lost and restrict movement of carriers into the State.	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2017-0218/lh#creationhistory

Name	Publication date	Topics amended	Link to leg. history – explanatory notes and human rights
		• CGMMV: invoking the reporting obligations relating to category 1 restricted matter under section 42 of the Act • Panama TR4: inclusion of information notice with disease notice, to allow for review of decision. • Panama TR4 – removal of requirements for movement of carriers from Biosec Manual – to allow risk based flexibility. • Panama TR4 - omit section 60 to allow more flexibility to support innovative and risk appropriate approaches to the movement of risk items from Panama disease tropical race 4 affected land; • Sugar cane pests: removal of biosec certificate for ow risk dried sugar cane trash and sugar cane plantlet clean planting scheme. • Contaminant MRL alignment for DDT. • Police stock squad rename.	
Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fees) Amendment Regulation 2017	30 June 2017	• Annual indexation of fees and charges	Agriculture and Fisheries Legislation (Fees) Amendment Regulation 2017
Biosecurity (White Spot Syndrome Virus) Amendment Regulation 2017	16 June 2017	• Establishing white spot syndrome virus zone	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2017-0090/lh#creationhistory

Name	Publication date	Topics amended	Link to leg. history – explanatory notes and human rights
Biosecurity and Other Legislation Amendment Regulation (No. 1) 2016	12 August 2016	• CGMMV - excluding harvesting bins as a carrier • Giant Pine Scale Carrier – add soil or appliance into definition of carrier. • Sugar cane pest carrier – allow movement from zone to another state • S7 poisons : remove 'holders of a license to sell S7 poisons, other than for human therapeutic use, granted under section 233 of the Health (Drugs and Poisons) Regulation 1996' as a class of persons that the CE may appoint as an inspector. • Invasive cat 3 matter – allow distribution if another law allows it.	https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/sl-2016-0132/lh#creationhistory

Attachment 4 – Interjurisdictional comparison of Biosecurity Regulation 2016

Y: Indicates that this jurisdiction aligns with Queensland's regulation

N: Indicates that this jurisdiction does not align with Queensland's regulation

N/A: Indicates that the regulation in Queensland is not relevant or required in this jurisdiction (for example, where a certain pest or industry is not present in that jurisdiction)

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Similar to Qld (Yes/No/Not applicable)					
		NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA	NT
2	Removes bee louse from the prohibited matter schedule (s4)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2	Removes *Varroa destructor* from the prohibited matter schedule (s4)	N	Y	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2	Prescribes a compulsory code of practice about the labelling of fertilisers, the levels of contaminants in fertilisers and required warning statements on fertilisers (s6-7 + Schedule 2)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2	Prescribes a compulsory code of practice for labelling of feed for food producing animals (s8-9 + Schedule 3)[1]	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2	Prescribes a code of practice for managing Panama disease tropical race 4 (s9A-9B)	Y	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y	N
2	Approved ways of disposing of and distributing, and purposes of disposing restricted matter category 3 (otherwise must not distribute or dispose of) (s10-11E)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2	Approved purposes for distributing category 3 restricted matter (s12-16A + Schedule 4)[2]	N	N	N	N	N	N
2	Approved ways of distributing category 3 restricted matter infested grain (s17)[3]	N	N	N	N	N	N

[1] National code (Australian Feed Standard for Food Producing Animals) currently under development

[2] other jurisdictions require permits or exemptions for distribution where Queensland lists approved purposes

[3] other jurisdictions have permits for trading or dealing with infested grain but no prescribed exceptions for the distribution or disposal of infested grain

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Similar to Qld (Yes/No/Not applicable)					
		NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA	NT
2	Approved ways of disposing of category 7 (some types of fish) (s18)	N	N	N	N	N	N
2	Establishes notification requirement (phone call/web form) when a honey bee colony is showing prescribed symptoms (s19(1)-(2))	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
2	Establishes notification requirement where presence of tick fever in a cattle tick carrier within the cattle tick free zone is found (s19(3)-(4))	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2	Details the permissible levels of contaminants in carriers named in specific parts of the national Food Standards Code Australia and NZ (s20-22)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2	Requires CE approval of exotic disease diagnostic test kits or methods and their use (s23-29)	Y	Y	N	Regulation Pending	Y	Y
2	Regulates distances between apiaries to prevent the spread of biosecurity risks (s30-31)	N	N	N	N	N	N
2	Prohibits keeping or moving live Asian honey bees (*Apis cerana*) without a biosecurity authorisation, to prevent the spread of this invasive species and associated biosecurity risks (s32)	Y	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y
2	Prescribes the minimum labelling standards for animal feed regarding restricted animal material contents (s35-41)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
3	Sets a formula for the maximum amount a local government may be required to pay for Departmental management of invasive animals and invasive plants in the LGs area (s42)[4]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N/A	N/A
4	Prescribes the number of directors, species, responsibilities and operational area of the Darling Downs–Moreton Rabbit Board (s43)[5]	N	N	N	N	N	N
4	Prescribes local government building authority responsibility for parts of the wild dog check fence (s44)[6]	N	N	N	N	N	N

[4] N/A indicates that local governments do not contribute funds, N indicates that local governments do contribute but there is no stipulated cap

[5] While other states and territories have boards or groups that address pest and invasive species management, none have a comparable system of invasive animal boards with specific responsibilities for maintaining barrier fences and managing invasive animals

[6] fences are typically constructed and maintained by private landholders, with no equivalent government-managed barrier fence system

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Similar to Qld (Yes/No/Not applicable)					
		NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA	NT
5	Ensures biosecurity matter or a carrier is dealt with in accordance with risk minimisation requirement, and makes reference to the Biosecurity Manual (s46)	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N
5	Sets conditions on moving samples of carriers for testing including packaging requirements (s46A-47)[7]	N	N	N	N	N	N
5	Statewide entry restrictions for banana pest carriers (s48)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
5	Statewide entry restrictions for branched broomrape carriers (s50)	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
5	Statewide entry restrictions for cucurbit virus carriers (s51)[8]	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
5	Statewide entry restrictions for European house borer carriers (s52)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	Statewide entry restrictions for giant pine scale carriers (s53)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	Statewide entry restrictions for mango malformation disease carrier (s54)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y	Y
5	Statewide entry restrictions for mediterranean fruit fly carrier (s55+ Schedule 6)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	Statewide entry restrictions for Pyriform scale carrier (s56 + Schedule 7)	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
5	Statewide entry restrictions for potato pest carriers (s57)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	Statewide entry restrictions for tomato/potato psyllid carrier (s57A)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	Statewide entry restrictions for citrus canker carrier (s57B + Schedule 7A)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5	Statewide pest management requirements for eradicating cattle tick from infested land (s61)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	Far northern pest biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s62-65 + Schedule 8)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5	Fire ant biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s66-73)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

[7] other jurisdictions do not provide details on moving biosecurity matter for testing
[8] some states control for CGMMV and not MNSV

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Similar to Qld (Yes/No/Not applicable)					
		NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA	NT
5	Electric ant biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s74-77)[9]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5	Banana pest biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s78-80)[10]	Y	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y	Y
5	Cattle tick biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s81-87)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	Grape phylloxera biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s88-89 + Schedule 9)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	Sugar cane pest biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s93-94)	N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5	Papaya ringspot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s90-92)	N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	Y
5	White spot biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s94A-94E)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5	Polyphagous shot-hole borer biosecurity zone regulatory provisions (s94EF-94EI	Y	Y	N/A	Y	Y	Y
5	Biosecurity management plan regulatory provisions (s94F-94H)	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
6	Hive branding/labelling requirements (s95)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6	Movement records for goats (s96-97)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6	National Livestock Identification System including movement record requirements, slaughter date, yard PICs, microchip details etc (s98-114)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
7	Prohibited and restricted matter permit types, plan requirements, and conditions (s115-120)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
8	Prescribes exceptions to material considered to be prohibited feed for pigs (s121)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
8	Prescribes exceptions to material considered to be prohibited feed for poultry (s121)[11]	N	N	N	N	N	N
8	Prescribes exceptions to material considered to be restricted animal material (s122)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

[9] No other jurisdictions have legislation referring directly to electric ants, not present in other jurisdictions: Electric ant (Wasmannia auropunctata) | Outbreak

[10] not all jurisdictions control for each banana pest

[11] QLD is precautionary due to potential contamination within feed production faculties with pig feed

Chapter	TOPIC (section of Regulation)	Similar to Qld (Yes/No/Not applicable)					
		NSW	VIC	TAS	SA	WA	NT
8	Allows for the appointment of nominated external classes of persons as inspectors/authorised persons under the Biosecurity Act (s123-125)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
8	Prescribes required details of compliance agreement applications (s126)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9	Sets up the schedule for regulated biosecurity fees and allowable fee waivers (s127-128 + Schedule 10)	Y	N	Y[12]	Regulation Pending	Y	N
10	Repeal of transitional provisions for Plant Protection Act 1989 and pest quarantine areas and controlled matter under the Stock Act 1915 (s130)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
10	Polyphagus shot hole borer Movement Control Order (MCO) revocation (s131)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

[12] Published in the Government gazette for that jurisdiction.

Attachment 5 – List of proposed amendments to approved biological control agents and associated distribution of category 3 restricted matter

Table A: Proposed removals

Category 3 restricted matter targeted for control Common Name (*Scientific Name*)	**Recognised Biological Control agent(s)**	**Reason for Removal**
giant sensitive plant (*Mimosa diplotricha*)	stem-spot fungus (*Corynespora cassiicola*)	This should not be a recognised biological control agent because *Corynespora cassiicola* is a highly diverse fungal pathogen that can infect more than 500 species of plants, including many economically important crops such as cotton, soybean, tomato, and cucumber (https://dpi.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/61DOAAF_INST/1jpo4jq/cdi_crossref_citationtrail_10_1094_PHP_05_18_0023_RV)
gorse (*Ulex europaeus*)	- gorse seed weevil (*Exapion ulicis syn. Apion ulicis*) - gorse soft shoot moth (*Agonopterix umbellana*) - gorse spider mite (*Tetranychus lintearius*) - gorse thrips (*Sericothrips staphylinus*)	Released before the *Biosecurity Act 2015* (Commonwealth), the importation of biological control agents was inconsistently regulated in the early 1900s. Over time, stricter regulations were introduced under the Quarantine Act 1908 (Commonwealth), with a rigorous risk analysis process implemented from 2009. This biocontrol agent was introduced to reduce the vigour, size, viability, and competitiveness of the target category 3 restricted matter. It has been approved for release in Queensland by the Department of Primary Industries (DPI) as it is documented as a recognised biocontrol agent in the World Weed Biocontrol Catalog[1].
prickly pear—tiger pear (*Opuntia aurantiaca*)	monacantha cochineal (*Dactylopius ceylonicus*)	This is recommend to be removed as a recognised biocontrol for this species due to low effectiveness and availability of other highly effective agents.
prickly pear—common (*Opuntia stricta*)	prickly pear spider mite (*Tetranychus opuntiae*)	This species is not considered the most effective agent and other biocontrol agents are better suited to be promoted as biocontrol agents. There is no major benefit in having this biocontrol agent as a recognised biological control for this purpose.
rubber vine (*Cryptostegia grandiflora*)	rubber vine pyralid moth (*Euclasta whalleyi*)	This is recommended to be removed as this biocontrol has been consolidated under the name *Euclasta whalleyi.*

[1] https://ibiocontrol.org/catalog/

Table B: Proposed additions

Rationale	Class of rationale
Recommended for release consistent with Australia's appropriate level of protection under *the Biosecurity Act 2015* (Commonwealth). This biocontrol agent has been introduced to reduce the vigour, size, viability and competitiveness of the target category 3 restricted matter. This species of biocontrol has been deemed to be suitable for release by DPI in Queensland as it is documented as a recognised biocontrol agent in the World Weed Biocontrol Catalog[2].	A
Released before the *Biosecurity Act 2015* (Commonwealth), the importation of biological control agents was inconsistently regulated in the early 1900s. Over time, stricter regulations were introduced under the *Quarantine Act 1908* (Commonwealth), with a rigorous risk analysis process implemented from 2009. This biocontrol agent was introduced to reduce the vigour, size, viability, and competitiveness of the target category 3 restricted matter. It is proposed to be approved for release in Queensland by the Department of Primary Industries (DPI) as it is a documented recognised biocontrol agent in the World Weed Biocontrol Catalog[3]	B

Category 3 restricted matter targeted for control **Common Name (*Scientific Name*)**	**Proposed additional recognised Biological Control Agent(s)**	**Class of rationale**
African boxthorn (*Lycium ferocissimum*)	rust (*Puccinia rapipes*)	A
belly-ache bush (*Jatropha gossypiifolia*)	Jatropha leaf miner (*Stomphastis thraustica*)	B
cabomba (*Cabomba caroliniana*)	cabomba weevil (*Hydrotimetes natans*)	A
coral cactus (*Cylindropuntia fulgida*)	cochineal (*Dactylopius tomentosus 'cholla' lineage*)	A
devil's rope pear (*Cylindropuntia imbricata*)	- tree pear beetle (*Lagocheirus funestus*) - prickly pear bug (*Chelinidea tabulata*)	B
harrisia cactus (*Harrisia martinii, H. tortuosa* and *H. regelii*)	prickly pear moth-borer (*Tucumania tapiacola*)	B
Hudson pear (*Cylindropuntia pallida and C. tunicata*)	cochineal (*Dactylopius tomentosus 'Californica var. parkeri'* lineage)	B

[2] https://ibiocontrol.org/catalog/

[3] https://ibiocontrol.org/catalog/

Category 3 restricted matter targeted for control **Common Name (*Scientific Name*)**	**Proposed additional recognised Biological Control Agent(s)**	**Class of rationale**
jumping cholla — (*Cylindropuntia prolifera*)	cochineal (*Dactylopius tomentosus* '*Californica var. parkeri'* lineage)	B
mikania vine (*Mikania micrantha*)	Mikania leaf rust (*Puccinia spegazzini*)	A
mimosa pigra (*Mimosa pigra*)	*Nesaecrepida infuscata*	B.
prickly pear—drooping tree pear (*Opuntia monacantha*)	tree pear beetle (*Lagocheirus funestus*)	B
sulphur cactus (*Opuntia sulphurea*)	-cactoblastis moth (*Cactoblastis cactorum* - tiger pear cochineal (*Dactylopius austrinus*)	B
prickly acacia (*Vachellia nilotica*)	Prickly acacia gall thrips (*Acaciothrips ebneri*)	A
sagittaria (*Sagittaria platyphylla*)	*Listronotus appendiculatus*	A
snake cactus (*C. spinosior*)	- cochineal (*Dactylopius tomentosus 'bigelovii'* lineage) - cochineal (*Dactylopius tomentosus 'spinosior safford'* lineage) - prickly pear bug (*Chelinidea tabulata*)	B

Attachment 6 – Proposed update to Mediterranean fruit fly carrier list.

Table A: Species proposed to be added to Schedule 6

Common Name	Scientific Name
barbados gooseberry	*Pereskia aculeata*
bitter melon	*Momordica charantia*
bottle melon / long melon	*Lagenaria siceraria*
capsicum and chilli	*Capsicum annuum*
Capsicum spp., not mentioned elsewhere in this schedule	*Capsicum* spp.
coffee berry, not mentioned elsewhere in this schedule	*Coffea* spp.
cowboy orange (joazeiro)	*Sarcomphalus joazeiro*
garden huckleberry	*Solanum scabrum*
garden strawberry	*Fragaria x ananassa*
golden kiwifruit	*Actinidia chinensis*
grape, not mentioned elsewhere in this schedule	*Vitis* spp.
guava, not mentioned elsewhere in this schedule	*Psidium* spp.
Irish strawberry	*Arbutus unedo*
jujube, not mentioned elsewhere in this schedule	*Ziziphus* spp.
kaffir plum	*Harpephyllum afrum*
miracle fruit	*Synsepalum dulcificum*
sandalwood	*Santalum freycinetianum*
star gooseberry	*Phyllanthus acidus*
turkey berry	*Solanum torvum*
white mulberry	*Morus alba*

Table B: Scientific name updates

Common Name	Scientific Name	Previous scientific name in Biosecurity Regulation 2016
acerola (barbados cherry)	*Malpighia glabra*	*Malpighia punicifolia* L. and *Malpighia glabra* L. and *M.glabra x M.punicifolia* L.
almond (with husk)	*Prunus amygdalus*	*Prunus amygdalus Batsch => Prunus dulcis*
apricot	*Prunus armeniaca*	*Prunus armeniaca* L.
babaco (ripe)	*Vasconcellea × pentagona*	*Carica pentagona*
blackberry	*Rubus fruticosus*	*Rubus fruticosus* L.
black walnut	*Juglans nigra*	*Juglans nigra* L.
blueberry	*Vaccinium corymbosum*	*Vaccinium corymbosum* L.

Common Name	Scientific Name	Previous scientific name in Biosecurity Regulation 2016
boxthorn	*Lycium europaeum*	*Lycium europaeum* L.
calamondin orange	*Citrus x microcarpa*	*Citrofortunella mitis*
cape gooseberry	*Physalis peruviana*	*Physalis peruviana* L.
capsicum	*Capsicum annuum* var. *annuum*	*Capsicum annuum* L. var. *grossum* L. *sendt*
carambola (star fruit)	*Averrhoa carambola*	*Averrhoa carambola* L.
cashew apple	*Anacardium occidentale*	*Anacardium occidentale* L.
cherry	*Prunus cerasus* (sour cherry)	*P. cerasus* L. (sour cherry)
	Prunus avium (sweet cherry)	*Prunus avium* L. (sweet cherry)
chilli	*Capsicum annuum* var. *annuum* (chillies)	*Capsicum annuum* v *acuminatum Fingerh*. (chillies)
	Capsicum chinense (cherry peppers)	*C. annuum* v *cerasiforme Irish* (cherry peppers)
	Capsicum frutescens (tabasco)	*C. annuum* v *conoides Irish* (tabasco)
choko	*Sicyos edulis*	*Sechium edule*
citron	*Citrus medica*	*Citrus medica* L.
coffee berry	*Coffea arabica* (arabian coffee)	*Coffea arabica*
	Coffea canephora (robusta coffee)	*C. canephora*
	Coffea liberica (liberian coffee, excelsa coffee)	*C. excelsa Chiov.*
		C. liberica Hiern.
		C. robusta Linden
date (fresh)	*Phoenix dactylifera*	*Phoenix dactylifera* L.
eggplant	*Solanum melongena*	*Solanum melongena* L.
feijoa	*Feijoa sellowiana*	*Acca sellowiana*
fig	*Ficus carica*	*Ficus carica* L.
granadilla	*Passiflora quadrangularis*	*Passiflora quadrangularis* L.
grape	*Vitis labrusca* (fox grape)	*Vitis labrusca* L. (Isabella grape)
	Vitis vinifera (wine grape)	*Vitis vinifera* L. (wine grape)
guava	*Psidium cattleyanum* (cherry or stawberry guava)	*P. littorale Raddi* syn *P. cattleianum Sabine* (strawberry guava)
	Psidium guajava	*Psidium guajava* L.
	Psidium guineense (brazilian guava)	*P. cattleianum Sabine* var.*guineense Sw.* (brazilian guava)
jaboticaba	*Plinia cauliflora*	*Myrciaria cauliflora*
jerusalem cherry	*Solanum pseudocapsicum*	*Solanum pseudocapsicum* L.
kei apple	*Dovyalis afra*	*Dovyalis caffra Warb.*
kiwifruit	*Actinidia chinensis* var. *deliciosa*	Actinidia deliciosa
kumquat	*Citrus japonica*	*Fortunella japonica *F. margarita*
lemon	*Citrus limon*	*Citrus limon x C. chinense*
lime	*Citrus aurantiifolia* (West Indian lime / Key lime)	*Citrus aurantiifolia* (West Indian lime)

Common Name	Scientific Name	Previous scientific name in Biosecurity Regulation 2016
	Citrus × *latifolia* (Tahitian lime)	*C. latifolia* (Tahitian lime)
		C. reticulata var. *Austera* (Rangpur lime)
longan	*Dimocarpus longan*	*Euphoria longan*
mango	*Mangifera indica*	*Mangifera indica* L.
mangosteen	*Garcinia mangostana*	*Garcinia mangostana* L.
medlar	*Crataegus germanica*	*Mespilus germanica*
mock orange	*Murraya paniculata*	*Murraya paniculata M. exotica*
mombin (vai apple, hog plum)	*Spondias mombin*	*Spondias aurantiaca* syn. *Spondias mombin* L.
mountain apple (malay apple)	Syzygium malaccense	Syzygium malaccensis, Eugenia
mulberry	*Morus nigra*	*Morus nigra* L.
orange	*Citrus* × *aurantium*	*Citrus aurantium* L.
papaya	*Carica papaya*	*Carica papaya* L.
passionfruit	*Passiflora edulis*	*Passiflora edulis f. edulis* (purple passionfruit) and *P. edulis f. flavicarpa* (yellow passionfruit)
pear	*Pyrus communis*	*Pyrus communis* L.
pepino	*Solanum muricatum*	*Solanum muricatum Aiton*
persimmon	*Diospyros kaki* (Japanese persimmon)	*Diospyros kaki* L.f. (Japanese persimmon)
	Diospyros decandra (persimmon)	*D. decandra Lour.* (persimmon)
	Prunus insititia (damson plum)	*Prunus insitita* L. (damson plum)
pomegranate	*Punica granatum*	*Punica granatum* L.
pond apple	*Annona glabra*	*Annona glabra* L.
rambutan	*Nephelium lappaceum*	*Nephelium lappaceum* L.
raspberry	*Rubus idaeus*	*Rubus idaeus* L.
rollinia	*Annona mucosa*	*Rollinia deliciosa*
santol	*Sandoricum koetjape*	*Sandoricum indicum*
sapodilla	*Manilkara zapota*	*Manilkara zapota* L.
smooth loofah	*Luffa aegyptiaca*	*Luffa cylindrical*
soursop	*Annona muricata*	*Annona muricata* L.
south american sapote	*Matisia cordata*	*Quararibea cordata*
spanish cherry	*Mimusops elengi*	*Mimusops elengi* L.
surinam cherry	*Eugenia uniflora*	*Eugenia uniflora* L.
sweetsop (sugar apple)	*Annona squamosa*	*Annona squamosa* L.
tomato	*Solanum lycopersicum*	*Lycopersicon esculentum* L.
tropical almond	*Terminalia catappa*	*Terminalia catappa* L.
walnut	*Juglans regia*	*Juglans regia* L.
wax apple (rose apple)	*Syzygium jambos*	*Syzgium jambos* L. syn. *Eugenia jambos* L.

Table C: Species to which there has been a scientific, common name and/or species grouping change

Common Name	Scientific Name	Change from Biosecurity Regulation 2016
atemoya	*Annona squamosa* × *Annona cherimola*	Previously listed as Cherimoya (*Annona cherimola*)
berries (Rubus hybrids)	*Rubus* hybrids	Previously listed as berries (other than strawberries) Additionally, Loganberry (*Rubus loganobaccus*) and Boysenberry (*Rubus ursinus x idaeus*) were listed separately
bullock's heart (custard apple)	*Annona reticulata*	Previously listed as custard apple (*Annona squamosa x A. Cherimolia)*
caimito (star apple)	*Chrysophyllum cainito*	Previously listed as camito (star cherry; *Chrysophyllum cainito* L.)
grapefruit, sweet orange & tangelo	*Citrus* × *aurantium f. aurantium*	Previously listed as grapefruit (*Citrus paradisi*)
java plum (black plum)	*Syzygium cumini*	Previously listed as black plum Additionally, Jambu (*Syzygium cumini* L. *Skeels*) was previously listed.
nectarine, peach, peacharine	*Prunus persica*	Previously listed separately as *Prunus persicae* var. *nectarina*, *Prunus nucipersica*
plantain	*Musa* × *paradisiaca*	Previously listed under banana species
pummelo (pomelo)	*Citrus maxima*	Previously listed as shaddock (*citrus maxima*) and pummelo (*Citrus grandis* L. *osbeck*)
tamarillo (tree tomato)	*Solanum betaceum*	Previously listed separately under tamarillo (*Cyphomandra betacea)* and tree tomato (*Cyphomandra betacea)*

Attachment 7 – Interjurisdictional comparison of equivalent biosecurity fees.

n/a – no equivalent service able to be identified (4 March 2026)

	QLD	NSW	VIC	SA	TAS	WA	NT
				$/yr			
1. Application for the registration of a registerable biosecurity entity (Act, s 148(1)(e))-							
(a) in relation to the keeping of designated animals other than bees, for each year applied for	**$52.94**	$144	$0	$52.50	$24.80	$27.52	$0
(b) in relation to the keeping of bees, for each year applied for	**$35.73**	$45 or $50 (Businesses) $27 or $30 (Recreational) $17 or $20 (Concession)	$15 (up to 50 hives) + 30c per hive (51 or more hives)	$52.50	$0	$27.52	$0
2. Renewal of registration of a registered biosecurity entity (Act, s 156(2)(a))—							
(a) in relation to the keeping of designated animals other than bees, for each year of registration	**$52.94**	$84	$0	$52.50	$12.73	$27.52	$0
(b) in relation to the keeping of bees, for each year of registration	**$35.73**	$45 or $50 (Businesses) $27 or $30 (Recreational) $17 or $20 (Concession)	$15 (up to 50 hives) 30c per hive (51 or more hives)	$52.50	$0	$27.52	$0

	QLD	NSW	VIC	SA	TAS	WA	NT
3.Application to end the following declarations (Act, s 164C(b))—							
(a) the declaration of a place as a restricted place;	$87.63	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
(b) the declaration of a designated animal as a restricted animal;	$87.63	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
(c) the declaration of designated biosecurity matter as restricted biosecurity matter	$87.63	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
4. Giving a copy of information held in the biosecurity register (Act, s 173(1))	$56.33	n/a	n/a	n/a	$0 (for Authorised Person – Livestock Register) $95.50 (for non-authorised person-Livestock Register) $95.50 (Register Entities Register)	$0	$0
5. Application for a prohibited matter permit or restricted matter permit (Act, s 214(2)(b)(ii))	$162.08	$144	$0 (Noxious Weeds Permit) $26.67 (Pest Animal – Special Collections)	$152 (Category 1 or 2 Animal) $42.33 (Category 1 or 2 Plant)	$0	$76.67 (keeping restricted birds)	$0

	QLD	NSW	VIC	SA	TAS	WA	NT
			$16.67 (Pest Animals – Private Collections) $16.67 (Pest Animals – Research/Education Collections) $100 (Pest Animals – Exhibition) $216.67 (Pest Animals – Zoo)	$42.33 (Category 3 Plant or Animal)			
6. Application for renewal of a prohibited matter permit or restricted matter permit (Act, s 225(2)(c))	$162.08	$0	$0 (Noxious Weeds Permit) $26.67 (Pest Animal – Special Collections) $16.67 (Pest Animals – Private Collections)	$152 (Category 1 or 2 Animal) $42.33 (Category 1 or 2 Plant) $42.33 (Category 3 Plant or Animal)	$0	$76.67 (keeping restricted birds)	$0

	QLD	NSW	VIC	SA	TAS	WA	NT
			$16.67 (Pest Animals – Research/Education Collections) $100 (Pest Animals – Exhibition) $216.67 (Pest Animals – Zoo)				
7. Application for the transfer of a prohibited matter permit or restricted matter permit (Act, s 230(1))	$87.63	$80 (per hour)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	Permits are non-transferable
8. Copy of all or part of the information held in the register of prohibited matter and restricted matter permits (Act, s 231(4))	$56.33	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
9. Inspection of a register of biosecurity orders kept by a chief executive officer of a local government, for each hour (Act, s 379(5))	$18.74 (per hour)	$0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
10. Copy of all or part of the information held in a register of biosecurity orders (Act, s 379(6))	$56.33	$0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
11. Application to enter into a compliance agreement with the State, for each year of the term of the agreement applied for (Act, s 396(3))	$160.84	$0	$0	n/a	$0	n/a	n/a
12. Giving of a biosecurity certificate by an authorised officer who is also an accredited certifier (Act, s 419) if—							
(a) the authorised officer does not visit a place for the purpose of giving the certificate; and (b) preparing the certificate takes no more than 15 minutes	$59.95 (per certificate)	$200 (per certificate)	For Business $51.54 (first 15min)	$41.00 (standard plant health	$0 (issuing fee) + $32.46 (per 15min	$44.18 (issue of export	$87 (per certificate)

	QLD	NSW	VIC	SA	TAS	WA	NT
			+ $51.54 (per additional 15min) For Individuals $17.77 (first 15min) + $51.54 (per additional 15min)	certificate) $129.00 (plant health import certificate)	for inspection)	certification)	
13. Application for the grant of an accreditation, for each year of the term of the accreditation applied for (Act, s 420(2)(b))	$367.49	$150	$0	$519.00	$0	$319.12	$464 (if application is made on or before date specified in scheme) $609 (if application is made after the date specified in scheme)
14. Application for the renewal of an accreditation, for each year of the term of the accreditation applied for (Act, s 432(2)(c))	$367.49	$32	$0	$204.00 (annual return) $307.00 (late	$0	$319.12	$464 (if application is made on or before date

	QLD	NSW	VIC	SA	TAS	WA	NT
				annual return)			specified in scheme) $609 (if application is made after the date specified in scheme)
15. Application for an approval as an auditor (Act, s 460(2)(b)), the total of the following fees—							
(a) the application fee	$181.88	$200	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
(b) the additional fee, for each year of the term of the approval applied for	$469.47	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
16. Application for the renewal of an approval as an auditor (Act, s 460(2)(b)), the total of the following fees—							
(a) the application fee	$181.88	$200	n/a		n/a	n/a	n/a
(b) the additional fee, for each year of the term of the approval applied for	$469.47	n/a	n/a	Act is awaiting proclamation	n/a	n/a	n/a
17. Application for the amendment of the conditions of a relevant authority (Act, s 479(2)(b))	$90.20	Case-by-case judgement + $80/per hour	n/a	Act is awaiting proclamation	$0	$76.67 (application fee) + $76.67 (inspection fee)	NT $0